Johnson v. Brentwood Teachers Assn.

Johnson v Brentwood Teachers Assn. 2026 NY Slip Op 05523 September 30, 2026 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. Kimberly Johnson, et al., respondents-appellants, v Brentwood Teachers Association, et al., appellants- respondents, et al., defendants. Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department Decided on September 30, 2026 2022-09184, (Index No. 607773/22) Hector D. Lasalle, P.J. Cheryl E. Chambers Paul Wooten Helen Voutsinas, JJ. Robert T. Reilly, New York, NY (Gregory M. Ainsley of counsel), for appellants-respondents. Kimberly Johnson and William King Moss III, Brentwood, NY, respondents-appellants pro se. [*1] DECISION & ORDER In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for violations of Civil Rights Law § 40-c and Executive Law §§ 290 to 300, the defendants Brentwood Teachers Association and Kevin Coyne appeal, and the plaintiffs cross-appeal, from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Joseph A. Santorelli, J.), dated September 20, 2022. The order, insofar as appealed from, in effect, denied those branches of the motion of the defendants Brentwood Teachers Association and Kevin Coyne which were pursuant to Civil Rights Law § 70-a for an award of costs, attorneys' fees, and compensatory and punitive damages. The order, insofar as cross-appealed from, granted that branch of the motion of the defendants Brentwood Teachers Association and Kevin Coyne which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them and, in effect, sua sponte, directed dismissal of the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants Mudnia Sheikh and Hassan Ahmed. ORDERED that on the Court's own motion, the notice of cross-appeal from so much of the order as, in effect, sua sponte, directed dismissal of the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants Mudnia Sheikh and Hassan Ahmed is deemed to be an application for leave to cross-appeal from that portion of the order, and leave to cross-appeal is granted (see CPLR 5701[c]); and it is further, ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, (1) by deleting the provision thereof, in effect, denying that branch of the motion of the defendants Brentwood Teachers Association and Kevin Coyne which was pursuant to Civil Rights Law § 70-a for an award of costs and attorneys' fees, and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion, and (2) by deleting the provision thereof, in effect, sua sponte, directing dismissal of the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants Mudnia Sheikh and Hassan Ahmed; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, without costs or disbursements. In April 2022, the plaintiffs commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for violations of Civil Rights Law § 40-c and Executive Law §§ 290 to 300 against, among others, the defendants Brentwood Teachers Association and Kevin Coyne (hereinafter together the union [*2]defendants) and the defendants Mudnia Sheikh and Hassan Ahmed (hereinafter together the candidate defendants). The plaintiffs alleged, among other things, racial discrimination in connection with two elections for trustee of the Board of Education of the Brentwood Union Free School District (hereinafter the Board). The union defendants moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them and pursuant to Civil Rights Law § 70-a for an award of costs, attorneys' fees, and compensatory and punitive damages, arguing, among other things, that the action constituted a strategic lawsuit against public participation (see id. § 76-a). In an order dated September 20, 2022, the Supreme Court granted that branch of the union defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them, in effect, sua sponte, directed dismissal of the complaint insofar as asserted against the candidate defendants, and, in effect, denied those branches of the union defendants' motion which were pursuant to Civil Rights Law § 70-a for an award of attorneys' fees, costs, and compensatory and punitive damages. The union defendants appeal, and the plaintiffs cross-appeal. "On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the complaint must be construed liberally, the factual allegations deemed to be true, and the nonmoving party granted the benefit of every possible favorable inference" (60 E. 196, LLC v Tokio Mar. Specialty Ins. Co., 242 AD3d 930, 931 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see 298 Humboldt, LLC v Torres, 197 AD3d 1081, 1083). The first and second causes of action alleged violations of Civil Rights Law § 40-c and Executive Law §§ 290 to 300, respectively. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(1) provides that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the equal protection of the laws of this state." Further, Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that "[n]o person shall, because of race, creed, color, [or] national origin, . . . be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights . . . by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the state." Executive Law § 290(3) requires the State to ensure that every individual "is afforded an equal opportunity to enjoy a full and productive life." "Courts must construe the Human Rights Laws broadly in favor of discrimination plaintiffs, to the extent that such a construction is reasonably possible" (Syeed v Bloomberg L.P., 41 NY3d 446, 451 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action alleging a violation of Civil Rights Law § 40-c or Executive Law §§ 290 to 300 against the union defendants because the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege how the union defendants deprived the plaintiffs of their rights or an opportunity to participate in the Board elections. The third cause of action alleged tortious interference with contract. "The elements of a cause of action alleging tortious interference with contract are: (1) the existence of a valid contract between the plaintiff and a third party, (2) the defendant's knowledge of that contract, (3) the defendant's intentional procurement of a third-party's breach of that contract without justification, and (4) damages" (Dibble v Schroedel, 240 AD3d 570, 573 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Tri-Star Light. Corp. v Goldstein, 151 AD3d 1102, 1105). Here, the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action alleging tortious interference with a contract against the union defendants since the plaintiffs failed to identify a valid, existing contract between themselves and a third party. The fourth cause of action alleged, in effect, prima facie tort. The