Matter of Sokolski

Matter of Sokolski 2026 NY Slip Op 06014 October 15, 2026 Appellate Division, First Department Per Curiam Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. In the Matter of Robert Edward Sokolski, an attorney and counselor-at-law: Attorney Grievance Committee for the First Judicial Department, Petitioner, Robert Edward Sokolski (OCA Atty. Reg. No. 2835866), Respondent. Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Judicial Department Decided and Entered: October 15, 2026 Motion No. 2026-03275|Case No. 2025-02555| Present — Hon. Sallie Manzanet-Daniels, Justice Presiding, David Friedman Bahaati E. Pitt-Burke John R. Higgitt Llinét M. Rosado Jorge Dopico, Chief Attorney, Attorney Grievance Committee, New York (Louis J. Bara, of counsel), for petitioner. Respondent, pro se. Disciplinary proceedings instituted by the Attorney Grievance Committee for the First Judicial Department. Respondent, Robert Edward Sokolski, was admitted to the Bar of the State of New York at a Term of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court for the Second Judicial Department on September 17, 1997. Per Curiam [*1] Respondent Robert Edward Sokolski was admitted to practice law in the State of New York by the Second Judicial Department on September 17, 1997. Respondent maintained an office for the practice of law in the First Department at the commencement of this proceeding and has since modified his OCA registration to reflect an office located in the Tenth Judicial District. The Tenth District's Grievance Committee has consented to the First Department's continued prosecution of respondent's matter, pursuant to Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters (22 NYCRR) § 1240.7(a)(2). On May 21, 2025, respondent's law partner and spouse, with whom he co-owned a law practice, was convicted of grand larceny in the second degree, grand larceny in the third degree, scheme to defraud in the first degree, and criminal contempt in the second degree (see Matter of Zekaria, 246 AD3d 49, 50 [1st Dept 2025]). The conviction emanated from her representation of three clients, two of whose escrowed funds she diverted for her own purposes and one of whose retainer she kept and used without performing the agreed-upon legal work. The indictments leading to the conviction were premised on conduct occurring between 2021 and 2023. Shortly before the conviction the Attorney Grievance Committee (AGC) served respondent with a notice and petition of charges alleging two charges of professional misconduct stemming from his "failure to oversee the management of escrow funds entrusted to his Firm, allowing his partner to misappropriate client funds," in violation of rule 8.4(h) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.0), and "failure to maintain bookkeeping records," in violation of rule 1.15(d). By unpublished order dated January 23, 2026, this Court appointed a Referee to conduct a hearing as to liability and sanction, make findings of fact and conclusions of law, and to recommend such sanction as may be appropriate. The Referee conducted a hearing at which respondent and the AGC's Staff Accountant testified, and the parties entered a joint stipulation in lieu of testimony. In his report and recommendation, the Referee sustained both charges and recommended that a public censure be imposed. By notice of motion dated June 5, 2026, the AGC requests that this Court issue an order confirming the Referee's liability determination and impose whatever sanction the Court deems appropriate and just. [*2] Respondent concedes the Referee's liability finding with respect to rule 8.4(h) (which is thus not discussed further) but disputes the liability finding as to rule 1.15(d). Specifically, respondent asserts that because the rule requires retention of records "for seven years after the events that they record" (emphasis added), the records required by rule 1.15(d) are "expressly" those solely of the lawyer who performed or recorded the account transaction. Respondent asserts that rule 1.15(d) does not impose supervisory or oversight requirements on other lawyers, and that because he did not make or record IOLA transactions, the charge against him pursuant to rule 1.15(d) cannot be sustained. Respondent misreads the text of rule 1.15. Respondent interprets the word "they" as referring to the lawyer when, in correspondence with its subject, the plural word "they" refers to the "events" in a phrase denoting the temporal relationship between the events and the retention period of the records recording those events. In the rules, the words "they" and "their" uniformly and exclusively refer to plural subjects, and the phrase "his or her" is used in relation to references to an attorney in the singular (see e.g. rules 1.15[a], 3.5[d], 5.8[a]). Accordingly, respondent's reading does not comport with the rules individually or as a whole, and the phrase cannot be read to limit recordkeeping responsibility solely to the author of the record or to the attorney actually performing the transaction. [*3] The Referee properly rejected respondent's contention that rule 1.15(d) imposes bookkeeping obligations only upon the attorney who personally conducts escrow transactions. Nothing in the rule limits its protections in that fashion. The fiduciary obligations imposed by rule 1.15 are personal and non-delegable. Although a law firm may internally allocate administrative responsibilities, those private arrangements cannot relieve an escrow signatory of the independent obligation to safeguard client property. Respondent became a fiduciary as soon as the funds of another were deposited into an account over which he possessed unqualified signatory control (see Matter of Schneider, 131 AD3d 175, 182 [2d Dept 2015], citing Matter of Vagionis, 217 AD2d 175 [1st Dept 1995] and NY St Bar Assn Comm on Prof Ethics Op 532, *2 [1981]). Because respondent remained a signatory entrusted with client funds, he retained the corresponding obligation to ensure that the required records were maintained. Respondent remained a named partner, maintained ownership in the firm, and continued as a signatory on the IOLA account. Those facts carried with