Fanuc Corp. v. Super. Ct.

Filed 10/9/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO FANUC CORPORATION et al., Petitioners, E086688 v. (Super.Ct.No. CIVSB2209387) THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN OPINION BERNARDINO COUNTY, Respondent; ABRAHAM BERNAL et al., Real Parties in Interest. ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. David E. Driscoll, Judge. Granted. Horvitz & Levy, Curt Cutting, Jason R. Litt, John B. Sprangers; Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, Michael J. Hurvitz, Ian G. Schuler, Meredith P. Montrose for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Balaban & Spielberger, Daniel K. Balaban, Andrew J. Spielberger, Kahren Harutyunyan; KJT Law Group, Aaron Turchin, Caspar Jivalagian, and Vache 1 Thomassian; Esner, Chang, Boyer & Murphy and Shea S. Murphy for Real Party in Interest, Abraham Bernal. No appearance for Real Party in Interest, Krones, Inc. No appearance for Real Party in Interest, Niagara Bottling, LLC. Abraham Bernal alleges he was injured by a robot manufactured by Fanuc Corporation (Fanuc Japan), a Japanese corporation. The sole issue before us is whether Fanuc Japan is subject to the jurisdiction of California state courts. Imputing the forum contacts of Fanuc Japan’s American subsidiary, the trial court concluded that it is subject to general jurisdiction. Bernal defends that ruling and further argues that it is also subject to specific personal jurisdiction. We disagree and find that personal jurisdiction does not extend to Fanuc Japan under any ground on the record before us. I. BACKGROUND An industrial machine called a depalletizer and a robot malfunctioned during one of Bernal’s shifts as a maintenance technician at Niagara Bottling Company in June 2020. Bernal was tasked with troubleshooting the two machines. As he was securing a ladder below the depalletizer’s gripper head, which was 15 to 20 feet above the floor, the depalletizer released the gripper head, severely injuring him. Krones, Inc. (Krones) 1 manufactured the depalletizer. Fanuc Japan manufactured the robot. 1 The complaint does not specify that the two machines were connected, but we assume as much from the allegations. 2  Bernal sued Krones, Fanuc Japan, and Fanuc America Corporation (Fanuc America), a wholly owned subsidiary of Fanuc Japan. Fanuc America, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan, did not contest personal jurisdiction. Fanuc Japan specially appeared and moved to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a)(1).) In support of the motion, a Fanuc Japan executive averred that Fanuc Japan was organized under Japanese law, that its principal place of business was in Japan, that it is not registered to do business in California, that it has no California office, that it does not own or lease property in California, that it has no California bank accounts, and that it manufactured the robot before distributing it to “FANUC Europe Corporation or its European subsidiaries.” In opposition, Bernal argued that Fanuc America was Fanuc Japan’s agent and alter ego, which subjected Fanuc Japan to general jurisdiction in California. Bernal also argued that Fanuc Japan and Fanuc America’s “inextricably intertwined” relationship justified specific jurisdiction over Fanuc Japan. Bernal cited evidence that Fanuc Japan holds itself out as “FANUC Group” (or simply “FANUC”), that Fanuc Japan and Fanuc America have interlocking boards, that Fanuc America receives at least 20 visits per year from Fanuc Japan, that three of Fanuc America’s 22 service locations are in California, that Fanuc Japan’s website showcases an advanced research laboratory “[t]hrough interaction with UC Berkeley[] and Stanford University,” and that Fanuc America 3 services Fanuc Japan’s products within the United States regardless of whether they were sold by Fanuc America. The trial court denied Fanuc Japan’s motion. It stated that there was considerable evidence that Fanuc Japan was subject to general jurisdiction in California based on an agency theory. It also noted that its analysis was consistent with its “conclusion, in ruling on Fanuc America’s motion for summary judgment, that there was evidence establishing that Fanuc America and Fanuc Japan essentially operated a single-enterprise [(i.e., were alter egos)].” Fanuc Japan then petitioned this court for a writ of mandate, and we issued an order to show cause. II. DISCUSSION California’s long-arm statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 410.10, states that a “court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.” It “manifests an intent to exercise the broadest possible jurisdiction, limited only by constitutional considerations.” (Sibley v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 442, 445.) Accordingly, we look to federal constitutional law when considering personal jurisdiction. “The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause limits a state court’s power to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant.” (Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (2021) 592 U.S. 351, 358 (Ford).) “Because ‘[a] state court’s assertion of jurisdiction exposes defendants to the State’s coercive power,’ it is ‘subject to review for compatibility with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,’ [citation], which 