Department of Homeland Security v. League of Women Voters

Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 1 Per Curiam SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 26A308 _________________ DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL. v. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, ET AL. ON APPLICATION FOR STAY [September 25, 2026] PER CURIAM. Since 1986, the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitle- ments (SAVE) program has allowed federal, state, and local government agencies to verify the citizenship and immigra- tion status of noncitizens applying for public benefits. For decades, it relied on records maintained by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice, and the Department of State. Last year, the Federal Government expanded SAVE’s scope. In March 2025, President Trump signed an Execu- tive Order directing DHS to put new systems in place to allow state and local authorities to verify the citizenship status of registered voters and individuals registering to vote. Exec. Order No. 14248, 90 Fed. Reg. 14006 (2025). The Executive Order also directed the Social Security Ad- ministration (SSA) to make its records available to DHS for that purpose. Id., at 14007. Two months later, DHS launched a modified SAVE pro- gram. The modified program differed from the original in two key respects. First, it incorporated checks against ad- ditional records—including social security numbers (SSNs)—maintained by SSA. Second, it allowed state and local authorities to conduct bulk searches of multiple indi- viduals at once. Under the modified SAVE program, a state or local agency seeking to determine an individual’s citizenship 2 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS Per Curiam status first uploads the individual’s first name, last name, date of birth, or full or partial SSN to the SAVE portal. The SAVE program automatically discloses that information to SSA, which runs it through its databases to find a match. SSA then discloses its search results to DHS, including the individual’s full name, date of birth, full SSN, and citizen- ship status. Finally, the SAVE portal returns a response to the agency, either confirming that the individual is a citizen or requesting that the agency resubmit its query with addi- tional information. If the modified SAVE program is unable to confirm that an individual is a citizen, the agency is re- quired to contact the individual and request that he provide proof of citizenship to register or remain registered to vote. Various organizations—including the League of Women Voters, its local affiliates, and the Electronic Privacy Infor- mation Center—sued DHS, SSA, and other federal actors to challenge the modified SAVE program. As relevant here, they raised three claims. First, they alleged that the modi- fications violated a confidentiality provision in the Social Security Act that prohibits the disclosure of SSNs and other SSA records. Second, they alleged that the modifications violated substantive and procedural protections in the Pri- vacy Act of 1974, which prohibits the nonconsensual disclo- sure of certain information and requires that agencies com- plete a notice-and-comment process for program modifications. Third, they alleged that the modifications were arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiff organizations moved for summary judgment on all three claims. The Government cross-moved to dis- miss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing; that the modified SAVE program did not violate the Social Security Act, Pri- vacy Act, or APA; and that Congress had authorized DHS in 8 U. S. C. §1373 to use SSNs and related records notwith- standing any other provision of law.  Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 3 Per Curiam The District Court agreed with the plaintiff organizations across the board, set aside and vacated the modified SAVE program and its related notices, and denied the Govern- ment’s application for a stay pending appeal. A divided panel of the D. C. Circuit (Srinivasan, C. J., Wilkins, J., and Katsas, J.) also denied the Government’s application for a stay, with Judge Katsas dissenting. The Government now seeks a stay from this Court. To succeed, the Government must establish “(1) a reasonable probability that four Justices will consider the issue suffi- ciently meritorious to grant certiorari; (2) a fair prospect that a majority of the Court will vote to reverse the judg- ment below; and (3) a likelihood that irreparable harm will result from the denial of a stay.’’ Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U. S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam). In “close cases,” we “balance the equities and weigh the relative harms to the applicant and to the respondent.” Ibid. We grant the ap- plication. To start, we consider the likelihood that this Court would reverse. At least one of plaintiffs’ members (J. Doe 4) is registered to vote in a State (Louisiana) that used the mod- ified SAVE program. She has demonstrated that SSA rec- ords do not accurately reflect that she is now a naturalized citizen. Supplemental Decl. of J. Doe in No. 25–cv–3501 (D DC), ECF Doc. 16–3, ¶¶2, 14. Had the modified SAVE program not been set aside, she likely would have been re- quired to provide additional proof of citizenship. Such a “need to take . . . affirmative steps to avoid risk of harm . . . constitutes a cognizable injury” supporting standing. Meese v. Keene, 481 U. S. 465, 475 (1987). Although the plaintiff organizations likely have standing, their claims likely lack merit. The plaintiff organizations claim that the federal defendants violated the Social Secu- rity Act, Privacy Act, and APA. In 1996, Congress, how- ever, separately and expressly authorized DHS to request and receive information relating to citizenship and 4 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS Per Curiam immigration status from other agencies, including SSA, in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi- bility Act (IIRIRA). The relevant IIRIRA provision, 8 U. S. C. §1373, contains two notwithstanding clauses. The first, section 1373(a), provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a Federal, State, or local govern- ment entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, the [DHS] information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlaw- ful, of any individual.” The second, section 1373(b), which is captioned “Additional authority of government entities,” similarly provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, no person or agency may prohibit, or in any way restrict, a Federal, State, or local govern- ment entity from doing any of the following with re- spect to information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.” The “following” activities include “[s]ending such infor- mation to, or requesting or receiving such information from, the [DHS].” §1373(b)(1). By prohibiting interference with the disclosure of infor- mation regarding citizenship status to DHS— “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law”—Congress necessarily authorized DHS to re- quest and receive that information. Otherwise, agencies, entities, and officials could find themselves in the impossi- ble predicament of either disclosing information consistent with section 1373 but in violation of legislation like the So- cial Security Act and Privacy Act or withholding that infor- mation consistent with those Acts but in violation of section  Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 5 Per Curiam 1373. It is improbable that Congress intended to place offi- cials in such a bind when it passed IIRIRA, so section 1373 likely supersedes restrictions on disclosure elsewhere in the Code.1 Lest there be any doubt, section 1373(c) requires DHS to respond to inquiries from state and local agencies “seeking to verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration status of any individual.” Considered alongside section 1373’s “notwithstanding” clauses, section 1373(c) appears to con- template an information-sharing regime like the modified SAVE program. In light of these provisions, this Court is likely to reverse the District Court’s holding that the federal defendants violated the Social Security Act, the Privacy Act, and the APA. The remaining factors also warrant a grant. We have of- ten granted certiorari where a lower court has set aside an important federal program. See, e.g., Bondi v. VanDerStok, 604 U. S. 458 (2025); Department of Education v. Career Colleges and Schools of Texas, 604 U. S. 1074 (2025). And, on the equities, the Federal Government is likely to suffer irreparable harm absent a stay. Under section 1373(c), the Federal Government has an obligation to respond to re- quests from state and local election officials seeking to ver- ify the citizenship of voters. The order below prevents the Federal Government from using the program it believes is best suited to the task. —————— 1 The dissent argues that sections 1373(a) and (b) do not displace laws restricting information sharing with DHS because “[w]hen a law imposes an express restriction on disclosure, it is that law—not an ‘entity,’ ‘offi- cial,’ ‘person,’ or ‘agency’—that is doing the ‘prohibit[ing]’ or ‘re- strict[ing].” Post, at 7 (opinion of JACKSON, J.). But the distinction the dissent draws between laws and those tasked with enforcing them is il- lusory. Sections 1373(a) and (b) prohibit any “entity,” “official,” “person,” or “agency” from “prohibit[ing]” or “in any way restrict[ing]” the request for or receipt of information regarding immigration status. (Emphasis added.) Those prohibitions necessarily include invoking a law to deny a request for or transfer of such information. 