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in part (fines reduced to $250 plus costs)CivilCourt of AppealsAppeal

Matter of Garnet Health Med. Ctr. v. People

Court
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
Decided
Sep 30, 2026
Docket
2024-09402
Judges
Not listed
Cited as2026 NY Slip Op 05530
Detailed analysis & 3-line summary

AI breakdown

Analyzed Oct 2, 2026

Where this case stands

  1. Supreme Court: imposed fines of $500 and then $1,000 per day for non-compliance with subpoenas.

  2. This decision · Appeal

    in part (fines reduced to $250 plus costs)

TL;DR

  1. 1A hospital was fined for not responding to a subpoena as ordered.
  2. 2The court lowered the fines to $250 and added payment of legal costs instead of daily penalties.
  3. 3The daily fines were deemed excessive for the nature of the contempt.

Key issues

  1. 1

    Did the daily fines exceed what was necessary for contempt?

    Holding · Yes, the court reduced them to $250 plus costs, finding dailies excessive.

Why it matters

This affects how organizations comply with court orders, ensuring penalties are fair and reasonable.

The AI breakdown is a reading aid, not legal advice. Always check the opinion for the exact wording.

If you were the judge?

Should a hospital pay daily fines or just costs?

  1. 1A hospital ignored a subpoena and got fined daily.
  2. 2The state argued the fines were too high for the offense.
  3. 3Now, they want the fines changed to a flat fee and costs.

Should fines for contempt be replaced with a flat penalty and costs?

Be the first juror

Parties

  • Appellant

    Matter of Garnet Health Med. Ctr.

  • Appellee

    People

Roles are inferred from the case caption.

