Tina-Pacific Residents Assn. v. City of Stanton

Filed 9/10/26; Certified for Publication 10/7/26 (order attached) IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE TINA-PACIFIC RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION et al., G065384 Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Super. Ct. No. 30-2023- v. 01316300) CITY OF STANTON et al., OPINION Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Michael D. Washington, Judge. Reversed and remanded. Appellants’ request to file late opposition to request for judicial notice granted. Appellants’ and respondents’ requests for judicial notice denied. Respondents’ application to file under seal granted.  Public Law Center, Marc Callahan, Richard Walker, Hannah Poploskie; Public Interest Law Project, Ugochi Anaebere-Nicholson, Craig Castellanet, and Michael Rawson for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Best Best & Krieger, Elizabeth Wagner Hull, Alexander M. Brand, Marc Bentzen, and Clarissa Thurston for Defendants and Respondents. * * * Plaintiffs Tina-Pacific Residents Association, the Kennedy Commission, Melina Bahena, Maria De Los Angeles Pineda, and Jennifer Bahena challenge the trial court’s dismissal of their claims against the City of Stanton and related defendants under the Community Redevelopment Law (Health & Saf. Code, § 33000 et seq.) and the California Relocation Assistance Act (Gov. Code, § 7260 et seq.). The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, finding the operative petition was fatally uncertain and failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. We disagree, reverse the judgment, and remand the matter for further proceedings. BACKGROUND This case concerns the City of Stanton’s gradual acquisition of a majority of the fourplexes in a low-income neighborhood over the past 17 years, its demolition of more than half of those fourplexes, and its failure to rent out many of the surviving vacant units. The central issue is whether the City had statutory obligations under the circumstances to adopt a replacement housing plan before acquiring the properties, provide replacement housing, and adopt a relocation plan for the affected residents. According to the operative petition, Stanton’s Tina-Pacific neighborhood was built in 1963 as a private development. Named after the 2 two streets bordering it on the north and south (Tina Way and Pacific Ave.), the neighborhood is about 10 acres in size and originally included 40 fourplexes (about 160 units). In 2009, citing neighborhood blight, the Stanton Redevelopment Agency authorized the City to accept funding to buy Tina-Pacific properties as part of the City’s initiation of a redevelopment project. The following year, the City received about $15.33 million in bonds to redevelop Tina-Pacific.1 Between 2009 and 2011, the City purchased about a dozen Tina- Pacific fourplexes using redevelopment funds. And in 2010, the City prepared and approved a relocation plan to address the anticipated displacement of the residents of 10 of those fourplexes. According to City documents, the Stanton Redevelopment Agency planned “to construct affordable housing, open space, and possibly a sheriff’s substation” in the area. In 2011, however, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. X1 26, which dissolved all redevelopment agencies in California effective February 1, 2012 and transferred control of agency assets to successor agencies.2 As a result, the Stanton Redevelopment Agency was dissolved, and its Tina-Pacific properties were transferred to the City and the Stanton Housing Authority. According to a City document, this “placed the 1 Until about 15 years ago, California law authorized cities and counties to form community redevelopment agencies to address issues of urban decay and assist in revitalizing blighted areas; these redevelopment projects were funded with tax increment financing. (See Cuenca v. Cohen (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 200, 209−210 (Cuenca) [discussing community redevelopment law as it existed from 1945 to 2011].) 2 See California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231, 250−251, for a further discussion of the effects of Assembly Bill No. X1 26. 3 redevelopment of the site on hold until such a time as alternative funding sources could be identified.” Nevertheless, between February and December 2012, the City (as successor agency) acquired a dozen more Tina-Pacific fourplexes using funds available to redevelopment successor agencies. This brought the number of Tina-Pacific fourplexes owned by the City to 25 out of 40 by late 2012. According to plaintiffs, many Tina-Pacific units deteriorated to the point of uninhabitability after being acquired by the City, prompting some tenants to move out. Further, the City allegedly left those units empty and in a state of disrepair instead of re-renting them to new tenants. Each time a fourplex became fully vacant, the City then allegedly demolished it, leaving a vacant lot where a residence once stood. Between 2010 and 2015, about nine of the City-owned fourplexes were demolished, with no replacement housing built in their place. In 2018, the City hired a company to provide relocation services for Tina-Pacific residents. According to their contract, the Stanton Housing Authority intended to acquire the 15 remaining occupied fourplexes, and “91 households . . . would need to be relocated as part of the Tina/Pacific development project.” The following year, the City Council authorized the City to acquire the remaining 15 parcels “‘for the construction of a 161 unit multi-family affordable housing development.’” By early 2020, the City had purchased six of those 15 remaining parcels through settlements. In May 2020, however, the City ceased further acquisition efforts because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the increased cost of relocation services, and the increased value of the remaining 11 properties. Meanwhile, two more fourplexes were demolished due to disrepair, and another was demolished due to habitability concerns and fire damage. 