Johnson v. Payne

Johnson v Payne 2026 NY Slip Op 05775 October 7, 2026 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. Paula Johnson, respondent, v Jerez Darion Payne, et al., appellants. Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department Decided on October 7, 2026 2025-04102, (Index No. 722613/24) Betsy Barros, J.P. Cheryl E. Chambers Janice A. Taylor Elena Goldberg Velazquez, JJ. Richard Schoenberg (Sweetbaum & Sweetbaum, Lake Success, NY [Joel A. Sweetbaum], of counsel), for appellants. Bruce S. Reznick, P.C. (Pollack, Pollack, Isaac & DeCicco, LLP, New York, NY [Brian J. Isaac], of counsel), for respondent. [*1] DECISION & ORDER In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Karina E. Alomar, J.), entered March 11, 2025. The order granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability. ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability is denied. The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries she allegedly sustained when her vehicle was struck in the rear by a vehicle operated by the defendant Jerez Darion Payne (hereinafter the defendant driver) and owned by the defendant Victor Payne. Prior to the parties taking any depositions, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability and dismissing the defendants' affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence. In an order entered March 11, 2025, the Supreme Court granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability. The defendants appeal. "A plaintiff in a negligence action moving for summary judgment on the issue of liability must establish, prima facie, that the defendant breached a duty owed to the plaintiff and that the defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the alleged injuries. A plaintiff is no[t] . . . required to show freedom from comparative fault in establishing his or her prima facie case" (Shanyou Liu v Joerg, 223 AD3d 762, 763 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Rodriguez v City of New York, 31 NY3d 312, 317-325). "[A] driver of a vehicle approaching another vehicle from the rear is required to maintain a reasonably safe distance and rate of speed under the prevailing conditions to avoid colliding with the other vehicle" (Madrigal v Paragon Motors of Woodside, Inc., 236 AD3d 885, 887 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a]). "Thus, a rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, requiring that operator to come forward with evidence of a nonnegligent explanation for the collision to rebut the inference of negligence" (Maurice v Donovan, 235 AD3d 633, 634 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Sroor v Marziano-Fontana, 229 AD3d 581, 583). "A nonnegligent explanation may include that [*2]a vehicle made a sudden lane change in front of a defendant's vehicle, forcing the defendant to stop suddenly" (Flood v Fillas, 190 AD3d 828, 828 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, the plaintiff established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability by submitting an affidavit wherein she averred that the rear of her stopped vehicle was struck by the front of the defendants' vehicle (see Pei-Qin Wang v Rodriguez, 235 AD3d 887, 888; Flood v Fillas, 190 AD3d at 829). However, in opposition, the defendants raised triable issues of fact as to the existence of a nonnegligent explanation for striking the rear of the plaintiff's vehicle. According to the defendant driver's affidavit, the accident occurred when the plaintiff's vehicle abruptly changed lanes, without signaling, and immediately came to a sudden stop in front of the defendants' vehicle (see Pei-Qin Wang v Rodriguez, 235 AD3d at 888; Flood v Fillas, 190 AD3d at 829). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability. To the extent that the parties raise arguments regarding that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence, that branch of the motion was not addressed by the Supreme Court and, thus, remains pending and undecided (see Katz v Katz, 68 AD2d 536, 542-543). BARROS, J.P., CHAMBERS, TAYLOR and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur. ENTER: Darrell M. Joseph Clerk of the Court