Town of Greenburgh v. State of New York

Town of Greenburgh v State of New York 2026 NY Slip Op 05567 September 30, 2026 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. Town of Greenburgh, et al., appellants, v State of New York, respondent. Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department Decided on September 30, 2026 2025-10232, (Index No. 76400/24) Mark C. Dillon, J.P. Linda Christopher Barry E. Warhit Elena Goldberg Velazquez, JJ. Dorf Nelson & Zauderer LLP, Rye, NY (O. Peter Sherwood, Paul J. Noto, and Ryan P. Kaupelis of counsel), for appellants. Letitia James, Attorney General, New York, NY (Judith N. Vale and Blair J. Greenwald of counsel), for respondent. [*1] DECISION & ORDER In an action for a judgment declaring that Laws of 2024, chapter 7 is unconstitutional, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Charles D. Wood, J.), dated July 25, 2025. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of the defendant's motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the third cause of action insofar as asserted by the plaintiffs S. Kenneth F. Jones and Pastor Leroy Richards and the fifth cause of action and, in effect, for a judgment declaring that Laws of 2024, chapter 7 is constitutional. ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for the entry of a judgment, inter alia, declaring that Laws of 2024, chapter 7 is constitutional. In December 2023, the Legislature enacted amendments to Village Law article 2, reforming the process by which unincorporated communities may seek to incorporate as villages (hereinafter the 2023 Village Law amendments) (see L 2023, ch 773; L 2023, ch 774). Among other changes, the 2023 Village Law amendments created the village incorporation commission, a body tasked with entertaining petitions for incorporation (see L 2023, ch 773, § 7). Further, petitions for incorporation were required to be supported by studies on the proposed village's fiscal viability (see L 2023, ch 773, § 3-a). In January 2024, the Legislature enacted amendments to the 2023 Village Law amendments (hereinafter the 2024 Village Law amendments) (see L 2024, ch 7; L 2024, ch 10). The 2024 Village Law amendments, inter alia, clarified the contents of the studies required to support each new incorporation petition (see L 2024, ch 7, § 2), as well as the village incorporation commission's standard of review (see L 2024, ch 7, § 14). In addition, the 2024 Village Law amendments provided that the reforms to Village Law article 2 would not apply to "any village incorporation petitions associated by having at least one common petition signature witness on either of the two petitions that were initially filed on a date in February 2017 and May 2019 respectively in a town with a population of more than ninety thousand as of the latest federal decennial census located in a county with a population of more than nine hundred thousand as of the latest federal decennial census" (L 2024, ch 7, § 17). It is undisputed that this exemption could apply only to Edgemont, an unincorporated community in the Town of Greenburgh in the County of Westchester. Until January 2040, incorporation petitions in relation to Edgemont are governed by the provisions of Village Law article 2 in effect prior to the 2023 and 2024 Village Law amendments (see L 2024, [*2]ch 7, § 17). In December 2024, the plaintiffs, the Town and two Town residents (hereinafter together the individual plaintiffs), commenced this action against the defendant for a judgment declaring that Laws of 2024, chapter 7 is unconstitutional. As relevant to this appeal, the first cause of action alleged that Laws of 2024, chapter 7 transgressed article IX, § 2 of the New York Constitution because it was a special law relating to the Town's property, affairs, or government, and enacted without a home rule message from the Town. The third cause of action alleged that Laws of 2024, chapter 7 violated the plaintiffs' right to equal protection. The fifth cause of action alleged that Laws of 2024, chapter 7 violated article III, § 17 of the New York Constitution because it was a local law in relation to the incorporation of a village. The defendant moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the third cause of action insofar as asserted by the individual plaintiffs and the fifth cause of action, and, in effect, for a judgment declaring that Laws of 2024, chapter 7 is constitutional. In an order dated July 25, 2025, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted those branches of the motion. The plaintiffs appeal. Article IX, § 2(b)(2) of the New York Constitution provides that the Legislature may act in relation to the property, affairs, or government