City of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp.

City of New York v Exxon Mobil Corp. 2026 NY Slip Op 05851 October 8, 2026 Appellate Division, First Department Friedman, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. City of New York, Plaintiff-Appellant, v Exxon Mobil Corp., et al., Defendants-Respondents. Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Judicial Department Decided and Entered: October 08, 2026 Index No. 451071/21|Appeal No. 6583|Case No. 2025-01687| Dianne T. Renwick David Friedman Barbara R. Kapnick Bahaati E. Pitt-Burke Kelly O'Neill Levy Muriel Goode-Trufant, Corporation Counsel, New York (Claude S. Platton, Richard Dearing and Rebbecca L. Visgaitis of counsel), for appellant. Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, New York (Kannon K. Shanmugam, William T. Marks, Theodore V. Wells, Jr., Daniel J. Toal, and David K. Kessler of counsel), for respondents. Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Anar R. Patel, J.), entered January 15, 2025, which, to the extent appealed from, granted defendants ExxonMobil, BP, and Shell's respective motions to dismiss the complaint as against them. Friedman, J. [*1] In this action, plaintiff City of New York alleges that defendant energy companies — Exxon Mobil Corp. and ExxonMobil Oil Corp. (collectively, ExxonMobil), Royal Dutch Shell Plc. and Shell Oil Company (collectively, Shell), and BP P.L.C. and BP America Inc. (collectively, BP) — have engaged in "deceptive . . . trade practice[s]" proscribed by the City's Consumer Protection Law (CPL) (Administrative Code of the City of NY § 20-700 et seq.). The City's first cause of action alleges that defendants violated the CPL "by misrepresenting the purported environmental benefits of using their fossil fuel products" — a practice referred to as "product greenwashing." The City's second cause of action alleges that defendants also violated the CPL "by creating a misleading impression of the role of renewables [i.e., renewable energy] in their businesses" — a practice referred to as "corporate greenwashing." The City now appeals to this Court from Supreme Court's order granting defendants' motion to dismiss both causes of action. The court dismissed the first cause of action, for product greenwashing, as against all defendants, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), on the ground that the alleged "product greenwashing" statements did not, as a matter of law, have "the capacity, tendency or effect of . . . deceiving or misleading consumers" (Administrative Code § 20-701), as required to constitute a deceptive trade practice within the meaning of the CPL. In addition, the court found that the first cause of action was time-barred with respect to conduct that occurred before April 22, 2018, and thus subject to dismissal, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5), as against Shell to that extent. The court also dismissed the second cause of action, for corporate greenwashing, as against all defendants, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), on the ground that the alleged "corporate greenwashing" statements were not "made in connection with the sale . . . or in connection with the offering for sale of consumer goods or services," as also required to constitute a deceptive trade practice within the meaning of the CPL. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. Factual and Procedural Background [*2] This is not the City's first action against defendants relating to the climate-change effects of their products and defendants' allegedly misleading advertising about their products and clean energy investments. In 2018, the City filed an action in federal court against defendants, among other energy companies, seeking to recover damages for climate change under state law theories of public nuisance, private nuisance, and trespass. Ultimately, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of that action on the ground that a municipality may not "utilize state tort law to hold multinational oil companies liable for the damages caused by global greenhouse gas emissions" (City of New York v Chevron Corp., 993 F3d 81, 85 [2d Cir 2021], affg 325 F Supp 3d 466 [SD NY 2018]). The City did not seek to have the Second Circuit's decision reviewed by the United States Supreme Court. On April 22, 2021 — three weeks after the Second Circuit's decision — the City filed this lawsuit in Supreme Court, New York County, claiming that the same allegedly misleading advertising referred to in the federal complaint was actionable as a deceptive trade practice under the City's CPL, as described above. In addition to ExxonMobil, Shell, and BP, the complaint named the American Petroleum Institute (API) as the sole defendant on a third cause of action. By an order not brought up for review on this appeal, Supreme Court granted API's motion to dismiss the complaint as against it. The premise of the complaint is that concern about climate change — the "primary driver" of which is alleged to be "the extraction, refinement, and combustion of fossil fuels" — is "driving consumer choices between fossil fuels and transportation and energy alternatives." According to the complaint, "NYC consumers are seeking out products and services that have less of an adverse impact on the environment and are