4 ‘limits the power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident defendant,’ [citation]. The primary focus of our personal jurisdiction inquiry is the defendant’s relationship to the forum State.” (Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco County (2017) 582 U.S. 255, 261-262 (Bristol- Myers).) “The canonical decision in this area remains International Shoe Co. v. Washington [(1945) 326 U.S. 310]. There, the Court held that a tribunal’s authority depends on the defendant’s having such ‘contacts’ with the forum State that ‘the maintenance of the suit’ is ‘reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government,’ and ‘does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” (Ford, supra, 592 U.S. at p. 358.) Since then, the United States Supreme Court has recognized “two types of personal jurisdiction: ‘general’ (sometimes called ‘all-purpose’) jurisdiction and ‘specific’ (sometimes called ‘case-linked’) jurisdiction.” (Bristol-Myers, supra, 582 U.S. at p. 262.) “General jurisdiction, as its name implies, extends to ‘any and all claims’ brought against a defendant. [Citation.] Those claims need not relate to the forum State or the defendant’s activity there; they may concern events and conduct anywhere in the world.” (Ford, supra, 592 U.S. at p. 358.) “Specific jurisdiction is very different.” (Bristol-Myers, supra, 582 U.S. at p. 262.) “It covers defendants less intimately connected with a State, but only as to a narrower class of claims.” (Ford, supra, 592 U.S. at p. 359.) “In order for a state court 5 to exercise specific jurisdiction, ‘the suit’ must ‘aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.’” (Bristol-Myers, supra, at p. 262.) “When a defendant moves to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction.” (L.W. v. Audi AG (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 95, 108.) “Where, as here, ‘“no conflict in the evidence exists . . . the question of jurisdiction is purely one of law and the reviewing court engages in an independent review of the record.”’” (Snowney v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1062.) A. General Jurisdiction “A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign- country) corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” (Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations S.A. v. Brown (2011) 564 U.S. 915, 919, 924.) In Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117 (Daimler), the United States Supreme Court emphasized that the last phrase—that a corporation be “essentially at home” in the forum—is paramount. (See Daimler, supra, 571 U.S. at p. 138-139 [“the inquiry . . . is not whether a foreign corporation’s in-forum contacts can be said to be in some sense ‘continuous and systematic’”], italics added.) That is because the wide breadth of available claims “imposes a correlative limit: Only a select ‘set of affiliations with a forum’ will expose a defendant to such sweeping jurisdiction.” (Ford, supra, 592 U.S. at p. 358.) 6  “The ‘paradigm’ forums in which a corporate defendant is ‘at home’ . . . are the corporation’s place of incorporation and its principal place of business.” (BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell (2017) 581 U.S. 402, 413 (BNSF).) “Those affiliations have the virtue of being unique—that is, each ordinarily indicates only one place—as well as easily ascertainable.” (Daimler, supra, 571 U.S. at p. 137.) However, “[t]he exercise of general jurisdiction is not limited to these forums; in an ‘exceptional case,’ a corporate defendant’s operations in another forum ‘may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.’” (BNSF, supra, at p. 413.) For example, in Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co. (1952) 342 U.S. 437 (Perkins), “war had forced the defendant corporation’s owner to temporarily relocate the enterprise from the Philippines to Ohio.” (BNSF, supra, at p. 413, citing Perkins, supra, at pp. 447-448.) “Because Ohio then became ‘the center of the corporation’s wartime activities,’ [citation], suit was proper there.” (BNSF, supra, at p. 413, citing Perkins, supra, at p. 448.) Fanuc Japan is incorporated in Japan and has its principal place of business there. It does not have an office in California, is not registered to do business in California, does not maintain any bank accounts in California, and does not own or lease any property in California. Thus, in no sense can Fanuc Japan’s direct relationship with California render it essentially at home here. The question then becomes whether general jurisdiction can somehow be imputed to Fanuc Japan through Fanuc America. 7  The trial court concluded that Fanuc Japan was subject to general jurisdiction on an agency theory. (See, e.g., Paneno v. Centres for Academic Programmes Abroad Ltd. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1447, 1455 [“‘Agency may confer general jurisdiction in the forum state over a foreign corporation.’”] (Paneno).) It focused on Fanuc Japan’s control over Fanuc America. It noted that there was evidence “of an importer and distributor relationship, a warranty and service relationship, marketing activities that also include[d] providing feedback to Fanuc Japan about product needs, overlap in some personnel, [and] a litigation reporting requirement based on” company regulations. Those regulations, moreover, “outlin[ed] the need for approvals for opening, closing, or moving a branch, factory, office, etc. . . . ; changes to various identified positions; various finance and accounting matters; important technology and business partnerships with other domestic and overseas entities,” and “numerous other operational decisions.” Daimler, however, forecloses the trial court’s use of an agency theory here. Daimler involved a lawsuit in California against Daimler, a German public stock company, based on alleged actions of its Argentinian subsidiary. (Daimler, supra, 571 U.S. at pp. 120-121.) “Jurisdiction over the lawsuit was predicated on the California contacts of Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA), a subsidiary of Daimler incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in New Jersey. MBUSA distributes Daimler-manufactured vehicles to independent dealerships throughout the United States, including California.” (Id. at p. 121.) The Ninth Circuit held that Daimler was subject to general jurisdiction in California courts. It applied what it called its agency test, which 8 required both a showing that the parent would perform the subsidiary’s services “if it did not have a representative to perform them” and a finding that the parent exercised sufficient control over the subsidiary. (Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (9th Cir. 2011) 644 F.3d 909, 920, reversed in Daimler, supra, at p. 142.) In reversing, the United States Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s agency test. It stated that “gaug[ing] . . . Daimler’s hypothetical readiness to perform those services itself if MBUSA did not exist” “stack[ed] the deck” because it would “always yield a pro-jurisdiction answer.” (Daimler, supra, 571 U.S. at pp. 135-136.) The high court expressed skepticism that agency relationships, which can be relevant in finding specific jurisdiction, applied for purposes of general jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 135, fn. 13 [“Agency relationships, we have recognized, may be relevant to the existence of specific jurisdiction. . . . It does not inevitably follow, however, that similar reasoning applies to general jurisdiction.”].) However, it stopped short of holding that agency relationships could never be relevant for general jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 135 [“we need not pass judgment on invocation of an agency theory in the context of general jurisdiction”].) The Ninth Circuit’s agency test, which was also known as the “representative services” 2 doctrine, was no longer good law. 2 Although no case has squarely held as much, the California cases applying the same doctrine presumably are no longer good law, even if the doctrine as applied in California courts did not separately require the parent’s right to substantially control the subsidiary. (Daimler, supra, 571 U.S. at pp. 135-136; see, e.g., BBA Aviation PLC v. Superior Court (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 421, 430 [“The representative services doctrine is 9  After Daimler, an agency theory appears to remain available to establish general jurisdiction, although its precise limits are unclear. In particular, Daimler rejected the Ninth Circuit’s finding that Daimler exercised sufficient control over MBUSA on the facts before it (namely that Daimler and MBUSA had disclaimed an agency relationship), but it did not declare inapplicable all arguments about a foreign parent’s control over a domestic subsidiary. (See Daimler, supra, 571 U.S. at p. 136, fn. 15 [“The Ninth Circuit’s agency analysis also looked to whether the parent enjoys ‘the right to substantially control’ the subsidiary’s activities. [Citation.] The Court of Appeals found the requisite ‘control’ demonstrated by the General Distributor Agreement between Daimler and MBUSA, which gives Daimler the right to oversee certain of MBUSA’s operations, even though that agreement expressly disavowed the creation of any agency relationship. Thus grounded, the separate inquiry into control hardly curtails the overbreadth of the Ninth Circuit’s agency holding.”].) Regardless of what remains of agency theories to establish general jurisdiction, Fanuc America is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan, and in Daimler, similar facts meant that general jurisdiction could not extend to the foreign parent in California. (Daimler, supra, 571 U.S. at p. 139 [“neither Daimler a variation of agency, but does not depend on whether the parent enjoys pervasive and continuous control over the subsidiary as to establish a general agency relationship”]; Dorel Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1277; F. Hoffman- La Roche, Ltd. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 782, 798; Paneno, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1456; Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 542 (Sonora Diamond).) 10 nor MBUSA is incorporated in California, nor does either entity have its principal place of business there”]; see id. at p. 136 [Daimler not subject to general jurisdiction even assuming subsidiary’s contacts were imputable to parent].) Whether general jurisdiction could be established over Fanuc Japan in Delaware or Michigan is not before us. What matters is that Fanuc America can hardly be said to be essentially at home in California, even if it conducts a significant amount of business here, and thus Fanuc Japan cannot be subject to general, all-purpose jurisdiction by virtue of any control it has over Fanuc America. (See Preciado v. Freightliner Custom Chassis Corp. