Persaud v. Muoio

Persaud v Muoio 2026 NY Slip Op 05560 September 30, 2026 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. Mala Persaud, etc., plaintiff, v Valerie Muoio, etc., et al., defendants; Danette Molina, nonparty-appellant; Kramer, Dillof, Livingston & Moore, nonparty-respondent. Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department Decided on September 30, 2026 2025-02588, (Index No. 711515/15) Lara J. Genovesi, J.P. William G. Ford Helen Voutsinas Donna-Marie E. Golia, JJ. Danette Molina, New York, NY, nonparty-appellant pro se. Kramer, Dillof, Livingston & Moore, New York, NY (Matthew Gaier and John Reardon of counsel), nonparty-respondent pro se. [*1] DECISION & ORDER In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for medical malpractice, nonparty Danette Molina appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Joseph J. Esposito, J.), entered January 13, 2025. The order denied that nonparty's motion for an award of at least 50% of the attorneys' fees collected and granted the cross-motion of nonparty Kramer, Dillof, Livingston & Moore to enforce a fee-sharing agreement and for an award of 75% of the attorneys' fees collected. ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs. In 2015, the plaintiff, individually and as parent and natural guardian of her infant child, by way of her attorney, nonparty Danette Molina, who had represented the plaintiff since May 2013, commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for medical malpractice surrounding the child's birth. In July 2021, as the action neared its scheduled trial date, Molina retained nonparty Kramer, Dillof, Livingston & Moore (hereinafter KDLM) to serve as trial counsel. After KDLM settled the action in February 2022, Molina moved for an award of at least 50% of the attorneys' fees collected pursuant to Rule 1.5 of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct. KDLM cross-moved to enforce a purported fee-sharing agreement with Molina wherein they agreed that KDLM would receive 75% of the attorneys' fees and Molina would receive 25%. In an order entered January 13, 2025, the Supreme Court denied Molina's motion and granted KDLM's cross-motion. Molina appeals. In fee-sharing disputes between attorneys, "the courts will not inquire into the precise worth of the services performed by the parties as long as each party actually contributed to the legal work and there is no claim that either refused to contribute more substantially" (Benjamin v Koeppel, 85 NY2d 549, 556 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Wolfe & Yukelson, PLLC v Davis, Saperstein & Salomon, P.C., 153 AD3d 585, 587). Fee-sharing agreements are "enforceable as long as the attorney who seeks [a] share of the fee has contributed some work, labor or service toward the earning of the fee" (Wolfe & Yukelson, PLLC v Davis, Saperstein & Salomon, P.C., 153 AD3d at 587-588 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Weinstein, Chayt & Chase, P.C. v Breitbart, 65 AD3d 587, 587; Graham v Corona Group Home, 302 AD2d 358, 359). "In determining whether the parties entered into a contractual agreement and what were its terms, it is necessary to look . . . to the objective manifestations of the intent of the parties as gathered by their expressed words and deeds" (Brown Bros. Elec. Contrs. v Beam Constr. Corp., 41 NY2d 397, 399; see Kolchins v Evolution Mkts., Inc., 31 NY3d 100, 106; 223 Sam, LLC v 223 15th St., LLC, 161 AD3d 716, 717-718). Here, it is undisputed that both Molina and KDLM substantially contributed to the representation of the plaintiff. Further, the submissions demonstrated the existence of an oral fee-sharing agreement to split attorneys' fees consistent with the Supreme Court's order. Molina sent an email in July 2021 that expressly referenced a fee-sharing agreement of 75% to KDLM and 25% to Molina. Subsequent correspondence from KDLM confirmed the existence of this agreement and its terms. Contrary to Molina's contention, the subsequent conduct of KDLM and Molina failed to demonstrate that negotiations regarding fee-sharing were still underway. Further, as Molina does not expressly assert an intention to be bound by a fee-sharing agreement reduced to writing or formally executed, the absence of such a writing does not render the agreement unenforceable (see 223 Sam, LLC v 223 15th St., LLC, 161 AD3d at 717-718; Brighton Inv., Ltd. v Har-Zvi, 88 AD3d 1220, 1222; see also Kolchins v Evolution Mkts., Inc., 31 NY3d at 107). Therefore, the court properly determined that KDLM was entitled to enforcement of the terms of its oral fee-sharing agreement with Molina. The parties' remaining contentions are either without merit or academic in light of our foregoing determination. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied Molina's motion for an award of at least 50% of the attorneys' fees collected and granted KDLM's cross-motion to enforce the fee-sharing agreement and for an award of 75% of the attorneys' fees collected. GENOVESI, J.P., FORD, VOUTSINAS and GOLIA, JJ., concur. ENTER: Darrell M. Joseph Clerk of the Court