Matter of Naila P. (Althea P.)

Matter of Naila P. (Althea P.) 2026 NY Slip Op 05540 September 30, 2026 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. In the Matter of Naila P. (Anonymous). Administration for Children's Services, respondent; Althea P. (Anonymous), appellant. Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department Decided on September 30, 2026 2025-12034, (Docket No. N-9234-23) Colleen D. Duffy, J.P. Betsy Barros Lourdes M. Ventura Lisa S. Ottley, JJ. Center for Family Representation, Inc., New York, NY (Tehra Coles and Mahum Shabir of counsel), for appellant. Steven Banks, Corporation Counsel, New York, NY (Deborah A. Brenner and Shane Magnetti of counsel), for respondent. Twyla Carter, New York, NY (Dawne A. Mitchell and Claire V. Merkine of counsel), attorney for the child. [*1] DECISION & ORDER In a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, the mother appeals from an order of the Family Court, Queens County (Elenor Reid-Cherry, J.), dated August 26, 2025. The order denied that branch of the mother's motion which was pursuant to Family Court Act § 1061 to modify an order of fact-finding and disposition of the same court dated December 13, 2023, so as to grant a suspended judgment and vacate the finding of neglect, which was entered upon her consent to the entry of an order of fact-finding without admission pursuant to Family Court Act § 1051(a). ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, without costs or disbursements, and that branch of the mother's motion which was pursuant to Family Court Act § 1061 to modify the order of fact-finding and disposition so as to grant a suspended judgment and vacate the finding of neglect is granted. In June 2023, the Administration for Children's Services filed a petition alleging that the mother neglected the subject child by failing to provide proper supervision and guardianship based on the mother's failure to take medication prescribed to treat her mental illness. The mother subsequently consented to a finding of neglect without admission pursuant to Family Court Act § 1051(a) and waived her right to a fact-finding or a dispositional hearing. In an order of fact-finding and disposition dated December 13, 2023, the Family Court, inter alia, entered a finding of neglect against the mother. In November 2024, the mother was granted a trial discharge of the child to the mother's care. In June 2025, the mother moved, among other things, for a final discharge of the child to the mother's care and pursuant to Family Court Act § 1061 to modify the order of fact-finding and disposition so as to grant a suspended judgment and vacate the finding of neglect. In an order dated June 24, 2025, the Family Court granted that branch of the motion which was for a final discharge of the child to the mother's care and adjourned that branch of the motion which was to modify the order of fact-finding and disposition pending opposition. In an order dated August 26, 2025, the [*2]court denied that branch of the motion which was to modify the order of fact-finding and disposition so as to grant a suspended judgment and vacate the finding of neglect. The mother appeals. Family Court Act § 1061 provides that for good cause shown, a court may set aside, modify, or vacate any order issued in the course of a child protective proceeding (see Matter of Ilan Z. [Milana P.], 238 AD3d 1164, 1165). As with an initial order, the modified order must reflect a resolution consistent with the best interests of the child after consideration of all relevant facts and circumstances, and must be supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of Wynter S.A. [Skylien A.], 238 AD3d 1140, 1142; Matter of Nila S. [Priscilla S.], 202 AD3d 695, 696). "Courts have identified four factors to consider when determining whether to vacate a finding of neglect: '(1) respondent's prior child protective history; (2) the seriousness of the offense; (3) respondent's remorse and acknowledgment of the abusive/neglectful nature of his or her act; and (4) respondent's amenability to correction, including compliance with court-ordered services and treatment'" (Matter of Cassidy B. [Cyntora B.], 227 AD3d 711, 713, quoting Matter of Leenasia C. [Lamarriea C.], 154 AD3d 1, 12). Here, the mother had no prior child protective history; the record demonstrates the mother's compliance with services, medication, and therapy; and the mother's therapist reported that the mother "shows good insight about the need for treatment." Further, a suspended judgment leading to vacatur of the neglect finding was in the child's best interests because the mother would have access to employment opportunities in childcare (see Matter of Leenasia C. [Lamarriea C.], 154 AD3d at 12). Under the circumstances of this case, the Family Court should have granted that branch of the mother's motion which was pursuant to Family Court Act § 1061 to modify the order of fact-finding and disposition so as to grant a suspended judgment and vacate the finding of neglect (see Matter of Boston G. [Jennifer G.], 157 AD3d 675, 677). DUFFY, J.P., BARROS, VENTURA and OTTLEY, JJ., concur. ENTER: Darrell M. Joseph Clerk of the Court