Scamardella v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc.

Scamardella v A. Duie Pyle, Inc. 2026 NY Slip Op 05565 September 30, 2026 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. Sophie Scamardella, respondent, v A. Duie Pyle, Inc., defendant, New York City Department of Education, et al., appellants. Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department Decided on September 30, 2026 2025-01537, (Index No. 150635/21) Francesca E. Connolly, J.P. Valerie Brathwaite Nelson Barry E. Warhit James P. McCormack, JJ. Steven Banks, Corporation Counsel, New York, NY (Claude S. Platton and Tahirih M. Sadrieh of counsel), for appellants. Morgan & Morgan NY, PLLC, New York, NY (Michael D. Ricchiuto of counsel), for respondent. [*1] DECISION & ORDER In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants New York City Department of Education, City of New York, and New York City Board of Education appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Orlando Marrazzo, Jr., J.), dated January 3, 2025. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied those defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them. ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and the motion of the defendants New York City Department of Education, City of New York, and New York City Board of Education for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them is granted. The plaintiff allegedly was injured when she tripped and fell over a wooden pallet stacked with containers of cleaning supplies located in a hallway of P.S. 65 in Staten Island. The accident occurred in June 2020, while the school was operating remotely due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In March 2021, the plaintiff commenced this action against the City of New York, the New York City Department of Education, the New York City Board of Education (hereinafter together the DOE defendants, and collectively with the City, the defendants), and another defendant, to recover damages for personal injuries. The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them. In an order dated January 3, 2025, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied the defendants' motion. The defendants appeal. The Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the City. The defendants established, prima facie, that the City is not a proper party to this action (see K.L. v City of New York, 218 AD3d 763, 763-764; Mejias v City of New York, 183 AD3d 886, 889). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the DOE defendants. [*2]While the owner or possessor of real property may have a duty to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition (see Basso v Miller, 40 NY2d 233), "there is no duty to protect or warn against an open and obvious condition which, as a matter of law, is not inherently dangerous" (Sebagh v Capital Fitness, Inc., 202 AD3d 853, 855 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Laruccia v Lewis J. Newton & Sons, 242 AD3d 854, 855; Young Min Kim v Jetro Cash & Carry Enters., LLC, 236 AD3d 1090, 1091; Cortes v King Kullen Grocery Co., Inc., 210 AD3d 949, 950). "A condition is open and obvious if it is readily observable by those employing the reasonable use of their senses, given the conditions at the time of the accident" (Berrick v 16 Brentwood Rd., LLC, 241 AD3d 1416, 1417 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Torres v La Borinquena HDFC, Inc., 229 AD3d 830, 831). Here, the evidence submitted by the defendants established, among other things, that the lighting condition was good at the time of the accident, that the colors of the wooden pallet and the white containers were in contrast to the surrounding floor, that the plaintiff observed the containers of cleaning supplies as she approached the area, and that there was sufficient space to navigate the hallway without incident. Thus, the defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that the condition was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous (see Karlin v K. Thompson Foods, LLC, 241 AD3d 525, 526; Young Min Kim v Jetro Cash & Carry Enters., LLC, 236 AD3d at 1091). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Sarab v BJ's Wholesale Club, 174 AD3d 933, 934; Weiss v Half Hollow Hills Cent. School Dist., 70 AD3d 932, 933). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them. The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit. CONNOLLY, J.P., BRATHWAITE NELSON, WARHIT and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur. ENTER: Darrell M. Joseph Clerk of the Court