Alexim Holdings, LLC v. Chang-Wardi

Alexim Holdings, LLC v Chang-Wardi 2026 NY Slip Op 05924 October 14, 2026 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. Alexim Holdings, LLC, etc., respondent-appellant, v Diane C. Chang-Wardi, et al., appellants-respondents. Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department Decided on October 14, 2026 2024-08205, (Index No. 630436/23) Hector D. Lasalle, P.J. Cheryl E. Chambers Paul Wooten Helen Voutsinas, JJ. Kosakoff & Cataldo LLP, Melville, NY (Michael Stanton and Katherine Weiss of counsel), for appellants-respondents. Ruskin Moscou Faltischek, P.C., Uniondale, NY (Craig H. Handler of counsel), for respondent-appellant. [*1] DECISION & ORDER In an action, inter alia, to foreclose mechanic's liens, the defendants appeal, and the plaintiff cross-appeals, from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Joseph A. Santorelli, J.), dated June 24, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied those branches of the defendants' motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the first, second, and fourth causes of action. The order, insofar as cross-appealed from, granted those branches of the defendants' motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the third and fifth causes of action. ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the fourth cause of action, and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, with costs to the defendants. The plaintiff, Alexim Holdings, LLC (hereinafter the builder), entered into a written contract with the defendants Diane C. Chang-Wardi and Teddie B. Wardi (hereinafter together the homeowners) to construct a single-family residence on certain real property. Throughout the course of the construction, the homeowners allegedly requested and agreed to pay the builder for certain additional work, which increased the total amount allegedly owed to the builder. The homeowners paid a portion of the increased amount and disputed the remaining amount. The builder filed two mechanic's liens against the property. Thereafter, the builder commenced this action asserting causes of action to foreclose the mechanic's liens (first cause of action), to recover damages for breach of contract (second cause of action), to recover damages for unjust enrichment (third cause of action), for injunctive relief (fourth cause of action), and to recover trust funds pursuant to Lien Law article 3-A (fifth cause of action). The defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint. The Supreme Court granted those branches of the defendants' motion which were to dismiss the third and fifth causes of action, and denied the remaining branches of the defendants' motion. The defendants appeal, and the builder cross-appeals. The Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the defendants' motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the first and second causes of action. The evidence submitted by the defendants did not utterly refute the builder's allegations that the provisions in the contract governing the submission of written change orders was modified by the parties' course of conduct, and that certain partial lien waivers executed by the homeowners did not encompass the claims at issue in this action (see CPLR 3211[a][1], [5]; Peter Scalamandre & Sons, Inc. v FC 80 Dekalb Assoc., LLC, 129 AD3d 807, 809-810; E-J Elec. Installation Co. v Brooklyn Historical Socy., 43 AD3d 642, 643-644). The Supreme Court also properly granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the third cause of action. "Unjust enrichment 'lies as a quasi-contract claim' and contemplates 'an obligation imposed by equity to prevent injustice, in the absence of an actual agreement between the parties'" (Columbia Mem. Hosp. v Hinds, 38 NY3d 253, 275, quoting Georgia Malone & Co., Inc. v Rieder, 19 NY3d 511, 516). "[T]he existence of a valid contract governing the subject matter generally precludes recovery in quasi contract for events arising out of the same subject matter" (EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11, 23). Here, since there exists a valid contract governing the subject matter, the complaint failed to state a cause of action to recover damages for unjust enrichment (see CPLR 3211[a][7]; EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d at 23). The Supreme Court should have granted, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), that branch of the defendants' motion which was to dismiss the fourth cause of action, seeking injunctive relief. "'A permanent injunction is a drastic remedy which may be granted only where the plaintiff demonstrates that it will suffer irreparable harm absent the injunction'" (Rockefeller v Leon, 233 AD3d 904, 907, quoting Aponte v Estate of Aponte, 172 AD3d 970, 974 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "[I]rreparable injury, for the purposes of equity, means any injury for which money damages are insufficient. In contrast, where an injury can be adequately compensated by money damages, injunctive relief is inappropriate" (id. at 907-908 [citations omitted]). Here, since any injury suffered by the builder can be adequately compensated by money damages, injunctive relief is inappropriate. The parties' remaining contentions are without merit. LASALLE, P.J., CHAMBERS, WOOTEN and VOUTSINAS, JJ., concur. ENTER: Darrell M. Joseph Clerk of the Court