4  In late 2020, $3.4 million in tax allocation bonds were released for the project, and in 2021, the City began efforts to select a firm to rehabilitate the neighborhood. Later that year, it entered into an Exclusive Negotiating Agreement with several developers to negotiate about possibly developing all 40 parcels, with a portion to be reserved for affordable, multifamily rental units. A contract was never finalized, however, and the Exclusive Negotiating Agreement was eventually dissolved. The plaintiffs in this case are the Tina-Pacific Residents Association (an association of Tina-Pacific residents who are largely low- income individuals), the Kennedy Commission (an organization that advocates for affordable housing), and three former Tina-Pacific residents who qualify for and need low-income housing. In 2023, they filed a verified petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the City, the City Council, the Stanton Housing Authority, and related persons and entities. Defendants filed a series of demurrers, which the trial court repeatedly sustained with leave to amend. Plaintiffs’ operative third amended verified petition is nearly 80 pages long. The gist of their allegations is that the City gradually acquired 31 out of the 40 Tina-Pacific fourplexes using redevelopment funds, coerced many residents into leaving by allowing the units to fall into disrepair, left empty units vacant rather than re-renting them (thereby removing them from the low-income housing market), and demolished fully vacant fourplexes, resulting in empty lots and the loss of low-income housing. Plaintiffs assert claims for writ of mandate and declaratory relief based on (1) defendants’ failure to adopt a replacement housing plan (Health & Saf. Code, § 33413.5), (2) their failure to provide for replacement housing (id., § 33413), and (3) their failure to adopt or amend a relocation plan (Gov. Code, § 7260 et 5 seq.); they also assert a fourth cause of action for injunctive relief on those three claims. Defendants filed another demurrer, asserting the petition was uncertain and failed to plead facts sufficient to assert a cause of action. After taking judicial notice of documents submitted by both sides, the trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, finding the petition’s continued ambiguity was a “tactical choice” and plaintiffs had failed to identify which specific actions triggered specific statutory obligations. DISCUSSION “When reviewing a judgment dismissing a complaint after the granting of a demurrer without leave to amend, courts must assume the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. [Citation.] Courts must also consider judicially noticed matters. [Citation.] In addition, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and read it in context.” (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081 [reversing judgment after trial court wrongly sustained demurrer to statutory claim asserted against county].) While the City correctly notes statutory claims against public entities must plead material facts with particularity, even two of its cited cases construed the complaint liberally. “It is well established that the allegations of a complaint must be liberally construed with a view to attaining substantial justice between the parties.” (Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 792; accord Frankland v. Etehad (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 503, 512 [court must “liberally construe the complaint’s allegations”].) 6  I. THE COMPLAINT IS NOT UNCERTAIN We begin with the trial court’s finding that the petition is uncertain. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) As the court itself acknowledged, demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and seldom sustained. Indeed, they “‘“are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.”’” (A.J. Fistes Corp. v. GDL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677, 695.) We have carefully reviewed the operative petition and cannot say it suffers from uncertainty. Indeed, despite its length, we were able to summarize the allegations above, and defendants notably do not argue uncertainty in their brief on appeal. We therefore turn to the trial court’s other basis for sustaining the demurrer—failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) II. THE PETITION STATES FACTS SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A CAUSE OF ACTION A. Failure to Adopt a Replacement Housing Plan Plaintiffs’ first cause of action seeks a writ of mandate and declaratory relief based on defendants’ alleged failure to adopt a replacement housing plan. In support, they cite Health and Safety Code section 33413.5, which requires: “Not less than 30 days prior to the execution of an agreement for acquisition of real property, . . . which agreement would lead to the destruction or removal of dwelling units from the low- and moderate-income housing market, the agency shall adopt by resolution a replacement housing plan.” 7  In enacting this provision, the “legislature intended to protect and ‘to expand the supply of low- and moderate-income housing.’” (Price v. City of Stockton, Cal. (E.D. Cal. 2005) 394 F.Supp.2d 1256, 1263 (Price).) The statute therefore requires that before “removal of lower income units from the affordable housing market as part of a redevelopment project, redevelopment agencies must adopt a replacement housing plan that will ensure the units are replaced.” (Ibid.) Such a plan must be adopted 30 days before entering into the property acquisition agreement. (Id. at p. 1267.) Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the claim, we find plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to establish a violation of this provision. Since 2009, the City has allegedly entered into a series of agreements to acquire Tina-Pacific parcels as part of its ongoing efforts to redevelop the neighborhood; the City effectively removed many units from Stanton’s low-income housing market through both the demolitions and its failure to rent the remaining vacant units to new tenants; and yet the City failed to adopt a replacement housing plan at all, much less at least 30 days before entering into any of the acquisition agreements. Defendants assert plaintiffs have not alleged the property acquisitions directly “resulted in” or “caused” the units’ demolition or removal from the housing market. We are not persuaded. The petition alleges the parcels were each acquired for redevelopment, citing repeated statements in City documents over the years about its plans to construct affordable housing in the neighborhood. City documents also show that between 2009 and 2024, the City demolished 17 of its 31 fourplexes and left 25 of the surviving 56 units vacant—effectively removing over two-thirds of the acquired units from the housing market. We can therefore infer the City executed a series of real property purchase agreements that not only “would lead”—but in fact did 8 lead—“to the destruction or removal of” low-income housing units. (Health & Saf. Code, § 33413.5.) Even if the acquisition agreements themselves do not explicitly mention plans to demolish Tina-Pacific, “there is nothing in the [statute] that limits [an a]gency’s § 33413 obligations to only those agreements that specifically outline the removal of low-incom[e] housing. If that were the case, redevelopment agencies would always be able to circumvent [the] replacement housing mandate by simply omitting housing removal language from such agreements, even if the redevelopment project that is the subject of the agreement would in fact inevitably lead to low income housing removal. The [statute’s] plain language clearly does not allow for that result.” (Price, supra, 394 F.Supp.2d at p. 1265.) Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the petition, as we must, we find plaintiffs alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action under Health and Safety Code section 33413.5. (See Price, supra, 394 F.Supp.2d at p. 1267 [plaintiffs were likely to succeed on claim that agency violated § 33413.5 by waiting to adopt replacement housing plan until eve of demolition; statute required agency to adopt plan 30 days before executing acquisition agreement].) B. Failure to Provide for Replacement Housing Plaintiffs’ second cause of action seeks a writ of mandate and declaratory relief based on defendants’ failure to provide replacement housing. In support, they cite Health and Safety Code section 33413: “Whenever dwelling units housing persons and families of low or moderate income are destroyed or removed from the low- and moderate-income housing market as part of a redevelopment project . . . where financial assistance has been provided by the agency, the agency shall, within four years of the 9 destruction or removal, rehabilitate, develop, or construct, or cause to be rehabilitated, developed, or constructed, for rental or sale to persons and families of low or moderate income, an equal number of replacement dwelling units that have an equal or greater number of bedrooms as those destroyed or removed units at affordable housing costs within the territorial jurisdiction of the agency.” (Id., subd. (a).) Again, drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor, we find plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to establish a cause of action under this provision. The operative petition alleges that Tina-Pacific neighborhood residents are low-income persons; that Tina-Pacific units have been destroyed or otherwise removed from the housing market as part of the ongoing Tina-Pacific redevelopment project; that the City acquired the Tina- Pacific properties using redevelopment funds or funds available to redevelopment successor agencies; and that the City failed to replace the homes removed from the market within four years of their destruction or removal. The City insists that there has never been an official redevelopment “project.” But City documents referenced in the petition suggest otherwise. For example, according to the petition, the City’s 5th Cycle Housing Element adopted in 2013 mentioned efforts to retain funding “to complete the Tina/Pacific affordable housing project”; a 2016 report to the City Council mentioned “the City is now able to move forward with the redevelopment project” and it plans to “complete the purchase of the remaining Properties, relocate the tenants, and construct the project”; and the City’s 6th Cycle Housing Element adopted in 2022 mentioned that the City would “continue the redevelopment of the neighborhood.” (Italics removed.) Further, the fact that redevelopment funds were used to acquire 10 many of the properties reasonably suggests the acquisitions were made so the City could eventually redevelop the area—not because it wanted to provide stable ownership for residents or combat unsafe conditions. Because we must assume the truth of plaintiffs’ allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of their claims, we find they successfully alleged facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action under