Opinion of the court
Matter of Garnet Health Med. Ctr. v People 2026 NY Slip Op 05530 September 30, 2026 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. In the Matter of Garnet Health Medical Center, appellant, v People of the State of New York, etc., respondent. Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department Decided on September 30, 2026 2024-09402, 2024-12989, (Index No. 2246/24) Betsy Barros, J.P. Lillian Wan James P. McCormack Phillip Hom, JJ. Jackson Lewis P.C., New York, NY (Bryn Goodman and Nicole E. Price of counsel), for appellant. Letitia James, Attorney General, New York, NY (Ester Murdukhayeva and Andrea W. Trento of counsel), for respondent. [*1] DECISION & ORDER In a proceeding, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 2304 to quash a subpoena duces tecum dated February 23, 2024, the petitioner appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (David S. Zuckerman, J.), dated August 22, 2024, and (2) an order of the same court dated November 6, 2024. The order dated August 22, 2024, granted the respondent's motion to hold the petitioner in civil contempt for violating an order of the same court dated May 3, 2024, and imposed a fine upon the petitioner in the sum of $500 per day, beginning 10 days after service of a copy of the order dated August 22, 2024, with notice of entry, for each day it failed to serve a "full, complete, and comprehensive" response to the subpoena duces tecum. The order dated November 6, 2024, granted that branch of the respondent's motion which was to hold the petitioner in civil contempt for violating the orders dated May 3, 2024, and August 22, 2024, and imposed a fine upon the petitioner in the sum of $1,000 per day, beginning on the date a copy of the order dated November 6, 2024, with notice of entry was served, for each day it failed to serve a "full, complete, and comprehensive" response to the subpoena duces tecum. ORDERED that the order dated August 22, 2024, is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof imposing a fine upon the petitioner in the sum of $500 per day, beginning 10 days after service of a copy of the order dated August 22, 2024, with notice of entry, for each day it failed to serve a "full, complete, and comprehensive" response to the subpoena duces tecum, and substituting therefor a provision imposing a statutory fine upon the petitioner in the sum of $250; as so modified, the order dated August 22, 2024, is affirmed, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Orange County, for a determination of the reasonable costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred by the respondent in the contempt proceedings; and it is further, ORDERED that the order dated November 6, 2024, is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof imposing upon the petitioner a fine in the sum of $1,000 per day, beginning on the date a copy of the order dated November 6, 2024, with notice of entry was served, for each day it failed to serve a "full, complete, and comprehensive" response to the subpoena duces tecum, and substituting therefor a provision imposing a statutory fine upon the petitioner in the sum [*2]of $250; as so modified, the order dated November 6, 2024, is affirmed, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Orange County, for a determination of the reasonable costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred by the respondent in the contempt proceedings; and it is further, ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the respondent. On March 18, 2024, the petitioner commenced this proceeding, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 2304 to quash a subpoena duces tecum dated February 23, 2024, issued by the respondent. In an order dated May 3, 2024, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted the respondent's motion to compel the petitioner to respond to the subpoena to the extent of directing the petitioner to comply with the subpoena, as modified, within 30 days of the date of the order. Thereafter, the respondent moved to hold the petitioner in civil contempt for violating the order dated May 3, 2024 (hereinafter the initial contempt motion). In an order dated August 22, 2024, the court granted the initial contempt motion and imposed a fine upon the petitioner in the sum of $500 per day, beginning 10 days after service of a copy of the order with notice of entry, for each day it failed to serve a "full, complete, and comprehensive" response to the subpoena. The respondent subsequently moved, inter alia, to hold the petitioner in civil contempt for violating the orders dated May 3, 2024, and August 22, 2024 (hereinafter the subsequent contempt motion). In an order dated November 6, 2024, the court granted that branch of the subsequent contempt motion and imposed a fine upon the petitioner in the sum of $1,000 per day, beginning on the date a copy of the order with notice of entry was served, for each day it failed to serve a "full, complete, and comprehensive" response to the subpoena. The petitioner appeals. "A motion to punish a party for civil contempt is addressed to the sound discretion of the motion court" (Madigan v Berkeley Capital, LLC, 205 AD3d 900, 905). In order to sustain a finding of civil contempt based on a violation of a court order, it is necessary to establish by clear and convincing evidence that a lawful court order clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate was in effect, that the person alleged to have violated the order had actual knowledge of its terms, and that the violation has defeated, impaired, impeded, or prejudiced the rights of a party (see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Raimo, 241 AD3d 1430, 1432). "In order to sustain a finding of civil contempt, it is not necessary that the disobedience be deliberate or willful; rather, the mere act of disobedience, regardless of its motive, is sufficient if such disobedience defeats, impairs, impedes or prejudices the rights of a party" (Palmieri v Town of Babylon, 167 AD3d 637, 640 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see El-Dehdan v El-Dehdan, 26 NY3d 19, 35; Tedesco v Elio, 211 AD3d 1074, 1076). Once the movant establishes a knowing failure to comply with a clear and unequivocal mandate, the burden shifts to the alleged contemnor to refute the movant's showing or to offer evidence of a defense, such as an inability to comply with the order (see Lisogor v Nature's Delight, Inc., 189 AD3d 1386, 1388; Palmieri v Town of Babylon, 167 AD3d at 640). "A hearing is required only if the papers in opposition raise a factual dispute as to the elements of civil contempt, or the existence of a defense" (El-Dehdan v El-Dehdan, 114 AD3d 4, 17, affd 26 NY3d 19; see McCurty v Roberts, 227 AD3d 1469, 1470; Matter of Ling v Sans Souci Owners Corp., 187 AD3d 755, 756-757). "Generally, conclusory, baseless, and self-serving allegations [are] insufficient to raise an issue of fact necessitating a hearing on a contempt motion, much less establish a defense to the motion" (El-Dehdan v El-Dehdan, 114 AD3d at 18 [citation and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Jaffe v Jaffe, 44 AD3d 825, 826). Here, on the initial contempt motion, the respondent established by clear and convincing evidence that the order dated May 3, 2024, clearly expressed an unequivocal mandate to comply with the subpoena, as modified, within 30 days, that the petitioner had knowledge of the order and nevertheless disobeyed it, and that the respondent was prejudiced by the offending conduct (see Matter of East End Hangars, Inc. v Town of E. Hampton, N.Y., 225 AD3d 865, 865; Palmieri v Town of Babylon, 167 AD3d at 640; El-Dehdan v El-Dehdan, 114 AD3d at 18-19). In opposition, the petitioner failed to refute the respondent's showing or to offer evidence of a defense, such as an inability to comply with the order dated May 3, 2024 (see Palmieri v Town of Babylon, 167 AD3d at 640; Matter of Fitzgerald, 144 AD3d 906, 907; cf. Tedesco v Elio, 211 AD3d at 1074). Likewise, on the subsequent contempt motion, the respondent established all the elements of civil contempt, and in opposition, the petitioner failed to offer evidence of a defense. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly found the petitioner to be in civil contempt for violating the orders dated May 3, 2024, and August 22, 2024 (see Palmieri v Town of Babylon, 167 AD3d at 640). "The aim of civil contempt is to vindicate a party's right to the benefits of a judicial mandate or to compensate that party for the interference by the contemnor" (Matter of Banks v Stanford, 159 AD3d 134, 140; see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Raimo, 241 AD3d at 1432). "Accordingly, '[a]ny penalty imposed is designed not to punish but, rather, to compensate the injured private party or to coerce compliance with the court's mandate or both'" (Matter of East End Hangars, Inc. v Town of E. Hampton, N.Y., 225 AD3d at 869, quoting Matter of Department of Envtl. Protection of City of N.Y. v Department of Envtl. Conservation of State of N.Y., 70 NY2d 233, 239). Upon a finding of civil contempt, "Judiciary Law § 773 . . . provides for two types of awards: one where actual damage has resulted from the contemptuous act in which case an award sufficient to indemnify the aggrieved party is imposed, and one where the complainant's rights have been prejudiced but an actual loss or injury is incapable of being established" (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Emily M. [Joyce G.], 245 AD3d 943, 944-945). "In the second situation, the fine is limited to $250, plus the complainant's costs and expenses" (Matter of Ferrante v Stanford, 172 AD3d 31, 39; see Judiciary Law § 773). By contrast, "where there is actual loss or injury the statute does not provide for a general $250 fine, single or multiple. It calls instead for an assessment that will indemnify aggrieved parties" (State of New York v Unique Ideas, 44 NY2d 345, 350). Here, actual damages were not established. Accordingly, to the extent the Supreme Court imposed fines in the sums of $500 per day and, thereafter, $1,000 per day for each day the petitioner failed to serve a "full, complete, and comprehensive" response to the subpoena as a penalty for the petitioner's civil contempt for violating the orders dated May 3, 2024, and August 22, 2024, the petitioner may only recover reasonable costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees, plus a statutory fine in the sum of $250 (see Judiciary Law § 773; Matter of East End Hangars, Inc. v Town of E. Hampton, N.Y., 225 AD3d at 869; Matter of Ferrante v Stanford, 172 AD3d at 39; Weissman v Weissman, 131 AD3d 529, 530; cf. Judiciary Law §§ 750[A][3]; 751[1]). Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Orange County, for a determination of the reasonable costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred by the respondent in the contempt proceedings. BARROS, J.P., WAN, MCCORMACK and HOM, JJ., concur. ENTER: Darrell M. Joseph Clerk of the Court
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