Board of Educ. of the Blind Brook-Rye Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Kliment Halsband Architects

Board of Educ. of the Blind Brook-Rye Union Free Sch. Dist. v Kliment Halsband Architects 2026 NY Slip Op 05512 September 30, 2026 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. Board of Education of the Blind Brook-Rye Union Free School District, appellant, v Kliment Halsband Architects, respondent, at al., defendants. Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department Decided on September 30, 2026 2024-11504, (Index No. 55986/24) Colleen D. Duffy, J.P. Barry E. Warhit Lourdes M. Ventura Lisa S. Ottley, JJ. Guercio & Guercio, LLP, Farmingdale, NY (Christopher F. Mestecky and John Bradley of counsel), for appellant. Wasserman Grubin & Rogers, LLP, New York, NY (Michael T. Rogers and Douglas J. Lutz of counsel), for respondent. [*1] DECISION & ORDER In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Linda S. Jamieson, J.), dated August 2, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of the motion of the defendant Kliment Halsband Architects which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the first, twelfth, and thirteenth causes of action insofar as asserted against it. ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs. The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant Kliment Halsband Architects (hereinafter the defendant), among others, inter alia, to recover damages for negligence (first cause of action), breach of contract (second cause of action), and fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment (twelfth cause of action), and seeking punitive damages (thirteenth cause of action). The defendant moved, among other things, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the first, twelfth, and thirteenth causes of action insofar as asserted against it. The plaintiff opposed the motion. In an order dated August 2, 2024, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted those branches of the motion. The plaintiff appeals. The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the first cause of action, alleging negligence, insofar as asserted against it as duplicative of the cause of action alleging breach of contract. "[A] simple breach of contract is not to be considered a tort unless a legal duty independent of the contract itself has been violated," and where a "plaintiff is essentially seeking enforcement of the bargain, the action should proceed under a contract theory" (IKB Intl., S.A. v Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 40 NY3d 277, 290 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Dormitory Auth. of the State of N.Y. v Samson Constr. Co., 30 NY3d 704, 711). In determining whether a tort claim lies, courts evaluate "the nature of the injury, how the injury occurred and the harm it caused" (Dormitory Auth. of the State of N.Y. v Samson Constr. Co., 30 NY3d at 711; see IKB Intl., S.A. v Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 40 NY3d at 290-291). Here, the complaint did not allege facts that would give rise to a duty owed to the plaintiff that was independent of the duty imposed by the parties' contract, and the plaintiff was [*2]essentially seeking the contractual benefit of its bargain (see Meserole Hub, LLC v Rosenzweig, 234 AD3d 751, 752; Michael Davis Constr., Inc. v 129 Parsonage Lane, LLC, 194 AD3d 805, 807). The injury alleged by the plaintiff was the result of the defendant's alleged failure to perform under the contract, and thus, there was no injury alleged here that is not already encompassed in the cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract (see Dormitory Auth. of the State of N.Y. v Samson Constr. Co., 30 NY3d at 713; Pratt Paper [NY], Inc. v Atlanta Gear Works, Inc., 246 AD3d 945, 947). The Supreme Court also properly granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the twelfth cause of action, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment, insofar as asserted against it, as that cause of action also was duplicative of the cause of action alleging breach of contract (see 298 Humboldt, LLC v Torres, 197 AD3d 1081, 1083-1084). "Generally, a cause of action alleging fraud is duplicative of a breach of contract cause of action if it is based on identical circumstances and alleges identical loss incurred for the breach as for the misrepresentation" (Ramsay v Garland, 243 AD3d 935, 937; see Pugni v Giannini, 163 AD3d 1018, 1020). Here, the cause of action alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment is based on identical circumstances as the cause of action alleging breach of contract, and does not allege that the purported misrepresentations resulted in any loss independent of the damages allegedly incurred for breach of the contract (see Toobian v Toobian, 209 AD3d 907, 910; Chen v Wen Fang Wang, 177 AD3d 694, 697). The Supreme Court also properly granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the thirteenth cause of action, seeking punitive damages, insofar as asserted against it. "New York does not recognize an independent cause of action for punitive damages" (Gershman v Ahmad, 156 AD3d 868, 868 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Lopiccolo v Holtsville Fire Dist., 242 AD3d 862, 866-867). Further, "[p]unitive damages are not recoverable for an ordinary breach of contract as their purpose is not to remedy private wrongs but to vindicate public rights" (Rocanova v Equitable Life Assur. Socy. of U.S., 83 NY2d 603, 613; see Toobian v Toobian, 209 AD3d at 910-911). "Where a lawsuit has its genesis in the contractual relationship between the parties, the threshold task for a court considering a defendant's motion to dismiss a demand for punitive damages is to identify a tort independent of the contract" (Schlusselberg v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 206 AD3d 682, 683; see Matter of Part 60 Put-Back Litig., 36 NY3d 342, 360). Here, the complaint failed to allege an independent tort sufficient to warrant punitive damages (see Sal Savasta, Inc. v Boar's Head Provisions Co., Inc., 246 AD3d 968, 973; Michael Davis Constr., Inc. v 129 Parsonage Lane, LLC, 194 AD3d at 808). The plaintiff's remaining contentions either need not be reached in light of our determination or are raised on appeal for the first time in its reply brief (see Morton v North Shore Univ. Hosp., 244 AD3d 722, 723-724). DUFFY, J.P., WARHIT, VENTURA and OTTLEY, JJ., concur. ENTER: Darrell M. Joseph Clerk of the Court