People v. Washington

People v Washington 2026 NY Slip Op 05893 October 9, 2026 Appellate Division, Fourth Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, v STEPHEN Q. WASHINGTON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department Decided on October 9, 2026 692 KA 24-00603 Present: Whalen, P.J., Lindley, Bannister, Delconte, And Hannah, JJ. CAMBARERI & BRENNECK, SYRACUSE (MELISSA K. SWARTZ OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. ANTHONY J. DIMARTINO, JR., DISTRICT ATTORNEY, OSWEGO (AMY L. HALLENBECK OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. Appeal from a judgment of the Oswego County Court (Karen M. Brandt Brown, J.), rendered October 12, 2023. The judgment convicted defendant upon his plea of guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. [*1] It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a plea of guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]) and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (§ 220.16 [1]), defendant contends that County Court erred in refusing to suppress the firearm. We reject that contention. Defendant was the front-seat passenger in a motor vehicle operated by a third party. The third party was the subject of a search warrant for her residence, person, and vehicle due to allegations related to the possession and sale of narcotics. On the day the warrant was executed, police officers effectuated a stop of the third party's vehicle near her home. While the vehicle was stopped, officers "cleared" the third party's residence to confirm that there were no people therein who could destroy evidence. Thereafter, the officers removed the subject of the warrant from her vehicle, while the passengers remained inside it. The two back-seat passengers were then removed from the vehicle, searched, and interviewed. Shortly after the backseat passengers were searched, defendant exited the vehicle and started to run from the officers. Defendant was forcibly seized, but he refused to remove his hands from his front waistband area, blocking that area from view. The officers eventually pat-frisked defendant and recovered a firearm from the front pocket of his hoodie. According to one of the officers, 45 minutes may have elapsed between the inception of the stop and defendant's exit from the vehicle, although other officers estimated much shorter intervals. Defendant contends that his prolonged detention in the vehicle was unlawful and that the officers had no legitimate basis to detain him, to forcibly seize him, and to frisk him. We disagree. "[A] police officer executing a search warrant is privileged to use reasonable force to effectuate the detention of the occupants of the place to be searched" (Boyd v City of New York, 149 AD3d 683, 684 [2d Dept 2017] [emphasis added]; see People v Hollingsworth, 191 AD3d 1412, 1413 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 36 NY3d 1120 [2021]; Linson v City of New York, 98 AD3d 1002, 1003-1004 [2d Dept 2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 855 [2013]; see generally Michigan v Summers, 452 US 692, 705 [1981]). Although defendant contends that the principle does not apply to vehicle searches, we see no basis for distinguishing between premises and vehicles inasmuch as the rationale for such forcible detention is "a fear that the [person] may interfere [*2]with the execution of a search warrant . . . or a concern for officer safety" (People v Hernandez, 187 AD3d 1502, 1505 [4th Dept 2020]; see People v Henderson, 162 AD3d 517, 517 [1st Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1111 [2018]). While the authority to detain occupants is "limited" (Summers, 452 US at 705; see People v Rashid, 196 AD3d 915, 916 [3d Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 994 [2021]; Ali v City of New York, 122 AD3d 888, 891 [2d Dept 2014]), it is justified to "minimiz[e] the risk of harm to the officers" (Summers, 452 US at 702), to facilitate "the orderly completion of the search" (id. at 703), and to "prevent[ ] flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found" (id. at 702 [emphasis added]). Those rationales are equally applicable to occupants of vehicles and of residential premises. Moreover, the right to detain occupants of the place to be searched exists regardless of "the quantum of proof justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure" (id. at 705 n 19; see Muehler v Mena, 544 US 93, 98 [2005]). We thus conclude that the detention of defendant for, at most, 45 minutes was lawful. We further conclude that officers were entitled to pat-frisk all occupants of the vehicle to ensure officer safety. Here, defendant's failure to comply with the officers' commands, his attempted flight, and his furtive attempts to conceal his front pocket gave rise to a need to pat-frisk him for officer safety (see Rashid, 196 AD3d at 917; see generally People v Broadie, 37 NY2d 100, 112 [1975]). In any event, we also conclude that the scope of the warrant and the circumstances surrounding its execution warranted a frisk of occupants "without a separate 'particularized suspicion' of criminality" (People v Smith, 164 AD2d 456, 457 [3d Dept 1990], affd 78 NY2d 897 [1991]). The warrant was premised on the illegal sale of narcotics, and it gave rise to a heightened suspicion that drugs could be found "in the possession of anyone found" in the place to be searched (id. at 458). We thus conclude that the court properly refused to suppress the firearm seized during the pat-frisk of defendant. Entered: October 9, 2026 Ann Dillon Flynn Clerk of the Court