supporting companies that purport to align with these values. In particular, there is a growing desire among consumers to reduce fossil fuel consumption, and to find other opportunities to fulfill their energy needs with energy generated through means considered to be less harmful to the environment and to the climate in particular." The complaint further alleges that survey evidence demonstrates that "[k]nowledge of the risks associated with the routine use of fossil fuel products is material to NYC consumers' decision to purchase and use those products." Thus, a consumer "might purchase fewer — or no — fossil fuel products if provided with accurate information that fossil fuel use was a primary driver of climate change and the resultant dangers to the environment and people." [*3] Given the allegedly intense concern among the City's consumers about the environmental consequences of the combustion of fossil fuels, the complaint alleges that defendants "deceive NYC consumers by misrepresenting the climate impacts of various gasoline products sold at their branded service stations in the City. In a bid to reassure consumers that purchasing these products is good for the planet, ExxonMobil, Shell, and BP advertise them as 'cleaner' and 'emissions-reducing,' but fail to disclose their harmful effects on the climate." Thus, according to the City, defendants "take advantage of NYC consumers and prevent them from making informed choices by falsely buying consumer goodwill, and by misrepresenting their investments in renewable energy or playing up environmental aspects of their products without disclosing that their primary business — fossil fuels — is also the primary driver of climate change." The City's first cause of action alleges that defendants have engaged in "product greenwashing" with respect to three product lines advertised and sold to consumers in New York City: (1) BP's "Invigorate" additive used in all of its fuel products sold in the City; (2) Shell's "Shell Nitrogen Enriched Cleaning System," which is used in all grades of Shell gasoline sold in New York City, and Shell's premium-grade fuel called "V-Power Nitro+ Premium"; and (3) ExxonMobil's line of fuel products containing the "Synergy&TLRtrade;" additive. The following advertising statements made about the foregoing product lines, among others, are alleged by the City to be misleading and, therefore, to constitute deceptive trade practices within the meaning of the CPL: BP — Invigorate BP "describes [Invigorate] on its website as better than 'ordinary fuels' that have problems like 'increased emissions.'" BP's website "advertises its fuel selection as 'including a growing number of lower-carbon and carbon-neutral products.'" Shell — Shell Nitrogen Enriched Cleaning System and V-Power Nito+ Premium Shell "advertises on its website that these fuels 'produce[] few emissions' and that not using them can lead to 'higher emissions.'" ExxonMobil — Synergy&TLRtrade; fuel products "ExxonMobil's website contains promotional materials for Synergy&TLRtrade; . . . [stating:] 'Environmental performance . . . conscientious practices. Rigorous standards. . . . Continually improving environmental performance while pursuing reliable and affordable energy.'" [*4] "[Also stating:] 'We're continually innovating to develop products that enable customers to reduce their energy use and CO2 emissions. For example, we have: Developed specially formulated synthetic lubricants for cars, trucks and industrial equipment that last longer and help end-users reduce their energy consumption . . . Created tire liners that retain air better than their predecessors, thereby improving vehicle fuel efficiency . . . Developed a technology to improve the separator films used in lithium-ion batteries, which are used in laptops, cell phones and, increasingly, hybrid vehicles.'" "[Also stating:] 'Engineered Fuel Technology Synergy&TLRtrade; fuels to help improve fuel economy and reduce CO2 emissions.'" "ExxonMobil advertises its Synergy&TLRtrade; Diesel Efficient fuel as the 'latest breakthrough technology' and the 'first diesel fuel widely available in the US' that helps '[i]ncrease fuel economy' and '[r]educe emissions and burn cleaner,' and 'was created to let you drive cleaner, smarter and longer.'" "In advertising its Synergy&TLRtrade; Supreme+ gasoline, ExxonMobil emphasizes environmental qualities like '2X cleaner' and 'lower emissions,' with the smaller text explaining that it can lead to lower emissions.'" "In ExxonMobil's annual Energy and Carbon Summary, the company promotes its Synergy&TLRtrade; fossil fuel product line as 'help[ing] customers reduce their emissions.' It states: 'Premium fuels such as Synergy&TLRtrade; gasoline and diesel also help consumers improve gas mileage. By improving engine efficiency and fuel economy, these products can help reduce greenhouse gas emissions compared to conventional lubricants and fuels. ExxonMobil is progressing several multibillion-dollar refinery expansion projects to supply the growing demand for these advanced products.'" As to each of the foregoing statements, the City alleges, in substance, that the representation is deceptive and misleading because it "fail[s] to disclose" that use of the referenced product or products will "generate large amounts of greenhouse gas emissions that contribute