JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Parmesar

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Parmesar 2026 NY Slip Op 05728 October 6, 2026 Appellate Division, First Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, Plaintiff-Appellant, v Mohandai Sherry Parmesar etc., Defendant-Respondent, U.K.T., etc., et al. Defendants. Decided and Entered: October 06, 2026 Index No. 36680/19|Appeal No. 7126|Case No. 2025-03599| Before: Mendez, J.P., Rodriguez, Pitt-Burke, Rosado, O'Neill Levy, JJ. McCalla Raymer Leibert Pierce, LLP, New York (Chong S. Lim of counsel), for appellant. Bronx Legal Services, Bronx (Martha J. de Jesus of counsel), for respondent. [*1] Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Naita A. Semaj, J.), entered March 26, 2025, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted defendant summary judgment dismissing the complaint and directed discharge of the subject mortgage, and bringing up for review so much of an order of the same court (Ben R. Barbato, J.), entered June 7, 2024, as granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as time-barred and on her counterclaim to discharge the mortgage under Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law § 1504(4), unanimously affirmed, with costs. In this foreclosure action, Supreme Court properly found that because plaintiff's predecessor, Washington Mutual Bank, accelerated the loan in a prior 2008 foreclosure action, the 2019 action underlying this appeal was therefore untimely (CPLR 213[4]; see U.S. Bank v Outlaw, 217 AD3d 721, 722-723 [2d Dept 2023]). The 2008 foreclosure action was rendered a legal nullity because of the death of the mortgagor defendant in 2006, and was thus dismissed with leave to recommence in 2019 (see Vello v Liga Chilean de Futbol, 148 AD3d 593, 594 [1st Dept 2017]). However, the finding that the action was a legal nullity did not revoke, invalidate, or otherwise destroy the lender's express invocation of the contractual election to accelerate the debt (Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy. v Burgress, 232 AD3d 933, 935 [2d Dept 2024]). In addition, plaintiff is estopped from asserting that the debt was never validly accelerated, as the 2019 order dismissing the 2008 action did not make any express judicial determination to that effect (see CPLR 213[4][a]; see also Genovese v Nationstar Mtge. LLC, 223 AD3d 37, 46 [1st Dept 2023]). Supreme Court also correctly ruled that the 2019 order constituted a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, preventing plaintiff from reaping the benefits of the savings provisions set forth in CPLR 205(a) and CPLR 205-a. The 2019 order ruled that plaintiff had "failed to obtain jurisdiction over those in title," which indicates a failure to obtain personal jurisdiction, not a failure to obtain subject matter jurisdiction. We have considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and find them unavailing. THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT. ENTERED: October 6, 2026