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 964, 977 [“As the Supreme Court has made clear, general jurisdiction requires more than a showing that ‘a corporation “engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business”’ in a state. [Citation.] Instead, the state must hold the particular position of being the location where the corporation is ‘at home.’”].) Separately from agency theory, general jurisdiction can extend to a foreign parent corporation if the domestic subsidiary is nothing but an alter ego of the parent. “Under the alter ego doctrine . . . when the corporate form is used to perpetrate a fraud, circumvent a statute, or accomplish some other wrongful or inequitable purpose, the courts will ignore the corporate entity and deem the corporation’s acts to be those of the persons or organizations actually controlling the corporation, in most instances the equitable owners.” (Sonora Diamond, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 538.) Like agency theory, the alter ego doctrine appears to remain a valid way to impute general jurisdiction. (See Williams v. Yamaha Motor Co. (9th Cir. 2017) 851 F.3d 1015, 1021 11 (Williams) [“while Daimler invalidated our previous ‘agency’ test, it ‘left intact’ the alternative ‘alter ego test for “imputed” general jurisdiction”’”]; cf. Daimler, supra, 571 U.S. at pp. 134-135 [“several Courts of Appeals have held[] that a subsidiary’s jurisdictional contacts can be imputed to its parent only when the former is so dominated by the latter as to be its alter ego”].) But again, because Fanuc America is not essentially at home in California, Fanuc Japan would not be subject to general jurisdiction here even 3 if we were to assume that Fanuc America was an alter ego of Fanuc Japan. Bernal’s other arguments for finding general jurisdiction are unavailing. Although Bernal spends several pages of his return arguing for general jurisdiction based on agency, at no point in that discussion does he discuss—or even cite—Daimler. Furthermore, he cites In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Products Liability Litigation 3 Bernal argues that the trial court found, in a separate ruling, that Fanuc America is an alter ego of Fanuc Japan, and that such a finding controls here. Setting aside that our result would not change even if this were true, we disagree with Bernal’s premise. In finding general jurisdiction over Fanuc Japan, the trial court stated that its analysis was “consistent with [its] conclusion, in ruling on Fanuc America’s motion for summary judgment, that there was evidence establishing that Fanuc America and Fanuc Japan essentially operated a single-enterprise under Las Palmas Associated v. Las Palmas Center Associates (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1220, 1249-1250.” But Bernal gives us no reason to believe that a finding that Fanuc America is an alter ego of Fanuc Japan (or, in other words, that they operated a single enterprise) would have been made in Fanuc America’s motion for summary judgment. And although the trial court’s ruling there might have explained why, Bernal did not include that ruling as an exhibit to his return. At most, the ruling appears to suggest that there was enough evidence to submit the question of alter ego liability to the factfinder at trial. (See Verizon California Inc. v. Board of Equalization (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1160 [“‘The purpose of a summary judgment proceeding is to permit a party to show that material factual claims arising from the pleadings need not be tried because they are not in dispute’”].) 12 (5th Cir. 2014) 753 F.3d 521 as an example of where an agent’s contacts were imputed to their parent for personal jurisdiction, but that case concerned only specific jurisdiction, not general jurisdiction. (See id. at p. 529 [“TG argues that the district court erred in 4 finding specific jurisdiction over it in Florida”].) We therefore find that the trial court erred in finding general jurisdiction over Fanuc Japan. B. Specific Jurisdiction Specific jurisdiction “covers defendants less intimately connected with a State, but only as to a narrower class of claims.” (Ford, supra, 592 U.S. at p. 359.) Three requirements must be met before a court can exercise specific jurisdiction. First, the defendant “must take ‘some act by which [it] purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.’” (Ibid.) Second, “because the defendant is not ‘at home’” in that jurisdiction, “[t]he plaintiff’s claims . . . ‘must arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts’ with the forum.” (Ibid.) And third, the exercise of 4 Bernal does not defend a portion of the trial court’s ruling where, in finding general jurisdiction, the trial court observed that Fanuc Japan attempted to maintain a low silhouette in California. Fanuc Japan argues that the trial court erred in doing so because it relied on cases concerning service of process, not personal jurisdiction. (See Cosper v. Smith and Wesson Arms Co. (1959) 53 Cal.2d 77 (Cosper) [service on domestic promoter of foreign defendant’s products sufficient]; General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 81, 85 [Cosper involved a defendant that “had not designated an agent for acceptance of service of process and had in effect attempted to maintain a rather low silhouette within the state by operating through subsidiaries and contract representatives”]; Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 264, 273-274.) 