6 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS Per Curiam The plaintiff organizations argue that the Federal Gov- ernment will not suffer irreparable harm because federal law currently prohibits state and local election authorities from clearing their voter rolls in the weeks leading up to federal elections. The organizations point to the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), 52 U. S. C. §20507(c)(2)(A), which provides that “[a] State shall complete, not later than 90 days prior to the date of a primary or general election for Federal office, any program the purpose of which is to sys- tematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters.”2 To be sure, that moratorium limits the potential impact of staying the District Court’s order in this case. Still, all agree that the order prevents the Federal Government from using the modified SAVE program to conduct individualized inquiries, which are per- mitted under federal law during this period. The District Court’s order thus inhibits the Federal Government’s ef- forts to assist state and local agencies in the proper admin- istration of the midterm elections. Under these circum- stances, the equities weigh in favor of a stay. * * * For the foregoing reasons, the application for stay pre- sented to THE CHIEF JUSTICE and by him referred to the Court is granted. The June 22, 2026 order entered by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in case No. 25–cv–3501 is stayed pending the disposition of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and disposition of a petition for a writ of certi- orari, if such a writ is timely sought. Should certiorari be —————— 2 We will consider the scope of this provision in Republican National Committee v. Mi Familia Vota, et al., No. 25–1017, which asks whether the NVRA prohibits States from implementing programs within 90 days of federal elections to cancel the registrations of voters who are not U. S. citizens. The parties in this case do not ask us to address that question and have not briefed it, and we do not need to decide it here.  Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 7 Per Curiam denied, this stay shall terminate automatically. In the event certiorari is granted, the stay shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of this Court. It is so ordered.  Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 1 JACKSON, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 26A308 _________________ DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL. v. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, ET AL. ON APPLICATION FOR STAY [September 25, 2026] JUSTICE JACKSON, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting. Since 2005, States have used a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) database called Systematic Alien Verifica- tion for Entitlements (SAVE) to ensure that registered vot- ers are American citizens. For most of its life, SAVE con- sisted almost entirely of immigration records from DHS. In 2025, however, DHS and the Social Security Administra- tion (SSA) decided to connect SSA’s database of master files, including all its sensitive information, to SAVE. A group of organizations sued, arguing that the modifications to SAVE violated various federal privacy laws, and that the staleness of SSA’s citizenship records risked disenfranchis- ing recently naturalized U. S. citizens. After months of lit- igation, the District Court agreed and vacated the modifi- cations. The D. C. Circuit denied a stay of the District Court’s or- der while reviewing the pending appeal. But, without full briefing or oral argument, this Court now grants one—ren- dering questionable interim rulings about two statutory provisions it has never before interpreted. The Court also focuses only on the harms the Government will purportedly suffer absent a stay, disregarding the harms that the mod- ified SAVE system has caused, and will likely continue to cause, to lawful voters. The Court thus misuses its equita- ble powers. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 2 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS JACKSON, J., dissenting I A SAVE is a database that “provides point in time immigra- tion status and U. S. citizenship information to federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal agencies.” Application for Stay 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). It was created in 1986 to help States verify eligibility for federally funded benefits like Medicaid and food stamps, which are typically limited to citizens and lawful immigrants. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, §121, 100 Stat. 3391, note following 42 U. S. C. §1320b–7; see also 42 U. S. C. §1320b– 7. Since 2005, States have used SAVE for voter-verification purposes too. Application for Stay 6. Twenty-seven States currently use SAVE for that purpose. Ibid. Until 2025, SAVE did not have access to natural-born cit- izens’ records, and it only accessed immigration and natu- ralization records in DHS’s systems (and occasionally, in systems at the State Department and the Department of Justice). Users could also only conduct individual searches, usually by way of a person’s alien-identification number. 835 F. Supp. 3d 79, 102–103 (DC 2026). In 2025, however, President Trump signed an Executive Order purporting to target voting by noncitizens in federal elections that, among other things, directed SSA to share its databases with state and local election officials for the purposes of voter verifica- tion. The Order required this information-sharing even though the Social Security Act dictates that “[s]ocial secu- rity account numbers and related records . . . shall be confi- dential, and no authorized person shall disclose any such social security account number or related record.” 