Health and Safety Code section 33413. C. The Relocation Assistance Law Plaintiffs’ third cause of action seeks a writ of mandate compelling defendants to develop and adopt a compliant relocation plan in accordance with the Relocation Assistance Law (Gov. Code, § 7260 et seq.; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 25, § 6000 et seq.). These provisions recognize that displacement as a result of public projects can be “caused by a number of activities, including rehabilitation, demolition, . . . and acquisition” (Gov. Code, § 7260.5, subd. (a)(1)), and they require that before proceeding with “any phase of a project or other activity which will result in” displacement, a public entity must first prepare a relocation plan (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 25, §§ 6010, 6038). Plaintiffs allege that defendants’ actions since 2009, including acquiring and demolishing the Tina-Pacific properties, have displaced residents. While recognizing defendants prepared a relocation plan in 2010 to address the anticipated displacement of some residents, plaintiffs allege the plan has not been updated to address the relocation needs of subsequently displaced persons. They therefore seek to compel defendants to adopt a compliant relocation plan and relocation assistance advisory program, and to 11 cease displacement until they have done so. They have thus stated a claim under the Relocation Assistance Law.3 D. The City’s Affirmative Defenses The City insists plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the four-year statute of limitations, since the alleged redevelopment project began in 2010 and the petition was not filed until 2023. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 343.) But where a plaintiff seeks to enforce statutory duties of a continuing nature that are susceptible to recurring breaches, the continuous accrual theory defeats an untimeliness challenge on demurrer. (Water Audit California v. Merced Irrigation Dist. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1147, 1193.) Further, “to prevail on a demurrer based on the statute of limitations, a defendant must establish the entire cause of action is untimely. A demurrer . . . cannot be used to attack a portion of a cause of action.” (Pointe San Diego Residential Community, L.P. v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 265, 274.) In this case, the petition alleges the City entered into acquisition agreements as early as 2009 but continuing through 2020 (within four years of the March 2023 filing date), that it continued to demolish properties through 2024, and continues to not comply with its statutory duties. The City alternatively contends the Kennedy Commission lacks standing. But unincorporated public interest associations, such as the Kennedy Commission, have standing to enforce affordable housing rights, even if not personally harmed. (See Cuenca, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 219; 3 Plaintiffs do not assert a claim for damages for unpaid relocation assistance benefits, and they confirm as much in their briefing on appeal. We therefore do not consider the City’s arguments that plaintiffs lack standing to pursue relocation benefits or that certain plaintiffs’ 2025 settlement agreement with the City bars their claim for relocation benefits. 12 Venice Town Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1563−1564; McKeon v. Hastings College (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 877, 892–893.) E. Injunctive Relief In their fourth cause of action, plaintiffs seek injunctive relief based on the first, second, and third causes of action. Defendants argue in passing that injunctive relief is not a separate cause of action and therefore subject to demurrer. They are correct that “injunctive relief is a remedy rather than a standalone cause of action.” (Granny Purps, Inc. v. County of Santa Cruz (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 1, 9, italics removed.) Nevertheless, the fourth cause of action “is really a request for an injunction and derives from the allegations of the mandate claim[s],” making a demurrer inappropriate. (HNHPC, Inc. v. Department of Cannabis Control (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 60, 73 [trial court erred in sustaining demurrer to injunction cause of action that was derivative of claim for writ of mandate based on statutory violation]; cf. Sims v. Kernan (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 105, 110 [regardless of label attached to cause of action, we examine complaint’s factual allegations to determine if they state a cause of action on any available legal theory].) DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed with directions to the trial court to vacate its order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, and enter a 13 new order overruling the demurrer. Plaintiffs shall recover their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).) SCOTT, J. WE CONCUR: GOODING, ACTING P. J. SERVINO, J. 14 Filed 10/7/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE TINA-PACIFIC RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION et al., G065384 Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Super. Ct. No. 30-2023- v. 01316300) CITY OF STANTON et al., ORDER GRANTING REQUEST FOR Defendants and Respondents. PUBLICATION The Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles has requested that our opinion filed September 10, 2026, be certified for publication. It appears that our opinion meets the standards set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c). The request is GRANTED.  The opinion is ordered published in the Official Reports. SCOTT, J. WE CONCUR: GOODING, ACTING P. J. SERVINO, J. 16