710 E Elizabeth Ave, LLC v. Jhong Kim

710 E Elizabeth Ave, LLC v Jhong Kim 2026 NY Slip Op 05756 October 7, 2026 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. 710 E Elizabeth Ave, LLC, et al., appellants, v Jhong Kim, respondent. Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department Decided on October 7, 2026 2025-08704, (Index No. 151657/22) Lara J. Genovesi, J.P. Barry E. Warhit Donna-Marie E. Golia Phillip Hom, JJ. Richard A. Rosenzweig, Esq. P.C., Staten Island, NY, for appellants. Law Office of Nicholas M. Moccia, P.C., Staten Island, NY, for respondent. [*1] DECISION & ORDER In an action to recover damages for breach of contract, the plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Catherine M. DiDomenico, J.), dated July 15, 2025. The judgment, upon a decision of the same court dated June 9, 2025, made after a nonjury trial, is in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff dismissing the amended complaint. ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law and the facts, with costs, the amended complaint is reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Richmond County, for the entry of an appropriate amended judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant in the principal sum of $300,000. This action arises from the nonpayment of a loan in the sum of $300,000 made by the plaintiffs in November 2020 for a construction project on real property located at 1719 Hylan Boulevard in Staten Island. At the time the loan was made, the property was owned by 1719 Hylan, LLC. The defendant is the principal of 1719 Hylan, LLC. In September 2022, the plaintiffs demanded repayment of the loan in full from the defendant. When no payment was made, the plaintiffs commenced this action against the defendant to recover damages for breach of contract. The action proceeded to a nonjury trial, after which the Supreme Court issued a judgment dismissing the amended complaint. The plaintiffs appeal. "In reviewing a determination made after a nonjury trial, the power of this Court is as broad as that of the trial court, and this Court may render the judgment it finds warranted by the facts, bearing in mind that the trial judge had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing the testimony" (New Ho Xin Dev., Inc. v Yang, 188 AD3d 1232, 1233). Here, contrary to the Supreme Court's determination, the plaintiffs met their burden of establishing a cause of action alleging breach of contract. "'The essential elements of a cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract are the existence of a contract, the plaintiff's performance pursuant to the contract, the defendant's breach of its contractual obligations, and damages resulting from the breach'" (Chestnut Bay Equestrian, Inc. v Irrevocable Trust of Jean Pizzirusso, 244 AD3d 1056, 1057, quoting 223 SAM, LLC v 223 15th St., LLC, 210 AD3d 733, 734-735). "To create a binding contract, there must be a manifestation of mutual assent sufficiently definite to assure that the parties are truly in [*2]agreement with respect to all material terms" (Matter of Express Indus. & Term. Corp. v New York State Dept. of Transp., 93 NY2d 584, 589). "Generally, courts look to the basic elements of the offer and acceptance to determine whether there is an objective meeting of the minds sufficient to give rise to a binding and enforceable contract" (Chestnut Bay Equestrian, Inc. v Irrevocable Trust of Jean Pizzirusso, 244 AD3d at 1057 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, a document dated November 17, 2020, established that the plaintiffs gave the sum of $300,000 to Mammoth Construction, Inc., the defendant's contractor, for construction on the property. The defendant signed the document as "Owner," and there is no mention of 1719 Hylan, LLC. Evidence presented at trial showed that the defendant admitted that the $300,000 from the plaintiffs was a loan that he was obligated to repay. Both the defendant and the plaintiffs' principal testified that they understood that the loan would be paid "soon," meaning in a "few months." The defendant made no repayment on the loan at any time. The defendant's contention that personal liability should not be imposed upon him because he was acting on behalf of 1719 Hylan, LLC, the owner of the property, is without merit. "An agent who enters into a contract on behalf of a disclosed principal is not personally liable unless there is clear and explicit evidence of the agent's intention to be personally bound" (Regal Commodities v Tauber, 225 AD3d 907, 908 [alteration and internal quotation marks omitted]). However, "[t]he party claiming, as an affirmative defense to liability for breach of contract, that an agency relationship existed must demonstrate that the agency relationship and the identity of the principal were disclosed" (id.). "A principal is considered to be 'disclosed' if, at the time of a transaction conducted by an agent, the other party to the contract had notice that the agent was acting for the principal and of the principal's identity" (Matter of Anderson v PODS, Inc., 70 AD3d 820, 821). Here, there was no evidence that the existence of 1719 Hylan, LLC, was disclosed to the plaintiffs at the time of the loan. The plaintiffs' principal testified that the defendant told her that he was the owner of the property, that there was no discussion that the construction project was on behalf of a company, and that the defendant never told her that the loan was for a company. The defendant presented no evidence to the contrary. Therefore, the defendant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the plaintiffs knew that he was acting on behalf of 1719 Hylan, LLC. Accordingly, the plaintiffs established the existence of a contract, performance of their obligations under the contract, the defendant's breach of his contractual obligation to repay, and damages (see New York Value Club, Ltd. v Nail & Beauty, LLC, 239 AD3d 761, 762). Since there was no evidence that the parties agreed that interest would be applied to the loan, judgment should be awarded to the plaintiffs in the principal sum of $300,000. The plaintiffs' remaining contention is improperly raised for the first time on appeal. The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit. GENOVESI, J.P., WARHIT, GOLIA and HOM, JJ., concur. ENTER: Darrell M. Joseph Clerk of the Court