of a local government "only by general law," or by "special law" only if, among other things, the affected locality issues a "home rule message." A "general law" is "[a] law which in terms and in effect applies alike to all counties, all counties other than those wholly included within a city, all cities, all towns or all villages" (NY Const, art IX, § 3[d][1]). A "special law" is "[a] law which in terms and in effect applies to one or more, but not all, counties, counties other than those wholly included within a city, cities, towns or villages" (NY Const, art IX, § 3[d][4]). Here, the Supreme Court correctly granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was, in effect, for a judgment declaring that Laws of 2024, chapter 7 is constitutional, albeit for different reasons than those relied upon by the court. A law with statewide impact, and general in its terms, remains general even though it may include exemptions (see County of Onondaga v State of New York, 44 NY3d 639, 655; Rozler v Franger, 61 AD2d 46, 51, affd 46 NY2d 760). Laws of 2024, chapter 7 amended the 2023 Village Law amendments, updating the standards for the studies required to support new incorporation petitions (see L 2024, ch 7, § 2). The law thus impacted incorporation petitions statewide. That the Legislature created a limited exemption for Edgemont did not transform Laws of 2024, chapter 7 into a special law. Accordingly, the Legislature did not require a home rule message to enact Laws of 2024, chapter 7. Where a defendant seeks dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(3) based on lack of standing, the burden is on the moving defendant to establish, prima facie, the plaintiff's lack of standing (see Nesconset Ctr. for Nursing & Rehabilitation v Commissioner of Health of the State of N.Y., 251 AD3d 848, 849; Kraus v Credit Control Servs., Inc., 237 AD3d 1083, 1084). To defeat a defendant's motion to dismiss, the plaintiff has no burden of establishing its standing as a matter of law, but must merely raise a question of fact as to the issue (see Nesconset Ctr. for Nursing & Rehabilitation v Commissioner of Health of the State of N.Y., 251 AD3d at 849; Sizova v Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 217 AD3d 1007, 1008). Standing concerns the absence or presence of a sufficiently cognizable stake in the outcome of the litigation (see Nolletti v Nolletti, 249 AD3d 901, 903; Nicke v Schwartzapfel Partners, P.C., 148 AD3d 1168, 1171). Thus, to demonstrate standing, a plaintiff must establish that they will actually be harmed by the challenged action, and that the injury is more than conjectural (see New York State Assn. of Nurse Anesthetists v Novello, 2 NY3d 207, 211; Westhampton Beach Assoc., LLC v Incorporated Vil. of Westhampton Beach, 151 AD3d 793, 795). A party generally has standing only to assert claims on behalf of themselves (see Nolletti v Nolletti, 249 AD3d at 903; Cardo v Board of Mgrs., Jefferson Vil. Condo 3, 67 AD3d 945, 946), and they must raise injuries distinct from the general public (see Matter of Green v Town of Ramapo, 227 AD3d 994, 994-995; Matter of Beckerman v Liguori, 209 AD3d 1012, 1013). Here, the defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that the individual plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain the third cause of action. The individual plaintiffs' asserted injuries are vague, hypothetical, and speculative, and are insufficient to confer standing (see New York State Assn. of Nurse Anesthetists v Novello, 2 NY3d at 214; Matter of Green v Town of Ramapo, 227 AD3d at [*3]995). Moreover, the defendant demonstrated that the individual plaintiffs' asserted injuries are not different in kind or degree from any injury to the community generally (see Matter of Kopald v Town of Highlands, 241 AD3d 1567, 1569; Matter of Green v Town of Ramapo, 227 AD3d at 995). Accordingly, the Supreme Court correctly granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the third cause of action insofar as asserted by the individual plaintiffs. Contrary to the court's reasoning, the individual plaintiffs likewise lacked standing to maintain the fifth cause of action. On this appeal, the Town has not challenged the Supreme Court's determination that it lacked capacity to maintain the fifth cause of action. Since this is a declaratory judgment action, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for the entry of a judgment, inter alia, declaring that Laws of 2024, chapter 7 is constitutional (see Lanza v Wagner, 11 NY2d 317, 334). DILLON, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, WARHIT and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur. ENTER: Darrell M. Joseph Clerk of the Court