significantly to climate change." While it is not alleged that any of the challenged advertising contains an outright falsehood, the City complains that the statements, while "promot[ing] these gasoline products as environmentally beneficial and 'emissions-reducing,'" nonetheless "conceal from consumers the material fact that using these products still significantly increases greenhouse gas emissions." [*5] The City's second cause of action alleges that defendants have engaged in "corporate greenwashing" by "exaggerating their investments in clean energy resources and . . . inflating the climate benefits of their natural gas products and investments in alternative energy sources" (initial capitalization omitted). The aim of these statements, the complaint alleges, is "to portray [defendants] as leaders in the fight against climate change, even though their products are the primary driver in causing it," on the theory that "today's consumers are more likely to buy from companies that are perceived to be environmental stewards." For example: BP describes itself as "working to make all forms of energy cleaner and better"; as "one of the major wind energy businesses in the US"; and as "changing, encouraging our people to innovate, create, partner, and invest, exploring activities that you might not expect to support our net-zero ambition." Shell describes itself as "a bigger player than you might expect in this budding movement to realize a cleaner and more efficient transportation future"; and as "[p]owering progress together with more and cleaner energy solutions." ExxonMobil describes itself as "working to decrease our overall carbon footprint"; as "plan[ning] to further reduce greenhouse gas emissions in our global operations by 2025, while aiming for industry-leading GHG performance by 2030," thereby "positioning for a lower-carbon energy future and this plan represents some of the most aggressive reductions in the industry"; as "[w]orking to meet the world's growing #energy needs while addressing the risks of climate change"; and as "the leader in carbon capture." In July 2024, ExxonMobil, Shell and BP made separate motions to dismiss the complaint as against each of them for failure to state a claim pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) and for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8). Shell also sought dismissal of the first cause of action as against it, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5), as time-barred insofar as based on conduct that occurred before April 22, 2018. The City opposed the motions. In the order appealed from, which was entered in January 2025, Supreme Court granted the motions to dismiss. While the court rejected defendants' jurisdictional argument, it agreed that the advertising and promotional statements attacked by the City did not violate the CPL. [*6] With regard to the product greenwashing claim, the court observed that the City's theory was that each product greenwashing statement was misleading, not because it was false, but "because it fails to disclose the material fact that the fossil fuel product emits substantial quantities of greenhouse gases that contribute significantly to climate change. However, [the City] cannot succeed on this theory where [the City's] own allegations concede that the connection between fossil fuels and climate change is public information." The court further noted that the City alleged in its complaint that it "has been 'a central focus of consumers' anxiety about the future' that 'driv[es] consumer choices concerning 'transportation and energy alternatives.'" The court concluded: "The City cannot have it both ways by, on one hand, asserting that consumers are aware of and commercially sensitive to the fact that fossil fuels cause climate change, and, on the other hand, that the same consumers are being duped by Defendants' failure to disclose that their fossil fuel products emit greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change. In this respect, the City's allegation that Defendants 'conceal the central role of fossil fuels in causing climate change' is not cognizable where the City has otherwise conceded widespread public awareness of this information." In addition, the court found that the complaint distorted, and took out of context, certain of the product-related statements to make them appear misleading. As an example, the court noted that the complaint quoted ExxonMobil as stating that its Synergy Supreme + premium fuel was '2X cleaner for better gas mileage," while ExxonMobil stated in full that Synergy Supreme+ "keep[s] your engine 2x cleaner for better gas mileage" (emphasis added). Still other statements, the court found, constituted nonactionable expressions of aspiration, opinion, or puffery. The court therefore dismissed the first cause of action. As to the corporate greenwashing claim, the court concluded that the complaint did not sufficiently allege that the statements were "made in connection with the sale" or "offering for sale" of "consumer goods or services" (Administrative Code § 20-701[a]), because none of the clean alternative energy products referenced in the statements were sold to consumers, either in New York or anywhere else. Because the corporate greenwashing statements lacked "any nexus to a consumer good sold in [New York City]," the second cause of action was also dismissed. Finally, the court also held that the claims against Shell based on statements made more than three years before the filing of the complaint were time-barred. The court's order directed that judgment be entered in favor of ExxonMobil, Shell and BP. This appeal by the City ensued. Discussion The following provisions of the CPL are relevant to the determination of this appeal (emphasis added): § 20-700. Unfair trade practices prohibited. [*7] "No person shall engage in any deceptive . . . trade practice in the sale, lease, rental or loan or in the offering for sale, lease, rental or loan of any consumer goods or services, or in the collection of consumer debts." § 20-701. Definitions. "(a) Deceptive trade practice. Any false or misleading oral, written, digital, or electronic statement, visual description or other representation or omission of any kind made in connection with the sale, lease, rental or loan or in connection with the offering for sale, lease, rental or loan of consumer goods or services, or in the extension of consumer credit or in the collection of consumer debts, which has the capacity, tendency or effect of directly or indirectly deceiving or misleading consumers. Deceptive trade practices include but are not limited to . . . the use, in any representation, of exaggeration, innuendo, or ambiguity as to a material fact, or the failure to state a material fact, if such use of, or failure to state, a material fact deceives or tends to deceive . . . . "(c) Consumer goods, services credit and debts. As used in section 20-700 of this subchapter and subdivisions a and b of this section, goods, services, credit and debts which are primarily for personal, household or family purposes. "(d) Consumer. A purchaser or lessee or prospective purchaser or lessee of the consumer goods or services or consumer credit, including a co-obligor or surety." On this appeal, the first question presented is whether the challenged "product greenwashing" statements by defendants had "the capacity, tendency or effect of directly or indirectly deceiving or misleading consumers," so as to constitute a "deceptive trade practice" proscribed by Administrative Code § 20-700, as that term is defined by Administrative Code § 20-701(a). The second question presented is whether defendants' challenged "corporate greenwashing" statements were made "in connection with the sale . . . or in connection with the offering for sale . . . of consumer goods or services" (Administrative Code § 20-701[a]), so as to fall within the scope of the CPL. Because we find that Supreme Court correctly answered both of the foregoing questions in the negative, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint without reaching the statute of limitations issue solely concerning Shell that Supreme Court addressed. First Cause of Action — Product Greenwashing [*8] Initially, the standard for evaluating whether a statement "has the capacity, tendency or effect of deceiving or misleading consumers" is disputed by the parties. Defendants argue that the standard for determining whether a statement is deceptive for these purposes is the effect the statement would have upon "a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances" (Oswego Laborers' Local 214 Pension Fund v Marine Midland Bank, 85 NY2d 20, 26 [1995]; see also Matter of City Line Auto Mall, Inc. v Mintz, 42 AD3d 407, 408 [1st Dept 2007] [rejecting an administrative finding of a CPL violation to the extent the finding was based on circumstances that would not have deceived "a reasonable consumer"]). The City argues that, to the contrary, the standard is the effect the statement would have upon a consumer falling within the ranks of "the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze but are governed by appearances and general impressions" (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 273 [1977]; see also People v General Elec. Co., 302 AD2d 314, 314 [1st Dept 2003]). Supreme Court agreed with defendants on the issue of the applicable standard, relying on the more recent Oswego case, in which the Court of Appeals applied the reasonable consumer standard to a claim under General Business Law § 349 (proscribing unfair business practices), in conformity with the complementary antifraud statute enforced by the Federal Trade Commission, "upon which the New York statute [General Business Law § 349] is modeled" (85 NY2d at 26). The court also relied on Administrative Code § 20-702, the section of the CPL providing that any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder "shall not be inconsistent with" the Federal Trade Commission Act and General Business Law § 350 (proscribing false advertising), both of which, like General Business Law § 349, adhere to a reasonable consumer standard (see Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 324 n 1 [2002] ["The standard for recovery under General Business Law § 350, while specific to false advertising, is otherwise identical to section 349"]). While the reasonable consumer standard appears to be better supported in current law than the more subjective standard urged by the City, we need not resolve this issue to decide this appeal. Under either standard, the City's claim that defendants engaged in product greenwashing