42 U. S. C. §405(c)(2)(C)(viii)(I); see Exec. Order No. 14248, 90 Fed. Reg. 14007 (2025). To comply with the Executive Order, DHS and SSA agreed to overhaul SAVE and link SSA’s master social se- curity files, which are held in a database called NUMIDENT, to SAVE. NUMIDENT contains information  Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 3 JACKSON, J., dissenting about natural-born U. S. citizens as well as naturalized cit- izens and noncitizens—not just social security numbers (SSNs) but also “names, dates and places of birth, citizen- ship indicators, death records, and information obtained while processing requests for SSNs.” 835 F. Supp. 3d, at 101. With the modified SAVE system, a state user can sub- mit bulk queries using full or partial SSNs as well as alien- identification numbers. Id., at 102–103. If a query is in- conclusive, a State might respond by asking the voter to provide proof of citizenship in order to remain registered, and it might strike the voter from the rolls if she fails to timely do so. Id., at 108–109. Before the overhaul, DHS had recognized SAVE as the sort of database that was covered by the federal Privacy Act. That Act requires agencies to publish a so-called sys- tem of records notice (SORN) anytime it “establish[es]” or “modifie[s]” any system of records containing personal iden- tifying information. 5 U. S. C. §552a(e)(4). The agency is then prohibited from disclosing anyone’s information in the system without consent, §552a(b), unless (among other things) the disclosure is for a “routine use,” §552a(b)(3). “[A]t least 30 days prior” to adopting a new routine use, however, the Act requires that an agency publish a SORN and offer a 30-day comment period. §552a(e)(11). When DHS had modified SAVE in the past, it had pub- lished a timely SORN and complied with the Act’s comment requirements. See 835 F. Supp. 3d, at 100 & n. 1. But this time, neither DHS nor SSA published a SORN or invited comments. Instead, on May 22, 2025, they simply an- nounced that the modified SAVE system was ready. See id., at 101. B Several organizations (Respondents here) promptly sued DHS and SSA under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), alleging that the SAVE modifications were arbitrary 4 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS JACKSON, J., dissenting and capricious and violated the Privacy Act’s procedural and substantive requirements. Class Action Complaint in No. 1:25–cv–3501 (D DC), ECF Doc. 1, ¶¶204–218. In fall of 2025, DHS and SSA belatedly published SORNs that an- nounced new “routine uses” covering the NUMIDENT in- formation and offered a 30-day comment period. 835 F. Supp. 3d, at 102; see Notice of a Modified System of Records, 90 Fed. Reg. 48948 (2025); Notice of a Modified System of Records, 90 Fed. Reg. 50879. The SORNs claimed that the new routine uses would not go into effect for 30 days. Id., at 40849, 50880. But the modified SAVE system (which involved disclosures that were covered by the newly announced routine uses) had already been in op- eration since May. See 835 F. Supp. 3d, at 100–101. So, Respondents filed an amended complaint, further al- leging that the modifications to SAVE violated the Social Security Act’s confidentiality provision at 42 U. S. C. §405(c)(2)(C)(viii)(I). First Amended Complaint in No. 1:25–cv–3501, ECF Doc. 61, ¶204. And they bolstered their Privacy Act claims, arguing that SSA’s disclosures of NUMIDENT information did not count as a “routine use” under the Act, and regardless, DHS and SSA had unlaw- fully failed to timely publish a SORN, or provide a public comment period, before sharing that information. Id., at ¶¶218–235. Respondents also claimed that outdated SSA data put some of their recently naturalized members at risk of either being deregistered to vote or having to verify their citizenship before being allowed to cast ballots in the 2026 primary or general elections. Id., at ¶¶168–170. The parties then litigated the case to summary judgment, where the Government asserted that a provision of the Ille- gal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 8 U. S. C. §1373, gave DHS and SSA the authority to implement their modifications to SAVE regard- less of the requirements of the Social Security Act and the Privacy Act. That statutory section provides that  Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 5 JACKSON, J., dissenting “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law,” no “government entity” or “official,” “person[,] or agency,” may “prohibit, or in any way restrict,” the ex- change of citizenship information with DHS. §§1373(a)–(b). It also obligates DHS to respond to state and local officials’ inquiries regarding a person’s citizenship status. §1373(c). The District Court rejected the Government’s argument that §1373 overrode the Social Security Act and the Privacy Act and granted summary judgment to Respondents, con- cluding that the modified SAVE system violated both laws, as well as the APA. 835 F. Supp. 3d, at 119–120, 130, 134– 136. The District Court then vacated the modifications to SAVE. Id., at 138. At that point, the Government sought