Haubold v. Towers on the Park Condominium

Haubold v Towers on the Park Condominium 2026 NY Slip Op 05725 October 6, 2026 Appellate Division, First Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. Alexander Haubold et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v Towers on the Park Condominium et al., Defendants-Respondents. Decided and Entered: October 06, 2026 Index No. 157881/20|Appeal No. 7149|Case No. 2025-04345| Before: Mendez, J.P., Rodriguez, Pitt-Burke, Rosado, O'Neill Levy, JJ. Alexander Haubold and Promiti Haubold, appellants pro se. Kellner Herlihy Getty & Friedman LLP, New York (Douglas A. Kellner of counsel), for respondents. [*1] Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Dakota D. Ramsuer, J.), entered on or about June 10, 2025, which granted defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs. The motion court properly dismissed plaintiffs' claim for tortious interference with business relations. The record shows that plaintiffs did not enter into a contract of sale for their combined condominium units in 2017, negating a central element of the claim (see Lama Holding Co. v Smith Barney, 88 NY2d 413, 424 [1996]). Plaintiffs also did not identify any purportedly tortious conduct by defendants that thwarted that sale (see Aridas v 244 E. 60th St. Owners Corp., 292 AD2d 325, 326 [1st Dept 2002]). Although in certain instances a plaintiff may pursue a claim for tortious interference where a prospective contract falls through, a claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations requires a more significant showing of culpable conduct on defendants' part, which is entirely absent here (see NBT Bancorp v Fleet/Norstar Fin. Group, 87 NY2d 614, 621 [1996]). Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that defendants took any steps to involve themselves with plaintiffs' 2017 unconsummated sale. Plaintiffs' bare allegation that the prospective buyer contacted the management company after a review of the board meeting minutes reflecting the units' status does not raise a question of fact as to defendants' interference because there is no allegation that defendants provided any information that was misleading—or even inaccurate—to constitute tortious interference with a prospective agreement (id.; see also Bridgers v Wagner, 80 AD3d 528, 528 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 717 [2011] ["Plaintiffs' allegation that the cooperative board's minutes referring to the allegedly illegal work performed in their apartment discouraged a potential purchaser is insufficient to support their claim of tortious interference with contract or with prospective business relations"]). The motion court also properly dismissed the claim for breach of fiduciary duty based on the same failure to identify any independent tortious conduct by any board member or any damages. In the absence of independent wrongful conduct by any board member, the business judgment rule requires courts to "defer to the board's determination so long as the board acts in good faith, within the scope of its authority under the bylaws, and to further a legitimate interest of the condominium" (Pomerance v McGrath, 124 AD3d 481, 483 [1st Dept 2015], lv dismissed 25 NY3d 1038 [2015]). [*2] Here, the motion court properly rejected plaintiffs' assertion that they were singled out for disparate treatment in being required to obtain a new tax lot for their combined units under the agreement plaintiffs struck with the seller at the time of purchase. Although plaintiffs presented some evidence that other units in the building had been combined, there is no evidence that any unit owner was permitted to sell a combined unit without obtaining a new tax lot in contravention of an agreement to do so. In these circumstances, the enforcement of plaintiffs' agreement in which they agreed to complete the tax lot merger does not constitute disparate treatment (see Jones v Surrey Coop. Apts., 263 AD2d 33, 37 [1st Dept 1999] [no breach of fiduciary duty where the plaintiff "was on notice that any transfer of her shares was subject to the restrictions contained in the cooperative's by-laws"]). Based on the above, the motion court providently rejected plaintiffs' contention, raised for the first time at oral argument, that summary judgment was premature because depositions had not been taken and certain document discovery remained outstanding (CPLR 3212[f]). Even if plaintiffs had argued in their motion papers that defendant's motion was premature, plaintiffs fail to identify facts that were unavailable to them as a result of defendants' purported refusal to schedule depositions or complete discovery that would have changed the outcome, for the reasons discussed above. We have considered plaintiffs' remaining contentions and find them unavailing. THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT. ENTERED: October 6, 2026