Matter of Partia A. v. Thierno D.

Matter of Partia A. v Thierno D. 2026 NY Slip Op 05713 October 6, 2026 Appellate Division, First Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. In the Matter of Partia A., Petitioner-Respondent, v Thierno D., Respondent-Appellant. Decided and Entered: October 06, 2026 Docket No. V-08945/24 V-01075/25|Appeal No. 7127|Case No. 2025-05982| Before: Mendez, J.P., Rodriguez, Pitt-Burke, Rosado, O'Neill Levy, JJ. Geoffrey P. Berman, Larchmont, for appellant. Steven N. Feinman, White Plains, for respondent. Donna C. Chin, New York, attorney for the child. [*1] Order, Family Court, Bronx County (Michael A. Liddie, J.), entered on or about July 7, 2025, which, after a fact-finding hearing, awarded petitioner mother sole legal and physical custody of the subject child, with supervised visitation to respondent father, unanimously affirmed, without costs. The father was not denied due process when Family Court granted him several adjournments to retain counsel and ultimately directed him to proceed pro se when he appeared for the fact-finding hearing without counsel. Although a litigant has the constitutionally guaranteed right to be represented by counsel of his own choosing, that right is qualified in that it may not be exercised as a means of delaying judicial proceedings (see Family Ct Act § 262; People v Arroyave, 49 NY2d 264, 271 [1980]). Here, at each appearance between November 2024 and May 2025, the father represented to the court that he intended to retain private counsel, even after he had been advised by the court that he could be assigned counsel if he qualified. However, at no point did the father assert that he was financially unable to retain counsel, request assigned counsel or provide any information concerning his financial circumstances. Under these circumstances, the father's repeated election to pursue privately retained counsel, without any indication that he was financially unable to do so or sought assigned counsel, did not require the court to sua sponte conduct a financial-eligibility inquiry. Although the father claimed that he had retained counsel who was unable to appear at the fact-finding hearing, he failed to provide any evidence that an attorney had actually been retained. Under these circumstances, the court providently exercised its discretion in denying the father's request for another adjournment, particularly where he had been afforded multiple prior opportunities to secure representation and failed to demonstrate that counsel had actually been retained (see Matter of Sherrene R. v Sheena R., 146 AD3d 480 [1st Dept 2017]). [*2] The remaining question is whether the father's decision to proceed pro se constituted a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. There is no requirement that the court follow a specific formula in assessing the voluntariness of the waiver. Rather, the record need only demonstrate that the litigant was aware of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel (see Matter of Angel N. v Elizabeth A., 169 AD3d 596, 596 [1st Dept 2019]). Family Court satisfied the standard. It sufficiently advised the father of the risks of self-representation and made it clear that it was not obligated to assist him in litigating his case (see Matter of Starlaylah C. [Josephine F.], 132 AD3d 556, 557 [1st Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 916 [2016]). Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that the father lacked the capacity to understand the consequences of proceeding without counsel (see Matter of Migdalia O. v Lucero V., 235 AD3d 430, 430 [1st Dept 2025]). THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT. ENTERED: October 6, 2026