a stay in the District Court, where it raised several new ar- guments about why the Social Security Act’s confidentiality provision did not apply to the modified SAVE system. See No. 1:25–cv–3501 (D DC, July 8, 2026), App. to Application for Stay 81a–84a (App.) (describing the Government’s argu- ments).1 The District Court denied the stay and refused to consider the forfeited arguments in that posture, but in- vited the Government to raise them via a Rule 52(b) motion to reopen the judgment. See id., at 85a, n. 3. The Government did not take the District Court up on that invitation. Instead, it requested an emergency stay from the D. C. Circuit, even though it was too late for States to use SAVE for systematic voter-list maintenance in ad- vance of the 2026 elections. See 52 U. S. C. §20507(c)(2)(A) —————— 1 Specifically, the Government claimed that the confidentiality provi- sion did not apply because the information disclosed through the modi- fied SAVE system was collected pursuant to the original Social Security Act of 1935, and the confidentiality provision only restricted disclosures of information “obtained or maintained” pursuant to laws enacted “on or after October 1, 1990.” App. 81a–82a; see 42 U. S. C. §405(c)(2)(C)(viii)(I). The Government also claimed that NUMIDENT records disclosed through the modified SAVE system did not count as “social security numbers [or] related records” under the provision. App. 81a–82a. 6 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS JACKSON, J., dissenting (prohibiting States from “systematically remov[ing] the names of ineligible voters” from their rolls during the 90 days prior to any primary or general election).2 A divided panel of the D. C. Circuit denied the requested stay. No. 26–5243 (Sept. 4, 2026), App. 102a; see also id., at 133a (Katsas, J., dissenting). The Government now asks this Court to stay the District Court’s ruling. Per the oft-repeated stay factors, a stay ap- plicant must demonstrate that it is “likely to succeed on the merits” of its appeal, that it will be “irreparably injured” absent a stay, and that the equities weigh in its favor. Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 426 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U. S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam). II The majority concludes that the Government has made the necessary “strong showing” of likely success on the mer- its, Nken, 556 U. S., at 426 (internal quotation marks omit- ted), because two IIRIRA provisions that we have never be- fore interpreted likely authorize the modifications to SAVE and displace any other statutory restrictions on the disclo- sure of citizenship information. See ante, at 4–5; 8 U. S. C. §§1373(a)–(b).3 As the majority sees things, Congress’s “prohibiting interference with the disclosure of information regarding citizenship status to DHS” in §§1373(a) and (b) “necessarily authorize[s] DHS to request and receive that information” from SSA, regardless of whether some other law prohibits disclosure. Ante, at 4. The majority thus treats §1373 as essentially overriding the limits that —————— 2 In fact, as the D. C. Circuit recognized, the Government had conceded that the “90-day limitation was ‘fatal’ to a claim of imminent harm prem- ised on systematic voter-roll maintenance.” No. 26–5243 (CADC, Sept. 4, 2026), App. 131a. 3 The per curiam properly rejects the Government’s threshold argu- ment that Respondents lack standing to sue. See ante, at 3; see also Application for Stay 11–18.  Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 7 JACKSON, J., dissenting privacy laws impose on the sharing of citizenship infor- mation with DHS. But that “back-of-the-napkin assess- ment,” Noem v. Doe, 605 U. S. 961, 962 (2025) (JACKSON, J., dissenting from grant of stay), is implausible. For starters, the majority misreads the statutory text. Subsections 1373(a) and (b) bar “government entit[ies] or official[s]” (in §1373(a)) and “person[s] or agenc[ies]” (in §1373(b)) from “prohibit[ing], or in any way restrict[ing],” the exchange of citizenship information with DHS, “not- withstanding any other provision” of law. These provisions do not affirmatively grant any power. Nor do they override any explicit statutory limits on information-sharing. Ra- ther, both provisions bar government entities or employees from interfering with otherwise lawful exchanges of citizen- ship information, notwithstanding that such interference may be permitted under some other law. When a law im- poses an express restriction on disclosure, it is that law— not an “entity,” “official,” “person,” or “agency”—that is do- ing the “prohibit[ing]” or “restrict[ing].” Neither §1373(a) nor (b) has anything to say in that circumstance.4 Statutory context confirms that this reading is the better one. Another part of IIRIRA lets SSA respond to citizen- ship-status inquiries to verify an individual’s employment eligibility. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, §§404(e), (h), 110 Stat. 3009– 546, 3009–665, note following 8 U. S. C. §1324a. But those provisions put strict limits on what information SSA can disclose—limits that would be meaningless if §1373 means —————— 4 This means the “impossible predicament” that causes the majority angst—i.e., the problem of agencies being forced to choose between, on the one hand, “disclosing information consistent with section 1373 but in violation of legislation like the Social Security Act and Privacy Act” and, on the other, “withholding that information consistent with those Acts but in violation of section 1373,” ante, at 4–5—is no predicament at all. DHS and SSA may exchange information consistent with the Social Se- curity and Privacy Acts, but may not exchange information in violation of those laws. 8 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS JACKSON, J., dissenting what the majority says it means. See ibid.; see also 835 F. Supp. 3d, at 136; No. 26–5243 (CADC, Sept. 4, 2026), App. 121a. IIRIRA’s enactment history also supports this view. Sec- tion 1373 was passed to respond to a particular problem: state and local agencies refusing to cooperate with federal officials in enforcing immigration laws. See H. R. Rep. No. 104–725, p. 383 (1996); S. Rep. No. 104–249, pp. 19–20 (1996). The language Congress ultimately chose sweeps more broadly, insofar as it covers federal, state, and local officials alike. But there is no reason to believe that Con- gress meant to repeal laws that would otherwise prohibit federal agencies from disclosing citizenship information. Contemporaneous Executive Branch practice reflects this same understanding. Addressing the provision at issue here, the Office of Legal Counsel once maintained that §1373(a) does “not clearly invest governmental officials or entities with the affirmative authority to disclose infor- mation in circumstances where they otherwise would be prohibited from doing so by a federal statute.” Relationship Between Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re- sponsibility Act of 1996 and Statutory Requirement for Confidentiality of Census Information, 23 Op. OLC 5 (Supp. 1999). Finally, “common sense” weighs in favor of this interpre- tation, Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477, 512 (2023) (BARRETT, J., concurring), because it harmonizes §§1373(a) and (b) with existing restrictions on disclosures of citizen- ship information. Under the per curiam’s reading, by con- trast, those provisions trump any such restrictions and give SSA the authority to share whatever citizenship infor- mation it wants. In the three decades since Congress en- acted IIRIRA, the Government has never invoked §1373 in that way—even as it has repeatedly refined the SAVE pro- gram. And when an agency “ ‘claim[s] to discover in a long- extant statute an unheralded power’ representing a  Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 9 JACKSON, J., dissenting ‘transformative expansion in its regulatory authority,’ ” this Court’s recent practice has been to ask for a clear state- ment, absent from §1373, conferring such a power. See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 724 (2022) (quoting Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U. S. 302, 324 (2014); alteration omitted); see also Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U. S 229, 245–246 (2026) (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). In response to all this, the per curiam just insists that its interpretation is required by another provision of IIRIRA: §1373(c). Ante, at 5. That provision plainly vests DHS with authority to respond to citizenship-status queries submit- ted by state and local agencies. 8 U. S. C. §1373(c). But it does not empower SSA (or any other non-DHS agency) to do anything, let alone share information that other laws make confidential. And even as to DHS, §1373(c) does not contain the “clearly expressed congressional intention” necessary to displace other laws restricting disclosures. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U. S. 497, 510 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). In fact, just the opposite, insofar as that provision only authorizes disclosures “for . . . purpose[s] au- thorized by law.” §1373(c). As a result, nothing in §1373 authorizes the modified SAVE system or overrides the provisions of the Social Se- curity Act and the Privacy Act that Respondents say the Government has violated. And the Government puts for- ward no nonforfeited arguments that the modifications to SAVE in fact complied with the Social Security Act’s confi- dentiality provision. See Application for Stay 30–33; No. 26–5243 (CADC, Sept. 4, 2026), App. 113a–120a.5 These —————— 5 Recall that the Government failed to argue, at the summary judg- ment stage, that the Social Security Act’s confidentiality provision did not apply to the modified SAVE system on its own terms. Instead, the Government raised those arguments for the first time in its stay motion before the District Court. See n. 1, supra. There is little reason to forgive such a forfeiture in the stay context, where the party asking this Court 10 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS JACKSON, J., dissenting are reasons enough to find that the Government is unlikely to succeed on the merits of its appeal, so I would not reach the Government’s arguments regarding the Privacy Act