Marcano v. Suazo

Marcano v Suazo 2026 NY Slip Op 05536 September 30, 2026 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. In the Matter of Ramon A. Marcano, respondent, v Daysis O. Suazo, appellant. Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department Decided on September 30, 2026 2025-10091, (Docket No. V-12196-25) Angela G. Iannacci, J.P. Helen Voutsinas Donna-Marie E. Golia James P. McCormack, JJ. David Laniado, Cedarhurst, NY, for appellant. [*1] DECISION & ORDER In a proceeding pursuant to Domestic Relations Law §§ 77-d and 77-e, the mother appeals from an order of the Family Court, Queens County (Elizabeth J. Newton, J.), dated August 1, 2025. The order, after a hearing, granted the father's petition, in effect, to register and enforce a decree of dissolution of marriage of the District Court of Lancaster County, Nebraska, dated June 30, 2025, which, inter alia, awarded him sole legal and physical custody of the parties' child. ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements. The mother and the father were married in Nebraska in 2020 and have one child, born the same year. In February 2024, the mother filed a complaint in the District Court of Lancaster County, Nebraska (hereinafter the Nebraska court), seeking a divorce. The Nebraska court issued a temporary order, awarding the mother temporary physical and legal custody of the child, with temporary parenting time to the father, and directed that neither party was permitted to remove the child from Nebraska without leave of court. In April 2025, the mother absconded with the child to New York. On June 30, 2025, after a trial at which the mother elected not to appear, the Nebraska court issued a decree of dissolution of marriage (hereinafter the Nebraska divorce decree) in which, inter alia, it awarded the father sole legal and physical custody of the child. The father filed a petition in the Family Court, Queens County, in effect, to register and enforce the Nebraska divorce decree. The mother objected to the petition. After conferring with the Nebraska court and conducting a hearing, the Family Court, in an order dated August 1, 2025, granted the father's petition. The mother appeals. Domestic Relations Law § 77-d provides for the registering and contesting of an out-of-state custody decree (see Matter of Pava v Atkinson, 180 AD3d 917, 918; Matter of Worsoff v Worsoff, 161 AD3d 879, 880). After a hearing on a contested petition, the court must confirm the registered decree unless the person contesting registration establishes that the issuing court did not have jurisdiction, that the child custody determination sought to be registered had been vacated, stayed, or modified by a court having jurisdiction to do so, or that he or she was entitled to but did not receive proper notice of the proceedings before the issuing court (see Domestic Relations Law § 77-d[4]; Matter of Pava v Atkinson, 180 AD3d at 918). Generally, a court of this state must "recognize and enforce . . . a registered child custody determination of a court of another state" (Domestic Relations Law § 77-e[2]). Here, the mother did not demonstrate that the Nebraska court lacked jurisdiction to issue the Nebraska divorce decree, that the Nebraska divorce decree had been vacated, stayed, or modified, or that she did not receive notice in the divorce proceedings before the Nebraska court. Thus, the Family Court properly granted the father's petition, in effect, to register and enforce the Nebraska divorce decree (see id. §§ 77-d[4]; 77-e[2]; Matter of Pava v Atkinson, 180 AD3d at 918). Contrary to the mother's contention, the Family Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in failing to exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 76-c. For a New York court to exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction, there must be "an emergency that is real and immediate, and of such a nature as to require [s]tate intervention" to protect the child or parent of the child "from imminent physical or emotional danger" (Matter of Baptiste v Baptiste, 179 AD3d 669, 670 [internal quotation marks omitted]). The mother in the present case did not establish the existence of such an emergency (see id.). Contrary to the mother's further contention, under the circumstances of this case, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in declining to appoint an attorney for the child in this proceeding, in effect, to register and enforce the Nebraska divorce decree (see Family Ct Act § 249[a]). The mother's remaining contention is without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the order appealed from. IANNACCI, J.P., VOUTSINAS, GOLIA and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur. ENTER: Darrell M. Joseph Clerk of the Court