elements of a cause of action to recover damages for prima facie tort are "(1) the intentional infliction of harm, (2) which results in special damages, (3) without any excuse or justification, (4) by an act or a series of acts which would otherwise be lawful" (Banschick v Johnson, 222 AD3d 608, 610 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "Special damages must be alleged with sufficient particularity to identify actual losses and be related causally to the alleged tortious acts" (Shahid v Slochowsky & Slochowsky, LLP, 208 AD3d 1381, 1383 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, the plaintiffs did not allege with sufficient particularity their actual losses (see id.). The fifth cause of action alleged, in effect, tortious interference with business relations. "To prevail on a cause of action to recover damages for tortious interference with business [*3]relations, a plaintiff must prove that it had a business relationship with a third party, that the defendant knew of that relationship and intentionally interfered with it, that the defendant's actions were motivated solely by malice or otherwise constituted illegal means, and that the defendant's interference caused injury to the plaintiff's relationship with the third party" (684 E. 222nd Realty Co., LLC v Sheehan, 185 AD3d 879, 879-880). Here, the plaintiffs failed to allege with specificity that they had a business relationship with a third party, that the union defendants knew of that relationship, that there was any intentional interference with that relationship, or that the union defendants' alleged interference caused injury to the plaintiffs. The sixth cause of action alleged civil conspiracy. "New York does not recognize civil conspiracy to commit a tort as an independent cause of action" (25-86 41st St., LLC v Guzman, 234 AD3d 649, 650 [internal quotation marks omitted]). However, "a plaintiff may plead the existence of a conspiracy in order to connect the actions of the individual defendants with an actionable, underlying tort, and establish that those actions were part of a common scheme" (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]). "[I]n order to properly plead a cause of action to recover damages for civil conspiracy, the plaintiff must allege a cognizable tort, coupled with an agreement between the conspirators regarding the tort, and an overt action in furtherance of the agreement" (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, contrary to the plaintiffs' contentions, they failed to sufficiently allege a cause of action alleging tortious interference with contract, prima facie tort, or tortious interference with business relations against the union defendants. Thus, the plaintiffs also failed to state a cause of action alleging civil conspiracy against the union defendants. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the union defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them. However, the Supreme Court erred by, in effect, sua sponte, directing dismissal of the complaint insofar as asserted against the candidate defendants, as no extraordinary circumstances warranted granting that relief to those defendants, who did not move for dismissal (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v St. Louis, 229 AD3d 116, 120; Cheslowitz v Board of Trustees of the Knox Sch., 156 AD3d 753, 757). "On a defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) and (g), once a defendant establishes that the action is an action involving public petition and participation, the plaintiff is obligated to demonstrate that the causes of action alleged have a substantial basis in law" (Moonbeam Gateway Mar., LLC v Tai Chan, 239 AD3d 965, 966 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Mable Assets, LLC v Rachmanov, 192 AD3d 998, 1000; CPLR 3211[g]). Costs and attorneys' fees shall be awarded to a defendant in an action involving public petition and participation "upon a demonstration . . . that the action involving public petition and participation was commenced or continued without a substantial basis in fact and law and could not be supported by a substantial argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law" (Civil Rights Law § 70-a[1][a]). Contrary to the plaintiffs' contentions, the union defendants satisfied their burden of establishing that this action was an action involving public petition and participation, since it involves a claim based upon "lawful conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of free speech in connection with an issue of public interest" (id. § 76-a[1][a][2]). Specifically, the union defendants established that a Facebook post regarding a Board election was both made publicly and in connection with an issue of public interest, namely, a Board election (see Reeves v Associated Newspapers, Ltd., 232 AD3d 10, 27; Nelson v Ardrey, 231 AD3d 179, 183). Since the union defendants established that this action constituted an action involving public petition and participation, the burden shifted to the plaintiffs to demonstrate that the causes of action had a substantial basis in law (see Moonbeam Gateway Mar., LLC v Tai Chan, 239 AD3d at 966). For the same reasons the Supreme Court properly granted dismissal of the complaint insofar as asserted against the union defendants, the plaintiffs did not establish that any of the causes of action insofar as asserted against the union defendants had a substantial basis in fact and law. Because the union defendants established that this action involved public petition and participation, and because the plaintiffs failed to establish that the causes of action insofar as asserted against the union defendants were predicated on a substantial basis in fact and law, the union defendants were entitled to an award of costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to Civil Rights Law § 70-a(1)(a) (see id. § 76-a[1][a][2]; Moonbeam Gateway Mar., LLC v Tai Chan, 239 AD3d at 966). However, the union defendants failed to sufficiently demonstrate that the plaintiffs commenced this action for "the purpose of harassing, intimidating, punishing or otherwise maliciously inhibiting the free exercise of speech, petition or association rights" (Civil Rights Law § 70-a[1][b]; see Southampton Day Camp Realty, LLC v Gormon, 118 AD3d 976). Thus, the Supreme Court properly, in effect, denied that branch of the union defendants' motion which was pursuant to Civil Rights Law § 70-a for an award of compensatory and punitive damages. The plaintiffs' remaining contentions are without merit. LASALLE, P.J., CHAMBERS, WOOTEN and VOUTSINAS, JJ., concur. ENTER: Darrell M. Joseph Clerk of the Court