cannot stand. [*9] As noted by Supreme Court, the City's claim is that defendants' advertising of their improved products is deceptive and misleading because, while the statements about the products extol their beneficial effects, they fail to state that these products, which are manufactured from fossil fuels, will still produce carbon emissions when used, thereby contributing to climate change. This claim of deceptiveness conflicts, however, with the premise of the entire action, namely, that the general public, regardless of level of sophistication, is now well aware of the fact that the use of fossil fuels results in greenhouse-gas emissions and is "the primary driver of climate change." Indeed, it is precisely the widespread public awareness of the connection between fossil-fuel use and climate change posited by the City that is alleged to charge the advertising at issue with persuasive force. After all, if the public did not know or care about the link between fossil fuels and climate change, highlighting the reduced-emissions feature of a gasoline product would not motivate consumers to buy it. Because the statements at issue disclose that the improved products are gasoline, even unsophisticated consumers — given the City's foundational assumption of near-universal understanding of the link between gasoline use and climate change — would necessarily understand that use of the improved products contributes to climate change. [*10] In this regard, it bears emphasis that, as previously noted, the City does not claim that any challenged statement is false. The statements, in their full context, are comparative in nature, informing consumers that use of the improved gasoline products will produce fewer carbon emissions than other gasoline products. Nothing in the statements could lead even an incautious consumer to understand defendants to be representing that the environmental impact of use of the new products to power private vehicles would be comparable to the impact of taking public transportation, bicycling, walking, or using electric or hybrid cars. For example, in one of the statements reproduced in the complaint, ExxonMobil represented that "[p]remium fuels" such as Synergy&TLRtrade; gasoline and diesel, "[b]y improving engine efficiency and fuel economy, . . . can help reduce greenhouse gas emissions compared to conventional lubricants and fuels" (emphasis added). Another representation by ExxonMobil upon which the complaint is based states that Synergy&TLRtrade; gasolines "[h]elp[] remove deposits, which can lead to fewer emissions" (emphasis added). The comparative nature of the challenged product representations is similarly apparent from the face of the statements by Shell (e.g., "[t]he Nitrogen Enriched Cleaning System gives all three grades of Shell gasoline the ability to clean up gunk on intake valves and fuel injectors," and "a clean engine . . . produces fewer emissions") and BP (e.g., BP gasoline with Invigorate "has 10 times better protection against intake valve deposits than ordinary, minimum-detergency fuels," which is "important" because "dirty deposits from ordinary fuels . . . can lead to . . . increased emissions"). In addition, as Supreme Court noted, many of the statements complained of are nonactionable subjective "statements of aspiration, opinion or puffery," such as ExxonMobil's characterization of one of its products as the "latest breakthrough technology" that "was created to let you drive cleaner, smarter and longer." [*11] In sum, all of the product statements attacked by the City make plain that the advertised products are gasolines and claim only that the use of these improved gasoline products has the potential to produce fewer carbon emissions than the use of other gasoline products. Not even the least sophisticated consumer could be led to believe that, by using the advertised gasoline products, he or she would be able to drive a vehicle without producing a significant amount of emissions. The claim of deception here is therefore as implausible as the claim, rejected by the Second Circuit, that the marketing of Diet Coke had the capacity to mislead consumers, through the use of the term 'diet,' to believe that consuming the drink would "assist in weight loss" (Geffner v Coca-Cola Co., 928 F3d 198, 199 [2d Cir 2019] [internal quotation marks omitted]). In Geffner, as in this case, it was clear from the face of the challenged statements that the defendant was making a "relative (rather than absolute)" representation about the benefit of the product, i.e., "that the 'diet' version of the drink is lower in calories than the 'non-diet' version of the drink" (id. at 200). The City, upon appeal, has sought to recast its product greenwashing claim as based on defendants' failure to quantify the reduction in emissions that would result from the use of the improved gasolines. Apart from the fact that this theory is not articulated in the complaint, the City cites no precedent requiring a seller, in advertising a product as offering a benefit relative to other products of the same kind, to quantify the magnitude of that benefit. Nor has the City come forward with evidence that the reduction in emissions made possible by the gasoline products at issue is so minute, as compared to other gasolines, as to be legally insignificant. We therefore