13 jurisdiction must be reasonable under the circumstances. (Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty. (1987) 480 U.S. 102, 113-114 (Asahi).) If a plaintiff demonstrates the first two requirements of purposeful availment and relatedness, then the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable. (L.W. v. Audi AG, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 108.) We focus on only relatedness here. In doing so, we assume, but do not decide, that Fanuc America is an agent of Fanuc Japan such that Fanuc Japan can be said to have purposefully availed itself of California through Fanuc America’s actions. (See Williams, supra, 851 F.3d at p. 1024 [noting that, although Daimler rejected the representative services doctrine, “some standard of agency continues to be ‘relevant to the existence of specific jurisdiction’”], italics removed.) Those actions include selling and distributing in the United States robots designed and manufactured by Fanuc Japan and operating three service locations in California. We do not reach whether the exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable under the circumstances, even though the “‘primary concern’” in this regard is “‘the burden on the defendant’” (Bristol-Myers, supra, 582 U.S. at p. 263), and Fanuc Japan is a foreign company. (See Asahi, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 114 [“The unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders”].) The United States Supreme Court most recently examined relatedness in Ford. The case arose from two auto accidents—one in Montana, the other in Minnesota— 14 involving allegedly defective Ford vehicles. (Ford, supra, 592 U.S. at p. 356.) Ford had argued that it was not subject to personal jurisdiction in either lawsuit because it neither designed, manufactured, nor sold the vehicles to their owners in those two states. (Id. at pp. 356-357.) It conceded that it did substantial business in Montana and Minnesota. (Id. at p. 361.) Nevertheless, it claimed that “those activities [did] not sufficiently connect to the suits, even though the resident-plaintiffs allege[d] that Ford cars malfunctioned in the forum States” because those activities did not give rise to the plaintiffs’ claims. (Ibid.) Rejecting Ford’s argument, the Supreme Court stated that it has “never framed the specific jurisdiction inquiry as always requiring proof of causation.” (Ford, supra, 592 U.S. at p. 362.) Rather, the “most common formulation of the rule” has been that the suit must “‘arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.’” (Ibid., citing Daimler, supra, 571 U.S. at p. 127.) And in applying that rule, the Court held that Ford’s activities was sufficient: “Each plaintiff’s suit, of course, arises from a car accident in one of those States. In each complaint, the resident-plaintiff alleges that a defective Ford vehicle—an Explorer in one, a Crown Victoria in the other—caused the crash and resulting harm. . . . Ford had advertised, sold, and serviced those two car models in both States for many years. (Contrast a case, which we do not address, in which Ford marketed the models in only a different State or region.) In other words, Ford had systematically served a market in Montana and Minnesota for the very vehicles that the plaintiffs allege malfunctioned and injured them in those States.” (Ford, supra, at p. 365.) 15  Bernal fails to show relatedness here. His argument on this is brief: he contends only that “the fact that the Fanuc robot was originally sold in Europe and resold in California does not defeat the relatedness requirement” and that “Fanuc Japan specifically directed efforts to sell its robotics equipment in California—indeed, its subsidiary Fanuc America even sold other robots to Niagara Bottling Company, Plaintiff’s employer.” But neither of these show relatedness. Because it is Bernal who must show relatedness (see L.W. v. Audi AG, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 108), we do not start with an assumption that his claims relate to Fanuc Japan’s California contacts. Bernal’s argument that where the robot was sold “does not defeat the relatedness requirement” does not help him because it assumes relatedness has been already established. His other point—that Fanuc Japan directed efforts to sell robots in California— fares no better. Ford emphasized the extensive marketing and sales of the specific Ford vehicles at issue in the forum states: “By every means imaginable—among them, billboards, TV and radio spots, print ads, and direct mail—Ford urges Montanans and Minnesotans to buy its vehicles, including (at all relevant times) Explorers and Crown Victorias. Ford cars—again including those two models—are available for sale, whether new or used, throughout the States, at 36 dealerships in Montana and 84 in Minnesota.” (Ford, supra, 592 U.S. at p. 365.) Critically, Bernal does not point to any sale of the