and the APA.6 III As I noted previously, a stay applicant must also show “that it will suffer irreparable harm while the case pro- ceeds, and that, on balance, the equities . . . favor a stay.” Trump v. California, 609 U. S. ___, ___ (2026) (dissenting opinion) (slip op., at 6). The majority’s analysis of those fac- tors is faulty. First, the per curiam finds that the Government is irrep- arably harmed absent a stay because the District Court “set aside an important federal program.” Ante, at 5. But if the Government has failed to show that modified SAVE com- ports with the Social Security Act, then disabling the Gov- ernment from using that program is not a cognizable harm. It cannot be that the Government is “injured whenever [it] is prevented from” violating the law. Trump v. Orr, 607 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (JACKSON, J., dissenting from grant of stay) (slip op., at 10); see also California, 609 U. S., at ___, —————— to exercise its equitable discretion is the party who failed to properly raise its arguments below. See State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575, 616 (1876) (“[H]e who seeks equity at the hands of the court must first do equity”); see also Ohio v. EPA, 603 U. S. 279, 298–299 (2024). 6 Notably, however, Respondents’ claim that the Government ignored the procedural requirements of the Privacy Act (which it obviously did) should not be affected even under the per curiam’s reading of §1373. Subsections 1373(a) and (b) apply only to “prohibit[ions]” or “re- strict[ions]” on the exchange of citizenship information with DHS. The portions of the Privacy Act requiring agencies to publish SORNs and to provide 30-day comment periods before implementing new routine uses do not “prohibit” or “restrict” anything. See 5 U. S. C. §552a(e)(4), (11). Nor do they affect DHS’s ability to respond to citizenship-status inquiries as required under §1373(c). The per curiam’s failure to grapple with this point is yet another indication that its interpretation of §1373 is mis- taken.  Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 11 JACKSON, J., dissenting ___–___ (JACKSON, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 8–9). And an- yway, the Government’s purported harm is substantially mitigated by its ability to use the pre-2025 version of SAVE. Next, in balancing the equities, the majority only looks at one side of the scale—the judicial equivalent of expecting a seesaw with weight applied on only one side to work properly. In the per curiam’s view, the sole harm here is that the District Court’s order “inhibits the Federal Govern- ment’s efforts to assist state and local agencies in the proper administration of the midterm elections.” Ante, at 6. As a threshold matter, this overvalues the harm to the Govern- ment, since States cannot use SAVE to systematically strike people from the voter rolls within 90 days of an elec- tion in any event. See 52 U. S. C. §20507(c)(2)(A); see also No. 26–5243 (CADC, Sept. 4, 2026), App. 131a. It is hard to see how the Government is harmed pending the comple- tion of the court proceedings below when SAVE’s applica- tion to the upcoming elections will already be limited. Even more concerning is the majority’s omission of any consideration of the harms that might occur if the modified SAVE system is allowed to continue operating. See Califor- nia, 609 U. S., at ___ (JACKSON, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 10). The District Court highlighted such harms, noting the risk that States might cancel the voter registrations of at least some recently naturalized citizens or force such per- sons to provide proof of citizenship before voting. 835 F. Supp. 3d, at 108–109. That court also found that those harms have already materialized in Texas, where one of Respondents’ members “had her voter registration re- voked without her knowledge,” and two more “had to pro- vide proof of citizenship to maintain registered voter sta- tus.” Id., at 113. But the per curiam’s purported balancing fails to address, much less account for, the demonstrated harms of issuing a stay. See Orr, 607 U. S., at ___ (JACKSON, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 3). 12 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS JACKSON, J., dissenting * * * The Government has not shown that it is entitled to the “ ‘extraordinary’ ” remedy of a stay pending appeal. Doe, 605 U. S., at 963 (JACKSON, J., dissenting) (quoting Graves v. Barnes, 405 U. S. 1201, 1203 (1972) (Powell, J., in cham- bers)). But if there is a bright side to today’s opinion decid- ing otherwise, it is that the per curiam will likely have min- imal short-term impact, as States will at most conduct individualized voter-roll maintenance using the modified SAVE system ahead of the November elections. See ante, at 6. In my view, however, the harm caused by burdening or disenfranchising even a few lawful voters outweighs the nonexistent harm that the Government experiences when it is prevented from taking an action that it likely lacks the authority to take. This imbalance, along with the Govern- ment’s improbable merits arguments, should have com- pelled the Court to deny the stay.