them continuing professional responsibilities that could not be avoided through reliance upon another attorney. While respondent's trust in his spouse may explain his conduct, it cannot excuse the abandonment of professional duties owed directly to clients whose funds were placed at risk. As the Referee found, "such absolute reliance on another is not a viable defense to these charges" (see Matter of Zucker, 154 AD3d 29, 31-32 [1st Dept 2017]; Matter of Marshburn, 70 AD3d 231, 233-234 [1st Dept 2009]). Respondent's cooperation, remorse, and history of pro bono work, and the mitigating factors identified by the Referee — including respondent's lack of prior discipline, personal hardships, absence of venal motive, and reliance upon his partner-spouse — are significant and should be acknowledged. They do not, however, outweigh the gravity of his prolonged inattention to the fiduciary obligations to safeguard client funds entrusted to his firm so complete that his partner was able to accomplish a theft of client funds that required restitution in the amount of approximately $375,000. [*4] Respondent's testimony reveals a years-long abdication of financial oversight. Since approximately 2008, he "was not managing any of the books and records of the firm," despite remaining a co-signatory to the IOLA account and maintaining ownership in the firm, and it is unclear whether this division of duties was the product of a consciously-engineered arrangement. Further, the record is replete with unheeded indicators of financial mismanagement. Specifically, for example, respondent was not aware of multiple official notices regarding two dishonored escrow checks ($55,000 and $2,500) sent by Chase Bank from November 2022 to June 2023 because he delegated all email monitoring to his spouse and an associate. Moreover, once he learned of the AGC's inquiries, respondent relied solely on his wife's assurances that "it was handled" and undertook no independent verification. Of note, respondent's disregard occurred at a time when he knew that the firm was having significant financial difficulties. Respondent testified that since 2019 the firm had experienced "income issues" serious enough to prevent his wife and him from receiving salaries. In fact, respondent testified that prior to the summer of 2023, the "bills were being paid by the corporation," and "[t]here were a lot of bills that weren't getting paid," including the couple's mortgage. Respondent's "impression" was that "the firm was not doing well all along." These are not minor oversights; they are cumulative warning signs that a prudent attorney, exercising ordinary diligence, would have investigated, particularly where, as the Referee found, respondent's claimed disinterest in the management of the firm did not extent as far as respondent had characterized it. His failure to act reflects sustained neglect rather than an isolated lapse of judgment. This complete disengagement represents a fundamental breach of the non-delegable duty imposed by rule 1.15 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. As the Court of Appeals emphasized in Matter of Galasso, "[f]ew, if any, of an attorney's professional obligations are as crystal clear as the duty to safeguard client funds" (19 NY3d 688, 694 [2012]). [*5] Unlike cases involving isolated negligence, respondent's inattention persisted for years, while he remained an owner and escrow signatory, despite mounting indications that the firm's finances were deteriorating. Those circumstances materially distinguish this matter from cases in which a partner reasonably relied upon another attorney in the absence of any objective indication for concern. As Matter of Langione (131 AD3d 199 [2d Dept 2015]) instructs, suspension may be warranted even where the attorney's conduct lacks corrupt intent if it demonstrates reckless disregard of professional duties. In light of respondent's abandonment of his fiduciary responsibility and disregard of warning signs, the mitigating factors as presented here cannot justify mere public censure. The aggravating circumstances present here — particularly respondent's prolonged inattention despite obvious financial warning signs — render a public censure inadequate to protect the public and preserve confidence in the profession. Accordingly, the AGC's motion should be granted to the extent of confirming the Referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law, the sanction recommendation is disaffirmed, and respondent is suspended from the practice of law in the State of New York for a period of three months, effective 30 days from the date of this order and until further order of this Court. All concur. Wherefore, it is Ordered that the motion by the Attorney Grievance Committee for the First Judicial Department is granted to the extent of confirming the Referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law, the sanction recommendation is disaffirmed, and respondent, Robert Edward Sokolski, is suspended from the practice of law in the State of New York for a period of three months, effective 30 days from the date of this order, and until further order of this Court; and It is further Ordered that, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90, during the period of suspension, respondent, Robert Edward Sokolski, is commanded to desist and refrain from (1) the practice of law in any form, either as principal or agent, clerk or employee of another, (2) appearing as an attorney or counselor-at-law before any court, Judge, Justice, board, commission or other public authority, (3) giving to another an opinion as to the law or its application or any advice in relation thereto, and (4) holding himself out in any way as an attorney and counselor-at-law; and It is further Ordered that, during the period of suspension, respondent, Robert Edward Sokolski, shall comply with the rules governing the conduct of disbarred or suspended attorneys (see 22 NYCRR 1240.15), which are made part hereof; and It is further Ordered that if respondent, Robert Edward Sokolski, has been issued a secure pass by the Office of Court Administration, it shall be returned forthwith. Entered: October 15, 2026