Seeboth v. State Dept. of State Hospitals

Filed 10/7/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT TIMOTHY SEEBOTH, F090566 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 24CECG02968) v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HOSPITALS et al., OPINION Defendants and Respondents. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. D. Tyler Tharpe, Judge. Timothy Seeboth, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Cheryl L. Feiner, Assistant Attorney General, Maureen C. Onyeagbako and Colin D. Schoell, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants and Respondents. -ooOoo- Timothy J. Seeboth, a patient at the Department of State Hospitals Coalinga, filed an amended petition for declaratory relief asking the court to determine the validity of California Code of Regulations,1 title 9, section 884, subdivision (b)(6) and, relatedly, a policy permitting the x-raying and opening of mail at Coalinga State Hospital Coalinga 1 All further references to “Regulations” are to the California Code of Regulations. outside of a patient’s presence. Seeboth asserted this policy conflicts with Welfare and Institutions Code section 5325, subdivision (e). He also asserted the policy conflicts with Regulations, title 22, sections 71507 and/or 73523. Respondents Department of State Hospitals Coalinga (DSH Coalinga) and Howard Rake, Hospital Police Chief, demurred, asserting Seeboth’s petition failed to state a cause of action because he is not committed to the DSH Coalinga under the Lanterman-Petris Short (LPS) Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.), and the rights provided under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5325 do not apply to him, a non-LPS patient. They also argued that DSH-Coalinga is authorized to prescreen patient mail for contraband to protect the health and safety of patients and staff pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 4005.1, and Regulations, title 9, section 884 applies over the other regulations. The court sustained DSH Coalinga and Rake’s demurrer, reasoning Seeboth is a non-LPS patient and Welfare and Institutions Code section 5325 and Regulations, title 9, section 884 are not in conflict as they apply to different populations. Plaintiff now appeals from the order sustaining the demurrer, alleging there is a sufficient controversy. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Seeboth filed an “Amended Petition for Declaratory Relief” on February 18, 2025. He alleged that “Defendant Howard Rake, Hospital Police Chief …, wrote a memo (Exhibit A) that defined the new policy of x-raying all incoming mail and opening mail outside the presence of the patients.” The cited exhibit contains a memorandum dated December 26, 2023, that states, “[e]ffective January 8th, 2024, the Department of State Hospitals-Coalinga will modify the incoming patient mail procedure. Due to multiple incidents of illicit and unknown substances within patient mail, increased measures are necessary to interdict contraband and safeguard staff and patients from airborne substances when opening patient mail.” 2.  The Amended Petition In the amended petition, Seeboth asserted his mail was sent to a trust office on or about May 8, 2024, and opened outside of his presence and without his knowledge or permission. Seeboth alleged that he was informed that a Visa card was confiscated from his mail and the accompanying letter was withheld for 21 days. Seeboth stated he had “never given permission, or signed a valid waiver for the opening of [his] correspondence outside of his presence.” He asked, “to have the patients’ rights declared, as to the right to send and receive unopened mail, as per Welfare and Institutions Code [section] 5325.” (Boldface omitted.) Relatedly, he asked the court to determine if Regulations, title 9, section 884, subdivision (b)(6) conflicts with Welfare and Institutions Code sections 5325 and 5326 and Regulations, title 22, sections 73523 and 71507. He asserted, “A careful reading of [Welfare and Institutions Code section] 5325 introductory paragraph makes it clear that the Legislature intended to include all persons committed to a State Hospital and not limit it to just LPS patients.” (Boldface omitted.) The Demurrer Respondents DSH-Coalinga (Hospital) and Hospital Police Chief Howard Rake demurred to the amended petition for declaratory relief. They asserted the petition failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because Seeboth is not committed to the Hospital under the LPS Act. Rather, he is a sexually violent predator (SVP) “held as a civil detainee for treatment at the Hospital in the Sex Offender Treatment Program, pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code, section 6600 et seq.” They argued the rights provided under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5325 do not apply to non-LPS patients such as Seeboth, nor do they conflict with Regulations, title 9, sections 881 through 884. They asserted that DSH promulgates and enforces regulations governing SVPs pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 4005.1. And, under Welfare and 3. Institutions Code section 6600.05, in general, SVPs must be housed at DSH-Coalinga.2 They further alleged, “[t]o the extent that … Regulations, title 22, sections 73523 and 71507 conflict with … Regulations, title 9 