Fanuc robot at issue (an “M-410iB/700” robot) to anyone in California by Fanuc Japan or 16  5 Fanuc America. Similarly, he does not show that Fanuc Japan or Fanuc America installed the specific robot in California, nor does he cite any marketing of the M- 410iB/700 robot to California customers. His focus on his employer buying other Fanuc 6 robots shows how different his case is from Ford. (Ford, supra, at p. 365 [“Ford had systematically served a market in Montana and Minnesota for the very vehicles that the plaintiffs allege malfunctioned and injured them in those States.”], italics added; see also L.W. v. Audi AG, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 116 [“the record reflects that Audi deliberately and systematically (albeit indirectly) served the market for automobiles in California for the very vehicle that plaintiffs alleged was defective”], italics added.) That Bernal’s employer bought other robots from Fanuc America shows little (or even nothing) about how his claim—that the M-410iB/700 was defective—is related to Fanuc America’s California contacts. That is, from the showing here, it is possible that the robot model at issue here was never sold in California. Bernal notes, in other sections of his return, that Fanuc America has three service centers in California and that Fanuc America serviced the robot that injured him after the 5 The Fanuc robot at issue was purchased by Krones from either “FANUC Europe” or “FANUC Germany.” 6 As Bernal phrases it, it is unclear whether he means that his employer bought more of the M-410iB/700 or, alternatively, other robot models. Neither Bernal in his return nor his cited source (a deposition transcript where a Fanuc America VP states “We have sold other robots to Niagara Bottling”) clearly claim that Niagara Bottling bought more than one of the same robot model that injured him. Since he has the burden of proof, we construe his statement to establish only that his employer bought other robot models, not that his employer bought other robots of the same model. 17 accident. But this does not help Bernal, either. The evidence he cites does not show that one of the California service centers repaired the robot after the accident. If none did, the existence of the repair shops does little. This case would be similar to LNS Enterprises LLC v. Continental Motors, Inc. (9th Cir. 2022) 22 F.4th 852, where the Ninth Circuit stated that “even assuming that [p]laintiffs could establish that Continental [an aircraft engine manufacturer] did operate [four] repair centers, plaintiffs have not established that their injuries in this case arise out of or relate to Continental’s contacts with the forum” because “[t]he existence of these four repair shops, without more, is insufficient to show that Continental ‘continuously and deliberately exploited’ Arizona’s market with respect to the specific type of engine at issue.” (Id. at p. 863, citing Ford, supra, 592 U.S. at p. 364.) Even if a California service center did repair the robot, however, this singular data point—Bernal points to no other instances of California service centers repairing M- 410iB/700 robots—would not be enough to show relatedness. Setting aside any potential fairness concerns with using subsequent remedial measures as the strongest evidence for personal jurisdiction (cf. Evid. Code, § 1151 [evidence of subsequent repairs not admissible to prove negligence]), in Ford, the forum contacts were so extensive that “the owners of [the] cars might never have bought them, and so these suits might never have arisen, except for Ford’s contacts with their home States.” (Ford, supra, at p. 367; see Yamashita v. LG Chem, Ltd. (9th Cir. 2023) 62 F.4th 496, 505 [construing the quoted language from Ford to mean that “a plaintiff’s injury relates to a defendant’s forum 18 contacts if similar injuries will tend to be caused by those contacts”].) Bernal has not 7 made a similar showing here. We do not mean to suggest that Fanuc Japan could never be subject to specific jurisdiction in California in a products liability case. Perhaps it could be on a different claim, or on a different record. But under Ford and on the record before us, we hold that, as with general jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction over Fanuc Japan has not been established. 7 Bernal’s reliance on an Illinois federal district court case from 1991 finding specific jurisdiction over Fanuc Japan is unpersuasive. (See King v. Perry and Sylva Machinery Co. (N.D. Ill. 1991) 766 F.Supp. 638.) Assuming that Fanuc Japan and “Fanuc Ltd.,” the defendant in the district court case, are the same, the case was decided well before Ford. A central point of Ford, moreover, is that specific jurisdiction in one case cannot demonstrate specific jurisdiction in another without ignoring the relatedness requirement altogether. 19  III. DISPOSITION The order denying the motion to quash summons for lack of personal jurisdiction is reversed. The matter is remanded with directions to enter a new order granting the motion. Fanuc Japan to recover its costs. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION RAPHAEL ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ J. We concur: RAMIREZ ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ P. J. MILLER ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ J. 20