Fritz v. Kurmel Brokerage, Ltd.

Fritz v Kurmel Brokerage, Ltd. 2026 NY Slip Op 05769 October 7, 2026 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. Lincoln Fritz, et al., appellants, v Kurmel Brokerage, Ltd., respondent, et al., defendant. Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department Decided on October 7, 2026 2024-13495, (Index No. 507197/20) Lara J. Genovesi, J.P. William G. Ford Helen Voutsinas Donna-Marie E. Golia, JJ. Aboulafia Law Firm, LLC, White Plains, NY (Matthew S. Aboulafia of counsel), for appellants. Furman Kornfeld & Brennan LLP, New York, NY (Aaron M. Barham and Alec B. Neimand of counsel), for respondent. [*1] DECISION & ORDER In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of Supreme Court, Kings County (Caroline Piela Cohen, J.), dated October 31, 2024. The order granted the motion of the defendant Edward A. Kurmel Brokerage, Ltd., for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by the plaintiff Lincoln Fritz against it. ORDERED that the appeal by the plaintiff Kenneth Fritz is dismissed, as that plaintiff is not aggrieved by the order appealed from (see CPLR 5511; Mixon v TBV, Inc., 76 AD3d 144, 156-157); and it is further, ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from by the plaintiff Lincoln Fritz; and it is further, ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the respondent. In May 2020, the plaintiffs, Lincoln Fritz (hereinafter Lincoln) and his brother Kenneth Fritz, commenced this action against the defendant Edward A. Kurmel Brokerage, Ltd. (hereinafter the defendant), an insurance broker, and another defendant, alleging, among other things, negligence and breach of contract by the defendant. Subsequently, the defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by Lincoln against it. Lincoln opposed. In an order dated October 31, 2024, the Supreme Court granted the motion. Lincoln appeals. "As a general principle, insurance brokers have a common-law duty to obtain requested coverage for their clients within a reasonable time or inform the client of the inability to do so" (Voss v Netherlands Ins. Co., 22 NY3d 728, 734 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Moutafis Motors, Ltd. v MRW Group, Inc., 144 AD3d 1000, 1001). "'Absent a specific request for coverage not already in a client's policy or the existence of a special relationship with the client, an insurance agent or broker has no continuing duty to advise, guide, or direct a client to obtain additional coverage'" (Spa Castle, Inc. v Choice Agency Corp., 241 AD3d 736, 736-737, quoting [*2]Axis Constr. Corp. v O'Brien Agency, Inc., 87 AD3d 1092, 1093; see Moutafis Motors, Ltd. v MRW Group, Inc., 144 AD3d at 1001). "In order for a broker to be held liable under theories of breach of contract or negligence for failing to procure insurance, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the broker failed to discharge the duties imposed by the agreement to obtain insurance, either by proof that it breached the agreement or because it failed to exercise due care in the transaction" (Femia v Graphic Arts Mut. Ins. Co., 100 AD3d 954, 955). Here, the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the negligence and breach of contract causes of action insofar as asserted by Lincoln against it, respectively, by submitting, inter alia, a transcript of the deposition testimony of the defendant's president and other evidence which demonstrated that Lincoln did not make a specific request for a particular kind of insurance coverage that the defendant failed to procure (see Spa Castle, Inc. v Choice Agency Corp., 241 AD3d at 737; Moutafis Motors, Ltd. v MRW Group, Inc., 144 AD3d at 1001; Axis Constr. Corp. v O'Brien Agency, Inc., 87 AD3d at 1093). The defendant established that it procured the specific insurance originally requested by Lincoln and that Lincoln did not make any requests for updated coverage once his circumstances had changed (see Femia v Graphic Arts Mut. Ins. Co., 100 AD3d at 955). The defendant further established that there was no special relationship between it and Lincoln which would have given rise to an additional duty of care. In opposition, Lincoln failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Spa Castle, Inc. v Choice Agency Corp., 241 AD3d at 737; Moutafis Motors, Ltd. v MRW Group, Inc., 144 AD3d at 1001). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by Lincoln against it. GENOVESI, J.P., FORD, VOUTSINAS and GOLIA, JJ., concur. ENTER: Darrell M. Joseph Clerk of the Court