section 881–884, the title 9 regulations control in this case because the subject matter of title 9 is more specific to DSH-Coalinga.” They also argued, “[e]ven if SVP patients have a right to unopened mail, that right must give way to DSH-Coalinga’s obligation to guard the ‘constitutionally protected liberty interest in safety’ of its patients and staff when mail is suspected of containing contraband.” Even if non-LPS patients such as Seeboth have a right to unopened correspondence, DSH should be allowed to continue x-raying and otherwise searching mail for contraband. They further noted that Seeboth failed “to allege any right to a writ of mandate and appears to have abandoned that claim in his Amended Petition.” In a rebuttal brief, Seeboth focused on the second sentence in Welfare and Institutions Code section 5325 which he alleged was “at the center of the controversy.” He asserted the language in this sentence, “Each person committed to a state Hospital shall also have the same rights” was added to this section and some of the limiting language as to who was covered was removed in 2012 pursuant to Senate Bill No. 1381, effective January 1, 2013. On reply, respondents again asserted Seeboth failed to demonstrate a right to declaratory relief because Welfare and Institutions Code section 5325 “was not intended to expand the application of that section to every individual committed to a state hospital.” Rather, “[t]he initial sentence of section 5325 limits the application of that section to those detained ‘under provisions of this part,’ and was not changed by the 2 Specifically, “Coalinga State Hospital shall be used whenever a person is committed to a secure facility for mental health treatment pursuant to [the Sexually Violent Predators Act] and is placed in a state hospital under the direction of the State Department of State Hospitals unless there are unique circumstances that would preclude the placement of a person at that facility.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600.05, subd. (a).) 4. amendment.” They also argued Seeboth’s argument that Regulations, title 9, section 884 violates his First Amendment rights fails because he could not show an injury-in-fact to prevail on this claim. They asserted “Seeboth contends that the current regulation could potentially be abused by denying ‘the right to have access to letter writing material and the right to receive any mail’ or ‘that personal letters can be read and censored, or to gather evidence of, the words and thoughts of a civil detainee.’ … But, critically, Seeboth does not allege that any of these events happened to him, and he therefore lacks standing for this claim.” They argued DSH is obligated to protect the safety of the residents of its state hospitals which requires it to take steps to prevent dangerous contraband from entering the state hospital. And “even if Seeboth is entitled to unopened mail, he is not entitled to mail that has not been x-rayed or otherwise inspected for contraband because such an entitlement would interfere with DSH’s statutory duty to ensure the safety of the staff and other patients at DSH-Coalinga. In an additional opposition, Seeboth asserted that Welfare and Institutions Code section 5325 applies to all patients committed at any state hospital rather than only to those patients committed under the LPS Act. Regarding respondents’ contention that giving patients unopened mail would “violate security and the safety of the hospital,” Seeboth states, “patients must open mail in front of staff or staff must open mail in front of patients, so that any contraband in the mail is immediately removed.” He further contends “any First Amendment claim that [he] made was not part of a request for Declaratory Relief.” The court sustained respondents’ demurrer to the amended petition without leave to amend. The court reasoned: “California Welfare and Institutions Code section 5325 affords involuntarily detained and voluntary patients the right ‘to mail and receive unopened correspondence.’ (Id., at subd. (e).) California Code of Regulations, title 9, section 884, subdivisions (b)(6)–(b) (7), provide that ‘[d]esignated facility employees shall open and inspect all incoming and 5.  outgoing mail [and packages] addressed to and from patients for contraband.’ The regulations describe the rights of non-LPS patients. Petitioner has confirmed that he is a non-LPS patient. The statute and the regulations do not appear to be in conflict as they apply to different populations. “Since the Amended Petition does not otherwise allege a controversy between Welfare and Institutions Code section 5325 and California Code of Regulations, title 9, section 884, the demurrer is sustained without leave to amend as to petitioner’s request for declaratory relief.” DISCUSSION I. STANDARD OF REVIEW “On appeal from a judgment dismissing an action after sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend, the standard of review is well settled. We give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.] Further, we treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citations.] When a demurrer is sustained, we determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. [Citation.] And when it is sustained without leave to amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse.” (City of Dinuba v. County of Tulare (2007) 41 Cal.4th 859, 865.) Said differently, “ ‘[i]n considering whether a demurrer should have been sustained, “we accept as true the well- pleaded facts in the operative complaint.” ’ ” (J.M. v. Illuminate Education, Inc. (2026) 19 Cal.5th 705, 711.) “[W]e examine the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory ….” (John’s Grill, Inc. v. The Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1003, 1013.) II. APPLICABLE LAW “ ‘In construing a statute, our task is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the enactment. [Citation.] We look first to the words of the 6. statute, which are the most reliable indications of the Legislature’s intent. [Citation.] We construe the words of a statute in context, and harmonize the various parts of an enactment by considering the provision at issue in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.’ [Citation.] ‘If the statutory language is unambiguous, then its plain meaning controls. If, however, the language supports more than one reasonable construction, then we may look to extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history.’ ” (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 83.) Welfare and Institutions Code section 4005.1 provides that “The State Department of State Hospitals … may adopt and enforce rules and regulations necessary to carry out their respective duties under this division.” Chapter 4.5 of title 9 of the Regulations “applies to patients’ rights and related procedures for all non-[LPS] patients placed in or committed to a treatment program in a Department of Mental Health facility, except when transferred to or placed in a federally certified program.” (Regs., tit. 9, § 880.) Regulations, chapter 4.5 (art. 1–3, §§ 880–892) became operative on July 4, 2003. Regulations, title 9, section 883 lists the non-deniable rights of non-LPS patients including but not limited to: “(6) A right to confidential case discussions, consultation, examination, and patient records. Confidential information shall only be provided to those people providing evaluation and/or treatment or as authorized by law. “(7) A right to be informed of the procedures for filing complaints and the process for appeals when complaints are not resolved to the patient’s satisfaction. “(8) A right to access the services of a Patients’ Rights Advocate. “(9) A right to confidential communications with an attorney, either through correspondence or through private consultation, during regularly scheduled visiting days and hours.” 7.  Regulations, title 9, section 884 lists the rights of non-LPS patients that are subject to denial for good cause, including: “(6) A right to have access to letter writing materials and to mail and receive correspondence. Designated facility employees shall open and inspect all incoming and outgoing mail addressed to and from patients for contraband. Confidential mail, as defined in Section 881(c), shall not be read. Limitations on size, weight and volume of mail shall be specified by formal facility policy. “(7) A right to receive packages. Designated facility employees shall open and inspect all incoming and outgoing packages addressed to and from patients for contraband. Limitations on the size, weight and volume, and frequency/number of packages allowed shall be specified by formal facility policy.” (Italics added) The LPS Act is “the primary statutory scheme for civilly committing those who are mentally ill.” (In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 16.) It is codified as chapters 1–7 of part 1 of division 5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code (§§ 5000–5579). Notably, Welfare and Institutions Code section 5002, subdivision (d) expressly states, “This part shall not be construed to repeal or modify laws relating to the commitment of mentally disordered sex offenders, persons with an intellectual disability, and mentally disordered criminal offenders, except as specifically provided in Section 4011.6 of the Penal Code, or as specifically provided in other statutes.” “ ‘The rights of involuntarily detained mentally disordered people in California are scrupulously protected by the [LPS Act].’ ” (In re Qawi, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 17.) “The LPS Act, in Article 7, confers rights on patients in two ways. First, it affirms that ‘[p]ersons with mental illness have the same legal rights and responsibilities guaranteed all other persons by the Federal Constitution and laws and the Constitution and laws of the State of California, unless specifically limited by federal or state law or regulations.’ ” (Ibid.) “Second, the LPS Act ‘specifies a nonexclusive list of rights including “[a] right to dignity, privacy and humane care” ([Welf. & Inst. Code,] § 5325.1, subd. (b)).’ ” (Ibid.) Specifically, article 7 of the LPS Act sets forth various rights of involuntary 8. mental patients in Welfare and Institutions Code sections 5325 and 5325.1. Welfare and Institutions Code, section 5325 provides in relevant part: “Each person involuntarily detained for evaluation or treatment under provisions of this part, and each person admitted as a voluntary patient for psychiatric evaluation or treatment to any health facility, as defined in Section 1250 of the Health and Safety Code, in which psychiatric evaluation or treatment is offered, shall have the following rights, a list of which shall be prominently posted in the predominant languages of the community and explained in a language or modality accessible to the patient in all facilities providing those services, and otherwise brought to his or her attention by any additional means as the Director of Health Care Services may designate by regulation. Each person committed to a state hospital shall also have the following rights, a list of which shall be prominently posted in the predominant languages of the community and explained in a language or modality accessible to the patient in all facilities providing those services and otherwise brought to his or her attention by any additional means as the Director of State Hospitals may designate by regulation: [¶] … [¶] “(e) To have ready access to letterwriting materials, including stamps, and to mail and receive unopened correspondence.” (Italics added.) The opening paragraph of Section 5325 was amended, effective June 27, 2012. (See Stats. 2012, ch. 34, § 85, eff. June 27, 2012 [Sen. Bill No. 1009]; see generally Stats. 2012, ch. 457, §§ 52, 68 [Sen. Bill No. 1381]; Stats. 2012, ch. 448, §§ 52, 68, 69 [Assem. Bill No. 2370].)3 3 Senate Bill No. 1381 and Assembly Bill No. 2370 were both aimed at deleting statutory references to “mental retardation” or “a mentally retarded person” and replacing this language with “intellectual disability” or “a person with an intellectual disability” without such changes being construed as substantive changes in law. (See, e.g., Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d Reading of Assem. Bill No. 2370 (2011- 2012 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 20, 2012, pp. 1-2; Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d Reading of Sen. Bill No. 1381 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) as amended April 10, 2012, pp. 1-2.) 9.  III. ANALYSIS Seeboth contends that Welfare and Institutions Code section 5325 was amended in 2012 to grant “[e]ach person committed to a state hospital” the same rights enumerated in section 5325, including the right to send and receive unopened correspondence. He contends Regulations, title 9, section 884, subdivision (b)(6) thus became invalid upon that revision of section 5325. He argues, “If the second sentence of the first paragraph of Welfare and Institutions Code … [section] 5325 … has any meaning, then all the committed patients at Coalinga State Hospital … have the rights enumerated in [section] 5325 including the right to send and receive unopened correspondence.” He contends, “That same theory applies to … Regulations … Title 22 [section] 71507 … and/or [section] 73523 … both of which grant patients the right to send and receive unopened correspondence,” which he asserts conflicts with Regulations, title 9, section 884, subdivision (b)(6). Respondents contend that “any right of SVP patients to send and receive mail is necessarily limited by Respondents’ constitutional obligation to maintain a secure environment at DSH-Coalinga.” They assert, as part of that obligation, they must develop and maintain a list of items deemed contraband and always monitor for contraband. They argue, “The rights enumerated by section 5325—including the right to unopened mail—apply only to individuals committed to a state hospital under the LPS Act, not to SVP patients such as Seeboth.” And the second sentence of that section “must be read in context with the sentence preceding it that specifically limits section 5325 to individuals ‘detained for evaluation or treatment under provisions of this part,’ meaning the LPS Act.” For the reasons that follow, we affirm the court’s order sustaining respondents’ demurrer. “ ‘A court must, where reasonably possible, harmonize statutes, reconcile seeming inconsistencies in them, and construe them to give force and effect to all of their provisions. [Citations.] This rule applies although one of the statutes involved deals 10. generally with a subject and another relates specifically to particular aspects of the subject.’ [Citation.] Thus, when ‘ “two codes are to be construed, they ‘must be regarded as blending into each other and forming a single statute.’ [Citation.] Accordingly, they ‘must be read together and so construed as to give effect, when possible, to all the provisions thereof.’ [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.] Further, ‘ “ ‘[a]ll presumptions are against a repeal by implication. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Absent an express declaration of legislative intent, we will find an implied repeal ‘only when there is no rational basis for harmonizing two potentially conflicting statutes [citation], and the statutes are “irreconcilable, clearly repugnant, and so inconsistent that the two cannot have concurrent operation.” ’ ” ’ ” (Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783, 805.) With these general principles of statutory interpretation in mind, the trial court did not err in concluding Seeboth failed to state a cause of action because section 5325 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, which is part of the LPS Act, and Regulations, title 9, section 884, which applies to non-LPS patients, are not in conflict. Courts have repeatedly differentiated between the characteristics and treatment of LPS conservatees and individuals committed as not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI’s), SVP’s, and mentally disordered offenders (MDO’s). (See People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1209, fn. 11 [directing court on remand to focus on NGI’s, MDO’s, and SVP’s in assessing equal protection claim because they “more closely resemble one another than they do those persons committed under the LPS Act”]; Conservatorship of E.B. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 986, 995 [“It is an ‘incontrovertible point’ that NGI’s, SVP’s and MDO’s do not share identical characteristics with LPS conservatees, who have not necessarily been convicted of a crime or found to be dangerous. [Citation.] Because of these differences, it is permissible to treat persons subject to other types of commitments differently from LPS conservatees in some respects.”]; see also People v. McKee, supra, at p. 1209, fn. 11 [“Although some committed under the LPS Act have been found incompetent to stand 11. trial on criminal charges [citation], they have not been definitively determined to have committed serious felonies, and in that respect differ from SVP’s, MDO’s, and NGI’s.”].) Indeed, these are separate systems of civil commitment, and the California Supreme Court has expressly held “different classes of individuals civilly committed need not be treated identically.” (People v. McKee, supra, at p. 1210; see In re Smith (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1251, 1268 [“the Legislature may separately classify ‘mentally ill persons against whom a judicial determination of criminal conduct has been made since such persons, at least initially, have demonstrated particular danger.’ [Citation.] … [T]he Legislature could legitimately conclude in the context of the SVP Act that any felonious criminal conduct would warrant a finding of greater danger and a separate classification. Individuals in prison with felony convictions have yet to demonstrate their capacity or willingness to keep their conduct within the bounds of the law and to break old criminal habits, and the Legislature could legitimately conclude that such felons who have prior sexually violent offenses represent a particular danger to society that justifies a separate system of civil commitment.”]; Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253 [“Although the LPS Act and the SVPA are both civil commitment statutes, the Legislature enacted these schemes with different purposes in mind.”].) While Seeboth asks us to assume the Legislature intended to expand the scope of section 5325 in amending its language in 2012, he points to no authority or legislative history to support his argument. Rather, the Legislature stated its intent in 2012 to delete statutory references to “mental retardation” or “a mentally retarded person” and replace this language with “intellectual disability” or “a person with an intellectual disability” without such changes being construed as substantive changes in law. (See, e.g., Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d Reading of Assem. Bill No. 2370 (2011- 2012 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 20, 2012, pp. 1–2; Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d Reading of Sen. Bill No. 1381 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.), as amended Apr. 10, 2012, pp. 1–2.) 12.  Seeboth has not established that the rights afforded individuals under the LPS Act apply to “[e]ach person committed to a state hospital” without limitation. Although Penal Code section 2972, subdivision (g) expressly provides that an MDO “shall be entitled to those rights set forth in Article 7 (commencing with Section 5325) of Chapter 2 of Part 1 of Division 5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code”, this section also provides that, “the State Department of Mental Health, or its successor, the State Department of State Hospitals, may adopt regulations to modify those rights as is necessary in order to provide for the reasonable security of the inpatient facility in which the patient is being held,” giving DSH the authority to modify the listed rights as to MDO’s. (Pen. Code, § 2972, subd. (g), italics added.) Notably, “[t]he SVPA contains no provision comparable to … Penal Code section 2972, subdivision (g), granting MDO’s the same rights as LPS patients.” (In re Calhoun (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1346.) And “[t]he SVPA’s omission of such a provision manifests a legislative intent to deny SVP’s the statutory right granted to … LPS patients, and MDO’s.” (Ibid.) “ ‘[I]f a statute on a particular subject omits a particular provision, inclusion of that provision in another related statute indicates an intent the provision is not applicable to the statute from which it was omitted.’ ” (Ibid., quoting In re Marquis D. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1813, 1827; see Hennigan v. United Pacific Ins. Co. (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 1, 8 [“The fact that a provision of a statute on a given subject is omitted from other statutes relating to a similar subject is indicative of a different legislative intent for each of the statutes.”].) Furthermore, “SVP ‘statutes are to be interpreted by assuming that the Legislature was aware of the existing law at the time of the enactment of the SVPA.’ ” (In re Calhoun, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1346; Peters v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 845, 850; see People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329 [Legislature “is deemed to be aware of statutes and judicial decisions already in existence, and to have enacted or amended a statute in light thereof”].) The SVPA was enacted in 1995 (Stats. 13. 1995, ch. 763, § 3, p. 5922), nine years after the enactment of Penal Code section 2972, subdivision (g) (Stats. 1986, ch. 858, § 7, p. 2955) and 14 years after the enactment of Welfare and Institutions Code section 5325 (Stats. 1981, ch. 841, § 2). “It follows that, if the Legislature had intended to grant SVP’s the right[s] of … LPS patients, and MDO’s … it would have expressly done so in the SVPA.” (In re Calhoun, supra, at pp. 1346– 1347.) However, the Legislature did not do so. Thus, Welfare and Institutions Code section 5325 and Regulations, title 9, section 884 can be harmonized such that they are not in conflict. (See Even Zohar Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 839, 838 [“all ‘ “ ‘ “presumptions are against a repeal by implication” ’ ” ’ [citation], including partial repeals that occur when one statute implicitly limits another statute’s scope of operation.”]; Schatz v. Allen Matkins Leck Gamble & Mallory LLP (2009) 45 Cal.4th 557, 573 [“ ‘ “we will find an implied repeal ‘only when there is no rational basis for harmonizing the two potentially conflicting statutes [citation], and the statutes are “irreconcilable, clearly repugnant, and so inconsistent that the two cannot have concurrent operation.” ’ ” ’ ”].) That is, the language of Welfare and Institutions Code section 5325, when read in the context of the broader statutory scheme and when construing and giving effect to all provisions of the Penal Code and California Code of Regulations, can be deemed to apply to patients committed pursuant to the LPS Act. And, even if Welfare and Institutions Code section 5325 can be deemed to apply to others, including Seeboth, there is no basis to conclude such rights are afforded to all patients without limitation. Rather, as discussed, Welfare and Institutions Code section 4005.1 expressly reserves the right of “[t]he State Department of State Hospitals, the State Department of Health Care Services, and the State Department of Social Services” to “adopt and enforce rules and regulations necessary to carry out their respective duties under this division.” And, “akin to prison administrators, CSH staff is ‘under an obligation to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the [patients]’ and ‘must 14. be ever alert to attempts to introduce … contraband into the premises ….’ ” (People v. Golden (2017) 19 Cal.App.5th 905, 912.) Thus, DSH is entitled to adopt regulations, such as Regulations, title 9, section 884, that it deems necessary to ensure the safety of patients and to limit the introduction of contraband to the premises. (See People v. Golden, supra, at p. 912 [“ ‘We are satisfied that society would insist that [an SVP’s] expectation of privacy always yield to what must be considered the paramount interests in institutional security [and rehabilitation].’ ”) We also conclude Regulations, title 9, not title 22, governs plaintiff’s rights. Title 22 provides a regulatory framework applicable to patients at different facilities including intermediate care facilities. An “ ‘Intermediate Care Facility’ means a health facility, or a distinct part of a hospital or skilled nursing facility, which provides the following basic services: Inpatient care to patients who have need for skilled nursing supervision and need supportive care, but who do not require continuous nursing care.” (Regs., tit. 22, § 73051.) Regulations, title 22, section 73523 applies to intermediate care facilities and it provides that “the facility shall ensure that these rights are not violated” (id. at subd. (a)) including, the right “[t]o associate and communicate privately with persons of the patient’s choice, and to send and receive his or her personal mail unopened” (id. at subd. (a)(14)). Regulations, title 22, section 71507 applies to acute psychiatric hospitals and it provides rights of patients, including the right “[t]o have ready access to letter writing materials, including stamps, and to mail and receive unopened correspondence.” (Id. at subd. (a)(5).) As discussed, Regulations, title 9, section 884 falls under the chapter of the California Code of Regulations related to “Patients’ Rights and Related Procedures for Non-Lanterman-Petris-Short Act Patients in Department of Mental Health Facilities.” Under title 9, “ ‘[n]on-LPS’ ” refers to placement in a facility pursuant to legal authority other than the LPS Act (Regs., tit. 9, § 881, subd. (o).) Thus, title 9 governs a non-LPS patient’s rights. (Regs., tit. 9, § 884 [entitled “Non-LPS Patients’ Rights”].) Because 15. Seeboth is an SVP detained under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 et seq., he is a non-LPS patient whose rights are set forth in Regulations title 9, not title 22. For all these reasons, we conclude the court did not err in sustaining the demurrer to Seeboth’s amended petition for declaratory relief. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. FRANSON, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR: SNAUFFER, J. DE SANTOS, J. 16.