conclude that, as a matter of law, the product statements at issue do not constitute a deceptive trade practice within the meaning of the CPL because they do not have "the capacity, tendency or effect of directly or indirectly deceiving or misleading consumers" (Administrative Code § 20-701[a]). Accordingly, the first cause of action was correctly dismissed. Second Cause of Action — Corporate Greenwashing [*12] As previously noted, the second cause of action alleges that defendants engaged in "corporate greenwashing" in violation of the CPL by advertising their investments in the development of alternative energy technologies (i.e., technologies not based on fossil fuels) so as to "create[e] a misleading impression of the role of renewables in their businesses" and to "deceitfully represent themselves as leaders in renewable energy." However, a statement does not fall within the scope of the CPL unless it is made "in connection with the sale . . . or in connection with the offering for sale . . . of consumer goods or services" (Administrative Code § 20-701[a]; see Polonetsky v Better Homes Depot, 97 NY2d 46, 53 [2001] ["the simple sale of a house does not involve consumer goods or services within the meaning" of the CPL, because real estate, by itself, is not a consumer good or service]). The limitation of the CPL to statements made in connection with the sale of consumer goods or services is underscored by the law's illustrative list of proscribed practices, which includes "representations that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, certification, accessories, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not have"; representations that "good are original or new" if they are not; and representations that "good or services are of a particular standard, quality, grade, style or model, if they are of another" (Administrative Code § 20-701[a][1]). The CPL's limitation of its scope to statements made "in connection with the sale . . . or in connection with the offering for sale . . . of consumer goods or services" distinguishes it from the state consumer protection statute, which extends to "deceptive . . . acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state" (General Business Law § 349[a]). Similarly, the CPL is narrower in scope than the consumer protection statutes of other jurisdictions that are not limited to statements made in connection with a specific consumer transaction. For that reason, we find inapposite the out-of-state decisions cited by the City that apply their respective jurisdictions' consumer protection laws to corporate greenwashing (see State v Exxon Mobil Corp., 2025 WL 3459468, *1, 2025 Conn Super LEXIS 3320, *1 [Nov. 26, 2025, No. HHDCV206132568S]; District of Columbia v Exxon Mobil Corp., 2025 DC Super LEXIS 13, *26-32 [April 21, 2025, 2020 CA 002892 B]; Earth Island Inst. v Coca-Cola Co., 321 A3d 654, 670-671 n 6 [DC 2024]; State of Vermont v Exxon Mobil Corp., 2024 WL 5189025, *9 [Vt Super Ct, Dec 11, 2024]; Commonwealth v Exxon Mobil Corp., 2021 WL 3493456, *1, Mass Super LEXIS 371, *1-3 [June 22, 2021, No. 1984CV03333BLS1]). [*13] The City does not allege that defendants sell to consumers any products or services based on the alternative technologies referenced in the challenged corporate greenwashing statements. Neither has the City brought to our attention any court decision in which a corporation's statements about itself solely for purpose of branding or public relations, without connection to the sale of any particular goods or services to consumers, have been held to run afoul of the CPL. The City's reliance on the CPL's use of the word "indirectly" in proscribing conduct that "has the capacity, tendency or effect of directly or indirectly deceiving or misleading consumers" (Administrative Code § 20-701[a][1]) is unavailing because, as noted by Supreme Court, "[e]ven an allegation that a statement has the tendency to indirectly deceive a consumer must still be 'made in connection with the sale' of a consumer good or services" to fall within the scope of the prohibition. Supreme Court correctly recognized that adopting the City's "expansive interpretation of the CPL . . . would render the 'made in connection' requirement meaningless." Supreme Court was therefore correct in concluding that the second cause of action does not state a claim for violation of the CPL. Finally, in view of the foregoing, we need not address the statute of limitations issue raised with respect to the claim against Shell, nor need we address defendants' argument that the claim based on corporate greenwashing runs afoul of the First Amendment. Accordingly, the order of Supreme Court, New York County (Anar R. Patel, J.), entered January 15, 2025, which, to the extent appealed from, granted defendants ExxonMobil, BP, and Shell's respective motions to dismiss the complaint as against them, should be affirmed, without costs. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly. Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Anar R. Patel, J.), entered January 15, 2025, affirmed, without costs. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly. Opinion by Friedman, J. All concur. Renwick, P.J., Friedman, Kapnick, Pitt-Burke, O'Neill Levy, JJ. THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT. ENTERED: October 8, 2026