Infante v. Manolarakis

Infante v Manolarakis 2026 NY Slip Op 05522 September 30, 2026 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. Alba Ivelisse Infante, appellant, v Georgios Manolarakis, respondent (and a third-party action). Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department Decided on September 30, 2026 2025-13778, (Index No. 502656/25) Francesca E. Connolly, J.P. Linda Christopher Barry E. Warhit Donna-Marie E. Golia, JJ. Chernyy & Associates, P.C. (Dmitriy Chernyy, Matthew Libroia, and Pollack, Pollack, Isaac & DeCicco, LLP, New York, NY [Brian J. Isaac and Joshua Block], of counsel), for appellant. Jacobson & Schwartz, LLP, Jericho, NY (Henry J. Cernitz of counsel), for respondent. [*1] DECISION & ORDER In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Aaron D. Maslow, J.), dated November 7, 2025. The order denied the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the defendant's counterclaim. ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs. The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries she alleged she sustained in November 2023 when she was a passenger in a vehicle operated by her husband Miguel A. Infante Garcia (hereinafter Garcia), which collided with a vehicle operated by the defendant on the Belt Parkway in Brooklyn. The defendant interposed an amended answer in which he asserted a counterclaim to recover damages for fraud. The counterclaim alleged, inter alia, that the plaintiff and Garcia staged the accident. The plaintiff moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the counterclaim. The defendant opposed the motion, submitting his own affirmation describing the incident and an affirmation of a biomechanical engineer who opined, among other things, that the plaintiff's alleged injuries were inconsistent with the circumstances of the accident. By order dated November 7, 2025, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's motion. The plaintiff appeals. "On a motion to dismiss a counterclaim pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept as true the facts as alleged in the [pleading] and submissions in opposition to the motion, accord [the pleading party] the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Maspeth Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v Elizer, 197 AD3d 1253, 1254 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Davydov v Youssefi, 205 AD3d 879, 880). "The elements of a cause of action sounding in fraud are a material misrepresentation of an existing fact, made with knowledge of the falsity, an intent to induce reliance thereon, [*2]justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, and damages" (Davidoff v Hershfield, 233 AD3d 926, 927 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Asamblea De Iglesias Christianas, Inc. v DeVito, 210 AD3d 843, 845). CPLR 3016(b) provides that the circumstances constituting fraud "shall be stated in detail" (see Lanzi v Brooks, 43 NY2d 778, 780; RBE N. Funding, Inc. v Stone Mtn. Holdings, LLC, 78 AD3d 807, 809). The pleading requirements of CPLR 3016(b) are satisfied "when the facts [pleaded] are sufficient to permit a reasonable inference of the alleged conduct" (Pludeman v N. Leasing Sys., Inc., 10 NY3d 486, 492; see Star Auto Sales of Queens, LLC v Filardo, 203 AD3d 865, 868). Here, the counterclaim set forth a cognizable cause of action alleging fraud and stated in sufficient detail the facts constituting the wrong, as required by CPLR 3016(b) (see Gimenez v Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y., Inc., 234 AD3d 943, 945). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the defendant's counterclaim. CONNOLLY, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, WARHIT and GOLIA, JJ., concur. ENTER: Darrell M. Joseph Clerk of the Court